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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
IMPROVING CIVIL JURY DECISION-MAKING: EVIDENTIARY AND
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

by
Julian A. Gilbert
Florida International University, 2006
Miami, Florida
Professor Kevin O'Neil, Major Professor

The civil jury has been under attack in recent years for being unreliable and
incompetent. Considering the myriad causes for poor civil juror decision-making, the
current investigation explores both procedural and evidentiary issues that impact juror's
decisions. Specifically, the first phase of this dissertation examines how jurors (mis)use
evidence pertaining to the litigants when determining liability and awarding damages.
After investigating how jurors utilize evidence, the focus shifts to exploring the utility of
procedural reforms designed to improve decision-making (specifically revising the
instructions on the laws in the case and bifurcating the damage phases of the trial). Using
the results from the first two phases of the research, the final study involves manipulating

pieces of evidence related to the litigants while exploring the effects that revising the
judicial instructions have on the utilization of evidence in particular and on decisionmaking in general.
This dissertation was run on-line, allowing participants to access the study
materials at their convenience. After giving consent, participants read the scenario of a

fictitious product liability case with the litigant manipulations incorporated into the
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summary. Participants answered several attitudinal, case-specific, and comprehension
questions, and were instructed to find in favor of one side and award any damages they
felt warranted. Exploratory factor analyses, Probit and linear regressions, and path
analyses were used to analyze the data (M-plus and SPSS were the software packages

used to conduct the analyses). Results indicated that misuse of evidence was fairly
frequent, though the mock jurors also utilized evidence appropriately. Although the
results did not support bifurcation as a viable procedural reform, revising the judicial
instructions did significantly increase comprehension rates. Trends in the data suggested
that better decision-making occurred when the revised instructions were used, thus
providing empirical support for this procedural reform as a means of improving civil jury
decision-making. Implications for actual trials and attorneys are discussed.
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Introduction

The jury can be regarded as the zenith of American jurisprudence-the marquee
of justice designed to protect the innocent and lay blame or responsibility to wrongdoers.

More than that though, the jury is perhaps the only mechanism of democracy besides
voting that so decisively places decision-making responsibilities in the hands of everyday
people. This year alone, over four million Americans will perform a civic duty by

participating in one of the oldest traditions in the history of our legal system, jury service
(Arizona Supreme Court, 2002). Although the vast majority of these four million
Americans will be seated on criminal juries, hundreds of thousands of individuals will
assume the role of civil jurors each year. Jury service both educates the public and
legitimates the justice system. As Alexis De Tocqueville wrote in 1835:

"Juries, especially civil juries, instill some of the habits of the
judicial mind into every citizen, and just these habits are the very best way

of preparing people to be free... [The jury] should be regarded as a free
school which is always open and in which every juror learns his
rights...and is given practical lessons in the law...I do not know whether a
jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure that it is very good for those
who have to decide the case" (quoted in Hans, 2000, p.225).

In civil tort litigation, injured people seek redress by filing a lawsuit against the
person or entity that they believe is responsible for their injuries. At these times, ordinary
people playing the unordinary role of jurors are asked to resolve these legal claims. The
first fundamental duty of the jury in civil litigation is determining liability (i.e., each
party's respective responsibility for the injuries and harm in question). The second major

duty of the civil jury, assuming they found the defendant at least partially liable, is
determining damages. Damages are designed either to compensate the victim (i.e.,
compensatory damages) or to punish the wrongdoer (i.e., punitive damages).
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As a result of carrying out these duties, horizontal inequities sometimes arise,
particularly with respect to damage awards (Saks, Hollinger, Wissler, Evans, & Hart,

1997). Horizontal inequities occur when different juries judging similar cases (in terms of
the claims, the evidence, the severity of the injury, etc.) produce disproportionately
variable and different verdicts (liability or damage awards). One frequently discussed
cause of horizontal inequities is jurors' lack of comprehension of judicial instructions.
The current project consists of three studies designed to: (1) explore causes of horizontal
inequities in liability and damage award assessments, (2) revise judicial instructions in an
attempt to increase juror comprehension rates, and (3) test whether revising instructions

moderates the effect of procedural and evidentiary manipulations, ultimately reducing
horizontal inequities.
Chapter One introduces background material on the legal concepts of negligence,
products liability, and damage awards. Chapter Two focuses on some of the perceived

problems with the civil jury system, particularly horizontal inequities in verdicts, and
details if those concerns are supported in the empirical research. Chapter Three deals with
some of the proposed reforms designed to minimize horizontal inequities in civil jury
decision-making, specifically concentrating on revised judicial instructions and
bifurcation. Chapters Four though Six detail the three studies that compose the current

proposal. Chapter Seven consists of a general discussion, including potential limitations
and general implications for the project as a whole.
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Chapter One: Legal background material

Before getting into the legal concepts of negligence and products liability, I will
touch briefly on why a products liability case was chosen for this project. Products
liability is a controversial and important field of law because it cuts across many
fundamental issues in society. Products liability can be viewed as a test of the private
industry's ability to balance competitiveness and safety, a test of the fairness and

functioning of the tort system, and a test of the jury system as a method of dispute
resolution (Phillips, 1998). As Phillips (1998) states, "it is not inappropriate to view the
law of products liability as a microcosm and a distillation of the entire system of civil
litigation" (p. 302). Products liability law is big business, amounting to over 40,000 cases
annually (National Center for State Courts, 2004).

As prior research demonstrates, products liability is a complex legal topic, so
comprehension rates tend to be low and horizontal inequities frequent. Also, laws
governing products liability offer several ways of measuring liability (e.g., manufacturing
defect, design defect, and failure to want). Determining whether a product is defective is

one of the more difficult decisions within products liability. The inherent difficulties in
determining design defects may promote the inappropriate use of evidence by jurors.
Research using products liability cases routinely find that jurors misuse evidence (e.g.
Greene, Woody, and Winter (2000) found that defendant conduct inappropriately
influenced compensatory damage awards). Since the misuse of evidence is common
when dealing with products liability, there clearly is room for improving jury decision-

making in these cases. Moreover, judicial instructions in such cases contain difficult legal
concepts and standards that make comprehension rates suffer but are ideal for revision.
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Finally, choosing a products liability scenario involving a design defect allows
examination of factors that impact corporate defendants, particularly exploring how
liability and damage awards are properly or improperly determined.
Negligence andproducts liability

The tort concept of negligence can arise in numerous ways in a products liability
case-through inadequate inspection, packaging, warning, marketing, or (relevant to this

investigation) design of a product (Phillips, 1998). Negligence is the failure to use
reasonable care, which is the degree of care that a reasonably careful person would
exercise under similar circumstances. Negligence may consist of either doing something

that a reasonably careful person would not do under similar circumstances or failing to do
something that a reasonably careful person would do under similar circumstances. The
legal concept of negligence is rather complex. The tort of negligence contains four
distinct elements: (1) duty: did the defendant owe the plaintiff a duty to confonn his

conduct to a standard necessary to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm to others? (2)
breach: did the defendant's conduct, whether by act or omission, fall below the

applicable standard of care set by law? (3) causation:was the defendant's failure to meet
that standard of care causally connected to the plaintiff's harm? and (4) damages: did the

plaintiff suffer harm (Epstein, 1998)? Of particular interest when discussing whether the
defendant was negligent is the second of the above questions; that is, did the defendant
engage in conduct that "falls below the standard established by the law for the protection
of others against unreasonable risk of harm" (American Law Institute, 1979, §282). The
standard established by law is that which a "reasonable person under like circumstances"
(American Law Institute, 1979, §283) would do-this "reasonableness" standard is
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defined in terms of a CBA (cost-benefit analysis) or a risk-utility analysis. Both the

plaintiff and the defendant may be negligent, though the present research does not focus
on a plaintiff's contributory negligence. Overall, and most important, whether this
standard of care has been breached should be determined solely by jurors' judgments
about the reasonableness of the litigant's behavior.

Phillips (1998) describes how the concept of negligence can relate to a products
liability claim. He states that the manufacturer of a product is negligent "if the
manufacturer fails to use a reasonable amount of care, skill and diligence in designing
and supplying the product that a reasonably careful manufacturer would use in similar
circumstances to avoid exposing others to a foreseeable risk of harm" (p. 39). A
manufacturer must reasonably anticipate the environment in which its product is
normally used and must design the product to minimize foreseeable risks of harm
resulting from using the product in such an environment. However, the manufacturer is
not required to design a product that is foolproof or incapable of producing injury-this is
not necessary in proving that a manufacturer was negligent. To prove that a manufacturer
was negligent, the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care
in designing its product and that this breach of duty was the proximate cause of the

plaintiffs injuries. Proximate cause means not only that there was a connection between
the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant and the plaintiff's injuries but also that the
occurrence responsible for producing those injuries was a natural and probable result of
the defendant's negligent conduct (Epstein, 1998).

Separate from the issue of negligence, a manufacturer may also be held liable for
consumer injuries under theories of products liability. A product is usually thought of as
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tangible personal property (though product liability has extended beyond tangible goods
to include things such as electricity). Significantly influenced by Justice Traynor's
concurring opinion in Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1944), products liability was
traditionally governed by strict liability standards in order to protect consumers.

Traynor's opinion became the dominant view when the American Law Institute
incorporated general principles of strict liability into section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (§402A) focused on
manufacturers' liability, particularly concentrating on manufacturers' market power and
their ability to internalize the costs of accidents associated with their products (Epstein,

1998). Under the Second Restatement, the seller of a product may be strictly liable for
harm caused to the consumer if the product is "unreasonably dangerous to the user"

(§402A). A product is considered unreasonably dangerous if it is "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics"

(American Law Institute, 1979, §402A comment g). This standard was held for products
liability cases involving manufacturing flaws and design defects.
In 1997, the American Law Institute adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts:

Products Liability. Section 2 divides product defects into manufacturing flaws, design
defects and inadequate warnings or instructions. Thus, modern products liability claims
expanded to explicitly separate failure/duty to warn and design defect cases from the
traditional manufacturing defect cases. Strict liability is still imposed for manufacturing
flaws. A product is considered to have a manufacturing or production flaw when the
product differs from its intended design even though a reasonable amount of care was

used when preparing and marketing the product. The factual elements of a manufacturer
defect claim are: 1) the product contained a defect when it left the manufacturer's
possession, 2) the product was used in a manner reasonably foreseeable to the
manufacturer, 3) harmed was caused by the use of the product, and 4) the manufacturer's
defect was a substantial factor in causing that harm. Liability for design defects and
failure to warn is typically imposed for "foreseeable risks of harm" that could have been
avoided by the adoption of a "reasonable alternative design" or "reasonable instructions
or warning," and the non-use or omission of the design or warning "renders the product

not reasonably safe" (American Law Institute, 1997, §2).
Since this dissertation only examines design defects, the focus will shift to that
specific type of products liability claim. Under the most recent Restatement's definition,

deciding whether a design defect exists might require a risk-benefit analysis examining if
the cost of making an alternative, safer product is greater or less than the risk of danger
from the product in its present condition. Many courts incorporate the idea of a costbenefit analysis (CBA) into the standard for determining whether a product is defective.

This incorporation of CBAs into design defect theories is highlighted by the changing
standards used by courts in determining the existence of a design defect (e.g., Did failure
to use a reasonable alternative design make the product "not reasonably safe?"). Thus, the
prevailing standard for determining liability for a product defect is whether the product
was "not reasonably safe" (as opposed to the older standard of "unreasonably
dangerous").

As noted previously, "reasonableness" is defined in terms of a CBA or a riskutility analysis. Since the prevailing product liability standard now incorporates

7

"reasonableness," it therefore involves a form of a cost-benefit analysis. That is, the "not

reasonably safe" standard for determining if a product is defective implies that the jury
finds the defendant liable if they deternine the risk of danger inherent in the challenged

design outweighs the benefits of the design. Here, the jury might engage in a CBA by
considering the likelihood of danger associated with the challenged design or the
feasibility of a reasonable alternative design (Epstein, 1998).
In sum, the conduct of the defendant in designing and distributing the product is
the fundamental consideration the jury must bear in mind when determining liability.
Assuming that the jury does find the defendant liable for the wrongdoing, the next key

decision they make entails damage awards.
Typology of damage awards
Compensatory damages

Damage awards may be compensatory or punitive. Compensatory damages are
generally intended to compensate the injured person, to return that person to pre-injury

levels of functioning, or to replace the loss caused by the injury (to the extent that money
can do so; American Law Institute, 1979, §901). Thus, compensatory damages focus on
the injured party. In other words, compensatory damages are plaintiff-focused, meaning
that the jury is supposed to focus exclusively on the needs of the plaintiff and the severity

of the plaintiff's injury in an attempt to return the injured person to his or her pre-injury
levels of functioning (Anderson & MacCoun, 1999). Jurors are therefore supposed to
focus solely on the nature, extent and duration of the injury when determining
compensatory damages.
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Compensatory damages are typically divided into economic and non-economic
damages (also referred to as pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages). Economic damages

refer to any financial costs the plaintiff encounters as a result of the injury. This typically
includes past and future income, past and future medical expenses, or funeral costs if
applicable. Non-economic damages, sometimes generically described as pain and

suffering, are designed to compensate

the victim for any injury to the "intangible,

subjective state of the plaintiffs life" (Vidmar, 1995, p. 186). These damages may entail
physical pain and disfigurement, emotional distress (such as fear, anxiety or depression),
the lost enjoyment of life, loss of mental faculties, and loss of consortium or
companionship (marital or otherwise).
Punitive damages
Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, are designed to punish the
defendant for egregious conduct and to deter the defendant, as well as others, from
engaging in similar misconduct in the future (Owen, 1994). Jurors are typically instructed
that they may award punitive damages if they find that the defendant acted in a reckless,
malicious, willful or wanton manner. Conduct is reckless if done carelessly and with
gross disregard for the consequences. Conduct is malicious if prompted or accompanied
by ill will or gross indifference to the rights of others. An act is willful if done voluntarily
and intentionally and with specific intent to commit said act. An act is wanton if done in
careless disregard to the rights of others (Melsheimer & Stodghill, 1994). Nearly all
states allow for punitive damages, and approximately 60 federal statues permit the
awarding of punitive damages (Greene & Bornstein, 2003). However, wide variation
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exists between jurisdictions regarding the definition of and instructions on punitive

damages.
Punitive damages are defendant-focused (Anderson & MacCoun, 1999). In other
words, the jury should determine an amount for punitive damages that will effectively
punish the defendant, deter the defendant, and/or make an example out of the defendant.

In determining an appropriate amount for punitive damages, jurors should consider the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the wealth of the defendant (in order for
the award to have a deterrent effect). Also, the Supreme Court, in State Farm Insurance
Co. v. Campbell (2003), instructed that courts consider the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff when determining an appropriate sum for punitive damages.

Although they are not awarded very frequently, punitive damages have captured a great
deal of attention in the media (due to some atypical anecdotal cases such as the infamous
McDonald's coffee-spill case). Moreover, punitive damages are a frequent point of
contention surrounding the civil jury, particularly for being unpredictable and highly
variable.

10

Chapter Two: Critiques of the civil jury
The jury system under attack
Despite the jury system's importance in American jurisprudence, it has been
under attack for many years. Over one hundred years ago, one critic denounced the jury

as 12 people of average ignorance (Spencer, c1902). Another anonymous commentator
asked, "How would you like your fate decided by twelve people who weren't smart
enough to get out of jury duty?" (cited in Shuman & Champagne, 1997). Even the famed
writer Mark Twain called the jury "the most ingenious and infallible agency for defeating
justice that wisdom could contrive" (cited in Wrightsman, Greene, Nietzel, & Fortune,

2002). The civil jury in particular has been the subject of recent vilification. As Vidmar
(1998) notes, "so many writings, both scholarly and journalistic, have been devoted to
criticizing the institution of the civil jury that it becomes boring to recite the claims" (p.
849). Vidmar states that civil juries have been criticized for being unreliable,

unpredictable, incompetent, biased, sympathy-prone, confused, hostile to wealthy and
corporate defendants, and excessively generous to plaintiffs. Yet, as Hans (2000) astutely
points out, little of the debate surrounding the jury's ability to arrive at appropriate
damage awards has been influenced by careful study, experimentation and analysis.
Flashy anecdotes that capture widespread media attention serve to fuel the

condemnation of the American civil jury system. For instance, critics are quick to point to
the well-known coffee spill case involving McDonald's to demonstrate the outrageous,
irrational and unjust institution that is the civil jury. In Leibeck v. McDonald's Corp., the
jury found in favor of the plaintiff, Ms. Leibeck, who had burned herself badly when she

spilled some coffee on herself and awarded her 2.7 million dollars in punitive damages
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(most people do not know that the trial judge later reduced this initial award to $480,000;

Hoole, 1996).
Much of the general public could not fathom how or why the jury would find for a
woman who should have known that the coffee would be quite hot and could easily cause

bums if spilled. What most of general public never knew was that Ms. Liebeck had to be
hospitalized for seven days as a result of the severe burns and was required to undergo
painful skin grafts as part of the treatment. Most of the general public also never knew
that McDonald's served their coffee hotter than any other restaurant, that McDonald's
had received over 700 other reports of excessively hot coffee and resultant burns, and that

McDonald's already paid out more than $500,000 in settling claims. The general public
was also not told that corporate management refused to alter their practices in order to

make the coffee safer for its customers or that McDonald's continually turned down Ms.
Leibeck's attempts to settle, offering her only $800 (which did not even cover the cost of
the medical bills). In addition, most people never found out that the large award given to
Ms. Leibeck was only equal to 1-2 days' coffee sales for the fast food chain (Hoole,
1996). Given these considerations, perhaps the jury deciding the case was not being
irrational or unjust at all. Such ostentatious anecdotes nourish the public perception that

civil juries are irrational bodies unfit to decide the cases on which they are seated. But
whether or not civil juries are acting rationally and are being influenced by the proper
evidence are empirical questions that should be examined through research.
Competence of civil juries and horizontal inequities

Particularly in the last quarter of the

2 01h

century, the civil jury has been derogated

for being (among other things) unpredictable, biased and incompetent, resulting in
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damage awards that are highly variable and too large (i.e., horizontal inequities; Vidmar,
1998). Thus, a focal point of the debate surrounding the civil jury system is concern that
juries are not competent enough to carry out their duties. That similar cases may result in
different verdicts on liability or damage awards fuels criticism that juries are too
incompetent or inept to carry out their duties. Yet, the legal system accepts some degree

of inequity in verdicts. Indeed, some horizontal inequity is inevitable given the nature of
the jury system. As Vidmar (1998) states, "human variability is inherent in the task
assigned to the jury" (p. 876).
Conceptual causes of inequities
Juries are a measure of community sentiment; they are the conscience of the

community composed of a group of unique, individual jurors. As such, each juror's
attitudes, background, and personality attributes are likely to influence perceptions of the
evidence and consequently jury decisions. Each individual juror's idiosyncratic
differences affect how that juror interprets evidence, listens to the judge and the

attorneys, evaluates the litigants, and so on. For example, jurors will differ in their
determinations of a witness's credibility or believability. Ultimately, individual
differences among jurors influence verdict preferences. One study found that five of the
ten demographic characteristics and eight of the nine attitudes measured were

significantly related to liability preferences (Diamond et al., 1998). Therefore juror
verdicts will inevitably vary across similar cases given the idiosyncratic differences of the
jurors.
Variance in verdicts is also produced because of the nature of the task facing
jurors. Deciding a verdict is a conceptually difficult and complex task. Each unique case
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is composed of specific pieces of evidence (e.g., defendant's recklessness, extent of
harm) and case features (e.g., lawyer's recommendations, size of corporate defendant).

Given that different jurors may react to different pieces of evidence or case features, any
of these specific features or factors of the case may contribute to variability in verdicts,

whether they are supposed to (e.g., recklessness of defendant conduct) or not (e.g.,
corporate vs. individual defendant). Complex cases, such as a products liability claim
where both negligence and design defect are issues, likely exacerbate variability in

verdicts. Similarly, cases involving large quantities of evidence and complicated
testimony will increase the amount of evidence and variability in the resulting verdicts.
In general, jurors are often asked to consider large amounts of confusing evidence
and conflicting testimony. For instance, experts offer widely differing monetary estimates
of losses and even experienced claims adjusters show great variability in their valuations

of damages (Vidmar, 1998). Jurors also have difficulty when asked to estimate the
magnitude of damages on a scale that is not limited (Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein,
1998). For instance, two jurors might differ significantly in their translation of punitive
intent into monetary values. That is, two jurors may be equally upset with the defendant

and believe punitive damages are warranted, but the two will likely differ in the actual
amount awarded (even if they are roughly comparable in their desire to punish the

defendant). Indeed, one study revealed a significant degree of variability produced
primarily by large (and possibly meaningless) individual differences in the translation of
punitive intent into dollar values (Kahneman et al., 1998). Given the complex nature of
the task assigned to jurors, variation in verdicts across similar cases arises.
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Legal causes of inequities
In addition to the conceptual reasons for variability in verdicts across similar
cases, there are causes of horizontal inequities derived from legally dictated procedures.
Jurors may have particular difficulty in determining certain components of compensatory
and punitive damages. For instance, if there is a record of past medical expenses one

could easily demonstrate how much was spent on hospital and doctors' bills, medicine,
therapies and rehabilitation due to the injury. However, the situation is complicated when
it involves those who are self-employed or stay-at-home spouses (Greene & Bornstein,
2003). The situation is also more complex and controversial when dealing with future
losses, where jurors must forecast future medical expenses, available job opportunities
and advancements, projected life expectancies, and even inflation and interest rates.

These anticipations are laden with uncertainty and very difficult to forecast.
Determining non-economic damages is even more confusing and uncertain than

deciding economic damages. Non-economic damages clearly involve both social and
psychological components and, because they are often hidden from plain view, may be

particularly difficult to quantify (Wissler, Evans, Hart, Morry, & Saks, 1997). How does
one estimate or measure pain and suffering? Imagine putting a price tag on a partner's
companionship or having to determine how much the infliction of embarrassment or
depression should cost. One study revealed twice the variability in damage awards for
pain and suffering than for economic damages (Diamond et al., 1998). Punitive damages
are also wrought with uncertainty and vilified for their unpredictable nature. Critics claim

that the determination of punitive damages is essentially random and that few guidelines
are given to jurors regarding these determinations (Greene & Bornstein, 2003). Also,
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most people do not know what a given dollar amount would do, or mean to, a particular
defendant (especially a corporation; Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, 1998).
The inherent variation in verdicts is exacerbated by the ambiguous and vague
guidance provided to jurors concerning their verdicts. That is, jurors are expected to face

a conceptually difficult and amorphous task without clear, comprehensible instructions
(particularly with respect to damage awards). Research indicates that jurors are
notoriously bad at comprehending judicial instructions (e.g., Greene & Bornstein, 2000).
Failure to comprehend judicial instructions contributes to jurors' inappropriate

consideration of evidence and extralegal factors and increases the likelihood of horizontal
inequities in verdicts. Jurors are expected to rely only on the appropriate evidence and to
disregard irrelevant information (i.e., extralegal factors). Some of these factors are
completely extralegal (e.g., defendant status or appearance) while other factors may be

occasionally extralegal (e.g., defendant wealth only should be considered when deciding
punitive damages). If jurors cannot understand the instructions dictating the use (or
admonishing the misuse) of such factors, how can they make decisions in accordance
with the law? Providing jurors with broad discretion and little guidance allows jurors to
operate in an unrestrained manner (Melsheimer & Stodghill, 1994). The vague,
unintelligible guidance encourages jurors to rely on their own personal biases, prejudices

and whims when determining liability or damage awards, which can cause horizontal
inequities in verdicts (Greene & Bornstein, 2003). When jurors are left to their own

devices to provide the appropriate amount for damage estimates, individual differences
result in unpredictable variation, reflecting a rational response to ambiguity (Diamond et

al., 1998).
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Since researchers will never identify the myriad causes of horizontal inequities in

liability and damage award verdicts, it is impossible to adequately account for them, let
alone eliminate them. Also, given the individual differences of jury members and the
uniqueness of each case, it is unreasonable to expect that two cases, no matter how
similar they are to each other, will result in exact same outcome. Therefore, the criticism

about horizontal inequities more realistically concerns the degree of inequity (statistically
speaking, the amount of variance) rather than the existence of any inequity.

Consequently, studies examining horizontal inequities, such as this dissertation, are
concerned with the feasible tasks of identifying and reducing variability rather than the

impossible task of eliminating it.
There have been a number of suggestions, both specific and broad, made in the
literature regarding reducing horizontal inequities in verdicts. Specific recommendations
include using less variable punishment ratings for punitive damages rather than highly
variable estimates of actual dollar awards (the punitive ratings could be translated to a
monetary value by the court according to some pre-determined standard; Kahneman et

al., 1998). Another possibility is to provide guidance to jurors either in the form of upper
or lower dollar limits that could be imposed for damage awards or by giving jurors a set
of comparable cases with the associated dollar values awarded in those instances (both of
these have met with some success in reducing inequity; see Saks et al., 1997).
A broad suggestion designed to reduce horizontal inequities not yet empirically

explored is revising judicial instructions, which is a focal point of the current project.
Poor comprehension of judicial instructions may lead to the consideration of extralegal
factors or the misuse of evidence when determining verdicts. For instance, jurors'
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confusion concerning important legal concepts such as "negligence" or "proximate
cause" may result in similar cases reaching varied liability verdicts. Moreover, the
ambiguous guidance given to jurors allows individual preferences to dictate damage

awards rather than the appropriate considerations of evidence. Therefore, revising judicial
instructions may help reduce inequity in verdicts and improve civil jury decision-making
by increasing

juror competence through both improved

comprehension of legal concepts

and the utilization of the appropriate pieces of evidence. Empirical investigations, such as
this one, are needed to explore this possibility. Before discussing the literature on juror
comprehension of instructions, however, I discuss the extant research on factors that

improperly influence jurors' decisions. These factors are variables whose influence
should be reduced when jurors better comprehend instructions. Given the plethora of
these variables, the current investigation only attempts to systematically examine some of

the following variables.
Completely extralegal factors
Litigant characteristics:juror-litigantsimilarity, race and gender. Although

jurors should not be influenced by their similarity to the litigants, some research suggests
that juror-litigant similarity affects verdicts. Notably, the vast majority of the research on
juror similarity deals with criminal cases (and therefore the similarity of the defendant to

the jurors). Nonetheless, a small amount of research has examined juror-litigant
similarity. For instance, Stephan (1974) found that mock jurors tended to favor plaintiffs
&

of their own gender. The similarity-leniency hypothesis (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson,

Weathers, 1995) proposes, in the context of civil damage cases, that more lucrative

awards will be given to plaintiffs who are similar to the jurors. Indeed, plaintiffs'
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&

attorneys often attempt to select jurors similar in some way to their clients (Greene

Bornstein, 2003). Alternatively, some psychologists point to the black sheep effect (BSE;
Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) to explain why, in certain cases, litigants who are
similar to the jurors actually receive harsher treatment (Taylor & Mettee, 1971). Here,
positively viewed in-group members (i.e., those defendants or plaintiffs similar to the
jurors) are viewed more favorably than out-group members (i.e., those dissimilar to the

jurors), but negatively viewed in-group members are viewed less favorably than outgroup members. Thus, whether or not the litigant is similar to the jurors (i.e., in is their
in-group) may help or hurt the litigant, depending on how that litigant's behavior reflects
on the in-group. Recent research, in the context of actual criminal cases, found no support
for either the similarity-leniency hypothesis or the black sheep effect (Taylor & Hosch,

2004).
Two ways that jurors discern how similar they are to the litigants are the obvious
demographic characteristics of race and gender. Research on the plaintiff race indicates
that race does affect civil jury verdicts. Using archival data, Chin and Peterson (1985)
found that African American plaintiffs received lower damage awards compared to

Caucasian plaintiffs. However, several hypotheses may account for this finding. African
Americans may retain less competent attorneys or they may not able to attain expert
economists to testify about the extent of losses suffered. Also, African Americans may
have lower incomes so their requests for compensatory damages may be lower than
Caucasians (Vidmar, 1994). These alternatives might account for the apparent

discrimination against African American plaintiffs. Of course, it is also possible that there
is some racial bias against African American plaintiffs. For defendants, there is some
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evidence that race influences damage awards, with African American defendants being
&

required to pay somewhat less than Caucasian defendants for similar injuries (Chin

Peterson, 1985). However, this may simply be a reflection of the differences among
plaintiffs who sue Caucasian versus African American defendants, such as their income

level (Chase, 1995).
Research also demonstrates that litigant gender may adversely impact civil jury
decisions. Research on plaintiff gender suggests that women are disadvantaged in civil
cases (e.g., Goodman, Greene, and Loftus, 1989). Archival data indicates that not only do
male plaintiffs tend to receive higher awards than their female counterparts but also

husbands who sue for losses related to their wives' injuries tend to collect more than
wives suing for losses related to their husbands' injuries. That is, men collect more

money for their own injuries as well as for injuries to their spouses (Greene & Bornstein,
2003). One likely explanation for this finding is that women either hold lower paying
jobs or they get paid less than their male counterparts. However, this should mean women

who sue on behalf on their injured husbands should be getter more money than men suing
for their injured wives, though the data suggest otherwise.
Further demonstrating a gender bias, Goodman, Loftus, Miller and Greene (1991)
examined 98 wrongful-death suits between 1984 and 1988. The mean and range of
awards were greater when the deceased was male as compared to female, suggesting that

civil juries pay attention to gender. In order to further explore the findings from archival
data in experimental studies, Goodman and her colleagues (1989) varied certain facts,
including gender, in one of three wrongful death lawsuits while keeping other facts
constant (the deceased was married, self-employed, and earned $25,000 a year). Across
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all three cases, survivors of female decedents were awarded only 58% of what survivors
of male decedents were given. The mean award was $788,000 when the deceased was

male but only $458,000 when the deceased was female (Goodman et al., 1989). When the
researchers examined the mock jurors' written explanations of their awards, they found
that jurors were significantly more likely to consider factors such as salary increases and
the effects of inflation and investment potential when the deceased was male than when
female. When the deceased was female, mock jurors simply picked a number that seemed

fair (Goodman et al., 1989).
Juror personality and attitudes. It is inevitable that jurors' attitudes and

personality attributes will influence their perception of the evidence and ultimately jury
decisions. The important question then is whether or not juror attitudes and personality
influence perceptions of the evidence accordingly. Do the attitudes have a direct effect on

verdict, such that the effect of the attitudes is independent of the effect of the evidence in
the case? Or are there indirect effects, such that the attitudes affect how jurors interpret

the evidence, which in turn influences verdicts (i.e., the effect of attitudes is mediated by
the evidence)? Or are there interactions between attitudes and evidence, such that
attitudes influence the weight jurors assign to evidence? Court decisions imply that

attitudes should not have a direct effect on verdict if jurors are following the law (O'Neil,
Patry, & Penrod, 2004), and thus any such effects would be "extralegal." Nonetheless,
criminal jury decision-making research suggests that certain dispositions, such as
authoritarianism, belief in a just world, and locus of control may influence criminal jury
verdicts (e.g., Narby, Cutler, & Moran, 1993). Other criminal jury research found
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evidence of large direct effects of death-penalty attitudes on sentencing verdicts in capital
cases (O'Neil et al., 2004).
What about the effect of attitudinal factors in civil cases? Since the law is less
clear regarding the role of attitudes in civil cases, one might anticipate direct effects of
attitudes on verdicts. Therefore research might focus on the magnitude of such direct

effects, as well as how those attitudes influence interpretations of evidence. Hans and
Lofquist (1992; 1994) asked actual jurors questions related to the legitimacy of civil
lawsuits and the size of damage awards. Collectively, these questions were designed to
measure what Hans and Lofquist referred to as litigation-crisis attitudes. They found that
many of the jurors they interviewed thought the civil justice system was in trouble. Most

believed that there were too many lawsuits, people were too quick to sue, and that
damage awards were too high. Not surprisingly, Hans and Lofquist (1992) also found that
these litigation-crisis attitudes were negatively correlated with damage awards (r = -.54)
such that the stronger the jurors perceived a litigation crisis, the lower were the
determinations of damage awards. Other research found evidence of effects of attitudes

toward tort reform on damage award assessments, such that jurors who favored tort
reform gave lower damage awards (Greene, Goodman, & Loftus, 1991; Hastie, Schkade,
& Payne, 1999). Prior research has not investigated if the total effect of attitudes is
mediated by perceptions of the evidence or whether attitudes moderate the effect of

evidence.
Defendant status. An extralegal factor that has been well studied is defendant
status as a corporation or an individual. There is a widely held perception that juries treat
&

individual defendants and corporate defendants differently (Hans, 1989, 2000; Hans
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Ermann, 1989). MacCoun (1996) referred to this phenomenon as a defendant identity
effect. Support for this phenomenon comes largely from archival data, which suggests
that business, professional and government defendants tend to pay more than individual

defendants who are held liable for causing similar injuries (e.g., Chin & Peterson, 1985;
Ostrom, Rottman, & Goerdt, 1996). The most likely explanation for this finding is that
juries hold corporate defendants to a higher standard than individual defendants.
Experimental research using simulated trials has also found that corporate
defendants are held liable more frequently and pay greater compensation than individual

defendants (e.g., MacCoun, 1996). Hans and Ermann (1986) presented mock jurors with
a trial scenario involving several workers harmed by exposure to a toxic substance. The
injured workers sued their employer, described as either an individual defendant ("Mr.
Jones") or a corporate defendant ("Jones Corporation"). Hans and Ermann (1989) found

that the corporate defendant was held liable for a greater number of claims and was
required to pay more in compensatory damages than the individual defendant. Bornstein
(1994), using four different personal injury cases, manipulated the defendant status such
that the defendant was portrayed as either a large corporation or a small, individually
owned company (i.e., he manipulated the size of the company). Bornstein (1994) found
that large corporate defendants were perceived with less sympathy, held to stricter safety
standards and more likely held liable but were not required to pay more in damages than
smaller companies. Nonetheless, even if status only affects

judgments of liability, jurors

are misusing this extralegal information when deciding the case.
Number ofplaintiffs. Although civil juries are supposed to evaluate the merits of

each plaintiff's claim absolutely and not relative to other plaintiffs, some research
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suggests that as the number of plaintiffs increase, damage awards increase as well.

Horowitz and Bordens (1988) utilized either a consolidated trial or separate trials with
four independent plaintiffs in which the defendant was a chemical plant that supposedly
contaminated the residential drinking water. The results showed that punitive damages

significantly increased as the number of plaintiffs increased. A different study by
Horowitz and his colleagues demonstrated that the number of plaintiffs could affect
compensatory damage awards as well (Horowitz, FosterLee, & Brolly, 1996). In this
study, increasing the number of plaintiffs impeded jurors' abilities to attend to each
plaintiff individually, such that jurors lumped all the plaintiffs together and awarded more
in compensatory damages when they heard from eight plaintiffs as opposed to only four.
Other research by Horowitz also indicates that an increase in damage awards

accompanies an increase in the number of plaintiffs up to a point (Horowitz & Bordens,
2000). These researchers found that damage awards were lowest with one or two

plaintiffs, reached their peak with four plaintiffs, and then slightly decreased with six and
ten plaintiffs.

Occasionally

extralegal factors

Factors such as juror-litigant similarity, jurors' litigation crisis attitudes, or
defendant status are completely extralegal; that is, they ideally should have no influence
on civil jurors' decisions (even though research suggests that they do). Other factors may
be legally appropriate for some certain decisions civil juries make but are irrelevant to

other decisions. Occasionally extralegal factors thoroughly explored in civil jury research
include the amount requested, the severity of the injury, the conduct of the defendant, and
defendant wealth.

24

Amount requested. According to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky

& Ka

eman, 1974), a salient reference point, known as an anchor, serves as a basis for

simplifying

judgments

that involve uncertainty (such as determining damage awards).

When new information is presented (for example, in the context of civil litigation,
evidence about injury severity or defendant reprehensibility), adjustments may be made
away from the anchor but the resulting response will still be related to the initial anchor.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, or experts on the plaintiffs' behalf, typically proffer some number
for the amount of damages sought by the plaintiff (this is known as the ad damnum), and

sometimes defense attorneys (or their experts) will counter with a second recommended
figure. Although these suggestions bear some relation to lost and future earnings and
other factors relevant to economic damages, it is extremely difficult to objectively
quantify non-economic and punitive damages. Consequently, there is concern that jurors
are improperly swayed by the (somewhat arbitrary) anchors suggested by attorneys, to

the detriment of appropriately considering the evidence.
Empirical research demonstrates that jurors do indeed fall prey to the anchoring
and adjustment heuristic when determining damage awards. Chapman and Bornstein
(1996) found that the ad damnum not only systematically influenced compensation
awards, but also affected

judgments of the probability that the defendant caused the

injuries and other perceptions of the litigants. The title of their paper, "The More You
Ask for, the More You Get," aptly summarizes the effects of anchors on damage awards.
Other researchers have found support for this assertion. Hastie, Schkade, and Payne
(1999) discovered that a plaintiff's request had a dramatic effect on punitive damage

awards: the higher the request, the higher the award. Note that in the case of punitive
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damages, the amount requested typically bears little relation to the award since punitive

awards should be based on the defendant's conduct and wealth. Marti and Wissler (2000)
systematically varied the amount requested by the plaintiff and the rebuttal by the
defense. They too found that the amounts requested affected the amounts awarded, as
long as the requests were not too extreme (which resulted in a boomerang effect). Award
size and variability increased with the plaintiff's request but decreased with the most

extreme request and award size and variability decreased as the defense rebuttal
decreased but increased with the most extreme rebuttal. These researchers argued that the
award recommendations alter jurors' beliefs about what constitutes acceptable awards
and that award recommendations produce biased and unpredictable damage awards

(Marti & Wissler, 2000).
Injury severity. The severity of the plaintiff's injury is obviously relevant when
deciding an appropriate amount for compensatory damages. After all, more severely
injured plaintiffs will likely have higher medical expenses, greater lost wages, and
experience more pain and suffering than plaintiffs with less severe injuries. However, if
information concerning the severity of injury affects liability decisions, then jurors are

using such information improperly. In terms of the relationship between injury severity
and liability decisions, the research is abundant and clear. Unfortunately, it suggests that
information regarding injury severity does inappropriately impact liability decisions.
A recent meta-analysis by Robbennolt (2000) examined the hypothesis that

greater responsibility is attributed to the potentially responsible party as the outcome
becomes more severe. This notion, called the defensive attribution hypothesis, is
explained in the social cognitive literature. Fiske and Taylor (1991) state that
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consequences of an action become more unpleasant as they become more severe. As a
result, the idea that the action might be accidental becomes less tolerable and people fear
that a similar fate could befall them. The researchers claim that "seeing the actions as
avoidable and blaming the person for their occurrence makes the actions more predictable

and hence avoidable by the self" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 85). Therefore, attributing
accountability to the seemingly responsible party makes the incident seem controllable
and thus avoidable. A meta-analytic review supports the defensive attributionhypothesis,
concluding that research strongly suggests that more responsibility is attributed to an
accident perpetrator when the consequences are severe than when they are mild (Burger,

1981).
In the context of a civil jury, the more severe the consequence of an incident, the
greater is the need for jurors to feel as though they could avoid such injuries. Therefore,
jurors are more prone to attribute liability to the party that supposedly caused the incident

when the injuries are more severe. Robbenolt's (2000) meta-analysis supports this
assertion. She found a small but significant positive relationship between outcome
severity and the responsibility-related judgment of liability (r = .08, p < .001). As
Robbennolt accurately notes, "the existence of any relationship between outcome severity
and liability is counter to the legal doctrine that dictates that the severity of injury ought

not to influence liability judgments" (Robbennolt, 2000, p. 2596). Other research
concerning the effect of injury severity on liability decisions tends to find that the
relationship between injury severity and liability is mediated by emotional reactions to
the litigants (Bornstein, 1998). Whereas plaintiffs who are hurt worse arouse greater
feelings of sympathy and sadness in jurors, defendants who cause more severe injuries
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are viewed with less sympathy and arouse anger and anxiety in jurors. Consequently,
these feelings tend to lead to liability verdicts in favor of the plaintiff (Bornstein, 1998).

Greene, Johns, and Bowman (1999) conducted a study that was not included in
the Robbennolt (2000) meta-analysis but still examined the relationship between injury
severity and liability decisions. These researchers manipulated the severity of injury in a

simulated automobile negligence case and found that it inappropriately affected liability
decisions. The defendant was perceived as more negligent when the plaintiff suffered

more serious injuries than when the injuries were not as severe. The researchers also
manipulated another factor, the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, which is

relevant when determining liability and punitive damages but not compensatory damages.
They found that juror judgments about the defendant's conduct influenced irrelevant

considerations regarding compensating the plaintiff for his injuries (Greene et al., 1999).
Defendant conduct before the injury. Obviously, the carelessness or recklessness
of the defendant plays a large part when deciding if the defendant was legally responsible
for causing any injury to the plaintiff. Similarly, the defendant's conduct is very relevant
with respect to punitive damages, both when deciding whether or not to award them and
when determining an appropriate sum. Indeed, most judges' instructions regarding
punitive damages direct jurors to award such damages if the defendant's conduct was
reckless, reprehensible, wanton, or malicious. Yet if the defendant's conduct affects
compensatory damage awards, jurors are inappropriately considering this evidence.
Greene and her colleagues have conducted much of the recent experimental

research addressing the extent to which mock jurors correctly use evidence regarding the
conduct of the defendant. Cather, Greene, and Durham (1996) manipulated the
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reprehensibility of defendant conduct in three different tort cases (personal injury,
products liability, and insurance bad faith). For instance, in a product liability case
involving a young boy injured while using a lawnmower, the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct was measured in terms of the amount of safety research conducted
on the product as well as the number of similar previous incidences. The mock jurors

were asked to award compensatory and punitive damages and the results showed that the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct properly influenced punitive damage
decisions but not compensatory damage assessments (Cather et al., 1996).
Other research done by Greene and her colleagues has produced somewhat
conflicting results. Greene, Woody and Winter (2000) also manipulated the

reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct in three tort cases (products liability,
automobile negligence, and medical malpractice) and found similar results. Mock jurors
appropriately utilized the reprehensibility manipulation in two of the cases (i.e., it only
affected punitive damage awards). However, reprehensibility also improperly influenced
compensatory damage awards in the products liability case (Greene et al., 2000).

Moreover, in the medical malpractice case, the reprehensibility manipulation did not
affect assessments of punitive damage, though it should have ifjurors were properly
considering such evidence.
Another study by Greene, Johns and Smith (2001) used a more realistic mock trial
as the stimulus material. Whereas prior studies provided brief written summaries of the

tort cases, this group of researchers used an audio-taped mock trial of an automobile
negligence case, along with photographs and demonstrative evidence. In this study
participants were asked to determine negligence and award any compensatory damages
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they believed the plaintiff deserved (but mock jurors were not allowed to award punitive
damages). Defendant conduct was manipulated by providing no conduct information (as
a control) or by describing either mildly careless conduct (defendant traveling near speed
limit with one lane change prior to accident), or very careless conduct (defendant

traveling 10 mph over speed limit, changed two lanes before accident, and had a
Breathalyzer test revealing a small amount of alcohol consumption). Both individuals and
deliberating juries awarded greater compensation when they heard any evidence related
to defendant conduct than when no such information was provided (Greene et al., 2001).

It is certainly possible that not being allowed to award punitive damages caused mock
jurors to inflate compensatory damages as a means of punishing the more reprehensible
defendant.
Another interesting finding was that mock jurors who heard evidence about the
defendant's conduct perceived the plaintiff as being harmed more severely than those
who received no information about conduct, even though actual evidence of the

plaintiff's injury was held constant (Greene et al., 2001). In other words, evidence related
to the conduct of the defendant (and therefore liability) shaped perceptions of the
plaintiff's injuries such that more negligent defendants appeared to cause greater harm
than less negligent defendants, even for the same injury. Consequently, more negligent

defendants may be required to pay more in compensation than less negligent defendants.
These conflicting results make it difficult to ascertain the effects of the
reprehensibility of defendant conduct on mock juror verdicts. Are jurors using this
information properly? On one hand, it appears that such evidence may not affect

compensatory damage awards while punitive damage awards usually are influenced by
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defendant conduct (Gather et al., 1996). On the other hand, some research suggests that

compensatory damage awards may be influenced by defendant reprehensibility (Greene
et al., 2000; Greene et al., 2001) while punitive damage awards may not be affected
(Greene et al., 2000). Perhaps case or study specifics such as case type and trial
complexity account for these discrepancies in the research. For instance, some of the
research used corporate defendants (e.g., product's liability) while other research did not

(e.g., medical malpractice)-perhaps the different standards jurors hold for corporate
versus individual defendants influenced their use of defendant conduct. Also, the research
differed in their manipulations, such that some research varied injury severity and

reprehensibility (Gather et al., 1996) while other research also manipulated trial type
(unitary vs. bifurcated; Greene et al., 2000).
Defendant wealth/revenue. One of the most common criticisms levied against the

civil jury is that it is biased against wealthy defendants. People assume that civil juries
are intent on transferring wealth from the rich defendant to the poor plaintiff (the so-

called Robin Hood effect or deep-pocket hypothesis). Defendant wealth is clearly not
relevant when deciding liability or compensatory damage awards, but should be

considered when deciding an appropriate sum for punitive damages. The purposes of
punitive damages include punishing the defendant for reprehensible conduct and
deterring the defendant from future misconduct. Thus, jurors should consider the wealth
of the defendant in order to adequately punish and have a deterrent effect. For a

corporation that makes millions of dollars per year in revenue, a punitive damage award
of one hundred thousand dollars would be a drop in the bucket to them even though it
seems like a large figure to laypeople. Since defendant wealth is a rather obvious aspect
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of the defendant, and it is relatively easy to examine in archival data and manipulate in
simulation experiments, a large body of research has been dedicated to exploring the
effect of defendant wealth on civil jury verdicts.

Chin and Peterson (1985) conducted one of the first and largest archival analyses
examining the deep-pocket hypothesis. These researchers at the Rand Corporation
analyzed jury verdicts in Cook County (Chicago), Illinois over two decades from 1959 to
1979. They found that corporate defendants were required to pay more in damages than
individual defendants, even when similar injuries resulted. Other researchers examining
juries nationwide in the 1990s also found evidence of horizontal inequities in damage
awards, such that there were remarkable differences in awards for corporate versus

individual defendants (Ostrom et al., 1996). However, it is important to recognize that it
may not be defendant wealth that is causing horizontal inequities in damage awards but
instead defendant status as a corporation.
In 1996, MacCoun attempted to decipher between a deep-pocket effect and a
defendant identity effect. As MacCoun (1996) noted, to demonstrate a true deep-pocket

effect, verdicts (liability, damage awards, or both) must vary only as a function of
defendant wealth and not due to any other factor that might correlate with wealth (such as

corporate identity). To assess the effects of wealth and status independently, MacCoun
(1996) conducted two experiments in which mock jurors made decisions about several

different personal injury cases. Each case utilized three defendant conditions: a poor
individual, a wealthy individual, and a corporation. Therefore, a comparison of the first
two conditions represented a test of the deep-pocket effect and a comparison of the
second and third conditions represented a test of the defendant-identity effect.
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In his first experiment, MacCoun (1996) found that wealthy and poor individuals

were equally likely to be held liable but were both less likely to be held liable than
corporate defendants. The same pattern emerged for compensatory damages. MacCoun
(1996) replicated these findings in his second experiment, demonstrating that what once
was believed to be a deep-pocket effect was in fact a defendant-identity effect. Thus,
wealthy defendants are not necessarily at a disadvantage; apparently, jurors are paying
attention to the defendant status as a corporation. However, two caveats needs to be made

about MacCoun's findings. First, the corporation was perceived as significantly wealthier
than the wealthy individual (MacCoun, 1996). For a true test of the defendant-identity
effect, they should have been perceived as equally wealthy. Second, MacCoun
confounded wealth and identity by not having separate conditions representing a poor
corporation and a wealthy corporation, making it impossible to attribute differences

found between corporations and wealthy individuals to differences solely in identity.
Regardless of these limitations, even though defendant wealth may not improperly affect
jurors' verdicts, defendant identity should play no part in jurors' decisions. That
empirical evidence suggests otherwise reflects that jurors indeed are influenced by
extralegal factors when deciding liability and determining damage awards.
Extralegal factors on which research is lacking

The previous discussion has been limited to issues that have already been
explored in research on factors that may inappropriately influence civil juries and
contribute to horizontal inequities in verdicts. Some of these variables (e.g., defendant

wealth, defendant conduct before trial) will be examined in this project. The next section
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of this dissertation covers extralegal factors on which not much empirical research has
been conducted but which will be explored in the current investigation.
Corporate defendant size and wealth. Prior research on defendant status (and
indirectly defendant wealth) has revealed that jurors indeed hold corporate defendants to

different standards than individual defendants (Hans, 2000). Although this research has
focused on defendant identity as an individual or corporation, little empirical research has
explored whether jurors are sensitive to manipulations regarding corporations, such as the
size of the company. It is possible that certain corporate identities foster horizontal

inequities in determinations of liability and damage awards.
Both the size of the corporation (an extralegal factor measured in terms of the

number of company locations nationwide and/or over-seas) and the wealth of the
corporation (a factor relevant only to punitive damages and measured in terms of net

revenue per year) might inappropriately influence civil jury-decision making. Indeed, in
one of the few studies to manipulate corporate size, Bornstein (1994) found that larger

corporations were viewed with less sympathy and were less likely to win their case than
smaller businesses. In order to make the large corporate defendant less sympathetic to
mock jurors, Bornstein (1994) had them represented in absentia (represented only by
their attorneys) while the individual owner of the business represented the smaller
business in court. Thus, Bornstein (1994) introduced a possible confound in his study,

such that the differences found could be attributable to either corporate size or company
representative.

Who represents the company at trial is an extralegal factor that applies to
corporate defendants yet has been generally overlooked in the empirical research (except
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for conference presentations: Slawson & Bornstein, 2000; McGorty & Bornstein, 2004).
One study found that company size interacted with the presence of a representative such
that higher damage awards were assessed when there was no representative for the

smaller company but when there was a representative present for the larger company
(McGorty & Bornstein, 2004). In addition to whether or not the presence of someone
from the company affects verdicts, the status of the company representative may also
influence jurors.

Research on juror-litigant similarity has revealed a similarity-leniency hypothesis,
such that litigants similar to the jurors tend to get more lenient treatment (assuming the

litigant's conduct does not threaten the juror's positive view of themselves). According to
this reasoning, a CEO or someone else in a position of power in the company will be
viewed more negatively than an employee from the lower ranks because jurors (who are

unlikely to be company executives) will likely view the CEO as a member of an outgroup. Alternatively, the status of the representative for the corporation might be linked
to wealth. For instance, jurors might reason that a company who has the CEO represent
them at trial is wealthier than a company who has a lower employee such as an engineer
representing them.

Defendant conduct at trial. Most empirical research on defendant conduct has
focused on the reprehensibility of the conduct in causing injury to the plaintiff; that is,
research has mainly considered defendant conduct prior to trial. In contrast, there has
been relatively scarce research on defendant conduct at trial. To the extent that the
defendant's conduct at trial does not reflect an admission of fault, guilt, or responsibility,

conduct at trial is an extralegal factor (that is, it should not impact verdicts). Yet, it is
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certainly possible that defendant conduct during trial might influence jurors' verdicts.

One of the few studies to examine defendant conduct at trial was conducted by Bornstein,
Rung and Miller (2002) examining the effects of defendant remorse and responsibility.
They had participants read one of three case scenarios where a physician had already
been found liable for malpractice. The researchers manipulated the physician's level of
remorse to ascertain the effect on damage award assessments. In one condition, the

defendant did not indicate feeling any remorse (the no-remorse condition). In the remorse
condition, the physician expressed sorrow for "the unfortunate death" of the plaintiff's
husband but did not admit any wrongdoing. Finally, in a third condition, the defendant
expressed remorse for his own negligence and the resulting death of the plaintiff's

husband (the remorse-responsibility condition). The interesting finding was that the
defendant in the remorse condition that did not admit responsibility was required to pay
less in compensation than in the other two conditions (Bornstein et al., 2002). Thus, there
is some evidence that expressing remorse may actually benefit the defendant, as long as
no responsibility is admitted.

One of the only other studies to explore defendant conduct before trial examined
the effect of an apology on settlement decisions prior to any trial (thus the effect of the
apology at trial was not actually assessed). Whether or not a company issues an apology
may be another factor that can affect how jurors view corporate defendants. Robbennolt
(2003) manipulated whether an apology was issued, as well as the type of apology, in a
personal injury case involving a pedestrian-bicycle accident. Some participants read a

scenario in which no apology was offered. Other participants received a scenario in
which a partial apology was offered that merely expressed sympathy. Finally, a third
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group of participants read a scenario in which a full apology that involved taking
responsibility for causing the injuries was issued. Robbennolt (2003) found that full
apologies (expressing sympathy and responsibility) increased mock jurors' willingness to
settle and resulted in the defendant being viewed with greater sympathy and less anger

than those issuing a partial apology (only expressing sympathy) or no apology. Mock

jurors also expected that fewer damages would be

awarded when a full apology was

proffered. Although the case used was relatively innocuous, the study does provide some
evidence that defendant conduct in the form of an apology might influence juror verdicts.
The extant research has explored the effects of apologies on settlement decisions

(Robbennolt, 2003) and in a medical malpractice case involving an individual defendant
(Bornstein et al., 2002). Therefore, there has yet to be an empirical examination of the
effects of an apology when the defendant is a corporation. Just as Robbennolt (2003)
found that individual defendants were viewed with more sympathy and less anger when

they offered an apology, it is likely that corporate defendants will be treated more
leniently when they proffer an apology than when they do not (providing the apology
does not include admissions of responsibility or imply guilt). Jurors may be sensitive to
these issues regarding corporate defendants, such that certain corporate identities are
treated differently in terms of liability verdicts and damage award assessments, but

empirical research is needed to explore this possibility.
Plaintiff characteristics. Prior research in the civil arena has failed to consider the
impact of many plaintiff characteristics, like plaintiff occupation, on juror verdicts. The
plaintiff's occupation is relevant to compensatory damages, since assessments of
economic damages, particularly for lost and future earnings, should be made in light of
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the plaintiff's profession. However, the plaintiff's occupation may also inappropriately
influence assessments of liability or punitive damages if, for example, jurors are less

inclined to find in favor of a plaintiff with a high-paying occupation. In these instances, it
is possible that plaintiff occupation contributes to horizontal inequities in verdicts. For
instance, suppose a neurosurgeon and a schoolteacher suffered comparable injuries when
using the same product but the defendant is more likely to be found liable with the
schoolteacher as the plaintiff. The similarity-leniency hypothesis proposes that jurors will

be sympathetic and lenient toward litigants similar to themselves. The average juror can
relate to a schoolteacher more than a neurosurgeon, both in terms of social status and

wealth. Therefore, jurors may improperly consider plaintiff occupation when deciding
liability or even punitive damage assessments (e.g., "The neurosurgeon is already

wealthy enough so he doesn't need any extra money in punitive damages.").
Manipulating the plaintiff's occupation is one way to examine the effects of
plaintiff wealth on civil jury verdicts. Another way to explore plaintiff wealth is by
manipulating the case and the cause of the injury. In a medical malpractice case, the

plaintiff might be injured when undergoing a necessary, vital procedure (e.g., heartbypass surgery; kidney transplant) or an unnecessary, luxurious procedure (e.g., plastic

surgery, liposuction). In a products liability case, the plaintiff might be injured while
using a common, conventional product (e.g., car) or an opulent, extravagant product (e.g.,
yacht). In both of the above instances, the wealth of the plaintiff (and indirectly that of
the defendant as well) is varied by the cause of injury. Perhaps jurors are sensitive to the

wealth of the plaintiff (and the defendant) as reflected by the case and cause of injury and
feel little sympathy for a plaintiff injured by a luxurious procedure or product. This could
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translate into fewer verdicts in favor of the plaintiff, even if other factors were held

constant (e.g., defendant conduct).
Summary

The current project consists of several studies designed to explore civil jury
decision-making. The first study manipulates several of the aforementioned litigant
characteristics and completely extralegal factors in the context of a corporate defendant in

a products liability case. Many of these variables have yet to be explored in this context,
so the analyses will focus on the how mock jurors utilize litigant characteristics when
determining verdicts. As the focus of the project shifts to comprehension and the judicial
instructions, we manipulate additional pieces of "occasionally extralegal" factors, or

those factors whose consideration is only appropriate for specific decisions (e.g., injury
severity should impact compensatory damages but not liability). How mock jurors use (or
misuse) these factors and how comprehension influences this (mis)use are of particular
interest in the later stages of this project.
Judicialinstructions

Comprehension of judicial instructions
Thus far, the focus of the discussion on juror competence has been on completely
extralegal factors and evidence relevant only to specific decisions. Jurors' consideration
of extralegal factors or misuse of evidence when making various decisions contributes to

variability in liability verdicts and horizontal inequities in damage awards. One
explanation of the effects found in the research described above may be jurors' failure to
comprehend judicial instructions. If jurors cannot comprehend the instructions on the
law, how can they make decisions in accordance with the law?
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Judges' instructions play an important role in every case. They explain the laws
that are applicable to the case (e.g., defining the standard of proof), and direct jurors to
reach a verdict in accordance with those laws. Jurors are presumed to understand and
comprehend the complicated legal terminology and concepts in these instructions.

Unfortunately, research suggests that jurors are notoriously bad at comprehending
judicial instructions (e.g., Ellsworth, 1999; Greene & Bornstein, 2000). Even some
judges seem to be aware that jurors fail to understand the instructions read to them. As

one judge stated, "When I read instructions to the jury, I hope that I will see a light go on
in the jurors' eyes, but I never do" (quoted in Severance, Greene, & Loftus, 1984, p.

202).
There are a number of explanations for why juror comprehension of these
instructions is so poor. One reason is the unfamiliar legal language in which the
instructions are written. Often times, the instructions simply repeat statutory language
and are laden with strange legal terms. Phrases comprised of unusual terminology, such

as "preponderance of the evidence," "proximate cause," or "non-economic
losses... incurred to the present time," are common in judicial instructions but are rarely
encountered in everyday language. Considering that preponderance appears only 0.26
times per million words in the English language and negligence appears once per million
words (Greene & Johns, 2001), it is no wonder that jurors have difficulty comprehending

some of the terminology. As another example, here is how jurors are typically instructed
on the definition of proximate cause: "a cause which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, produced damage, and without which the damage would not have occurred"
(quoted in Wrightsman et al., 2002, p.425).
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Due to the use of complicated, technical and convoluted legalese, it is estimated
that jurors spend at least 20% of their time in deliberation trying to decipher the meaning

of the instructions, but still tend to have difficulty comprehending them (Ellsworth,
1989). Studies of juror comprehension of judicial instructions find comprehension rates
&

that range from under 50% (comparable to having no instructions at all; Elwork, Sales,
Alfini, 1977; Steele & Thornburg, 1988; Reifman, Gusick, & Ellsworth, 1992) to
&

approximately 64% (which is slightly more promising but still rather meager; Greene
Johns, 2001). Besides the legalese, judicial instructions are often written in

grammatically

complex and compound sentences, in passive voice, and they tend to contain negatively
modified words. For instance, the word "disregard" appears frequently in the instructions.
Understanding this word requires comprehension of the word "regard" and then a
negation of it, which involves a two-step process. A better word choice to substitute for
"disregard" would be "ignore," which only requires one-step for comprehension. Since

the instructions should inform people what to do, negative words and negators (e.g.,
"not" or "never"), which tell them what to avoid, often cause unnecessary confusions
(Elwork et al., 1977).
Another reason that jurors may be confused by judicial instructions is the way the
instructions are communicated to jurors. Typically, the jury listens passively while the
judge monotonously reads the instructions aloud at the very end of the trial. Jurors are
almost never allowed to ask questions to clarify any misunderstandings. Even if the jurors
do ask for assistance while deliberating, judges are reluctant to help, reasoning that

rewording or clarifying the instructions might open the door for appeals. Thus, the judge
simply repeats the instructions that were read initially (which obviously does nothing to
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help clarify any confusion). Moreover, judges assume that the instructions will have the

intended effects of guiding jurors through myriad complex and foreign legal concepts
(Wrightsman et al., 2002). Other reasons jurors have difficulty understanding judicial
instructions lay in the ambiguity and vagueness of the instructions. The judicial
instructions may inform jurors of certain concepts such as economic damages, but

typically do not provide specific definitions of various terms (e.g., pain and suffering,
loss of consortium), explain how jurors are to consider and weigh these issues, or provide
information on how these terms translate into dollar awards (Greene & Bornstein, 2000).
Punitive damage instructions are even more ambiguous and vague than

instructions governing compensatory damages. Most judicial instructions concerning
punitive damages simply tell the jurors to assess an amount sufficient to punish and deter,
and in doing so, jurors should consider the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct
and the defendant's wealth. Other than that, the instructions are usually no more specific
(although some jurisdictions do provide some additional criteria, such as the award
should not bankrupt the defendant or be motivated out of passion or prejudice). In
essence, jurors are left completely on their own to assess a reasonable sum for punitive
damages. Even the Supreme Court, in their 2003 decision in State Farm Insurance Co. v
Campbell, recognized the shortcomings of punitive damage instructions, stating that

"vague instructions, or those that merely inform the jury to avoid 'passion or prejudice,'
do little to aid the decision maker in its task of assigning appropriate weight to evidence
that is relevant and evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory" (p. 436).
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Lack of comprehension leads to misuse of evidence
As described above, the vague direction and guidance in the instructions may
contribute to jurors using certain elements of evidence inappropriately when determining
liability and damage award verdicts. For instance, evidence relevant to one decision (e.g.,

injury severity) may influence other decisions (e.g., liability verdicts; Greene et al.,
1999). Additionally, jurors' confusion concerning important legal concepts (e.g.,
"preponderance of evidence" or "unreasonably dangerous") may result in similar cases
reaching different liability verdicts. One jury may interpret the concepts in a certain way
while another jury understands the concepts differently. If jurors cannot make sense of

&

the instructions they receive, they cannot reach a sensible verdict (Melsheimer

Stodghill, 1994). Given the above concerns regarding judicial instructions, a number of
procedural reforms have been proposed to not only provide more guidance and improve
comprehension of instructions, but also to ensure that jurors use the appropriate evidence

when determining liability and damage awards. Empirical research is needed to explore
the effectiveness of these reforms. This project specifically focuses on revising judicial
instructions so they are specific, clear, and understandable.
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Chapter Three: Proposed procedural reforms for the civil jury

Refbrms for judicial instructions

Suggestions for improving judicial instructions tend to focus on two issues:
increasing juror comprehension of the instructions and ensuring that jurors are using

evidence correctly when reaching their verdicts. These improvements in judicial
instructions include both minor and radical reforms. Some of the mild reforms that have
already been adopted in certain jurisdictions include allowing jurors to take notes and

providing jurors with written copies of the instructions. Drastic reforms, often viewed
with skepticism by legal professionals, are obviously more difficult to implement than
benign reforms. These reforms include requiring judges to clarify instructions or answer
other questions that jurors might have during deliberation. As stated earlier, judges are
hesitant to do such things for fear of opening the door for later appeals. Instead of

requiring judges to clear up confusion over the instructions, it might be easier, and more
influential, to revise the instructions in order to avoid ambiguity and misunderstandings
in the first place.
Revising judicial instructions

Previous empirical attempts to revise instructions have met with success in both
the criminal (e.g., Severance et al., 1984) and civil arena (e.g., Elwork et al., 1977;
English & Sales, 1997). Most of the studies that revise judicial instructions use principles
from the field of psycholinguistics, which is the study of how people understand and use

language (Wrightsman et al., 2002). These principles include minimizing or eliminating
the use of abstract, uncommon, and technical terms, as well as homonyms (e.g., "respect"
is used in the instructions to mean "reference" but could be misinterpreted to mean
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"esteem"). Suggestions based on principles from psycholinguistics also involve
eliminating negatively modified words, compound sentences and passive voice, as well
as reorganizing the instructions in a more simplistic and logical manner (Elwork et al.,
1977).
Another way to improve jurors' comprehension rates for instructions and improve
their use of evidence is to be more explicit in defining terminology. For instance,
Hawaii's instructions are one of the very few to include a definition of the term "mental
suffering" and New Jersey's instructions are one of the few that define "disability"
(Wissler, Kuehn, & Saks, 2000). Alternatively, some researchers suggest eliminating

certain legal jargon altogether. For example, instead of telling jurors that the plaintiff
must prove negligence by a "preponderance of the evidence" and then defining

preponderance, the instructions could read, "You must decide whether it is more likely
than not..." (Saltzburg, 1993, p. 357).
Some recommendations are rmore case-specific, including tailoring the
instructions and definitions to the exact case. Saltzburg (1993) provides a simple but

poignant example. "If the plaintiff's theory of negligence is that the defendant failed to
stop at a traffic light, the instruction...could be made case specific...so that it reads, 'You
must decide whether it is more likely than not that the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances because he drove his car through a red light"' (p.
357). His instruction eliminates the use of the technical terms "preponderance" and

"negligence" while being very case-specific. Other case-specific recommendations
involve providing upper and lower dollar amounts for the type of injury the jury is
evaluating or giving jurors several similar injury scenarios and the damage awards
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associated with those scenarios. Giving guidance in the form of information regarding
awards in comparable cases or providing a range of appropriate dollar amounts can
reduce variability in damage awards (Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, 1989; Saks et al.,

1997).
Judges' instructions could also be improved by being more explicit in the
information they convey to jurors. These overt instructions are designed to provide better
guidance and ensure jurors are considering the appropriate issues when deciding their
verdicts. Consequently, these instructions should reduce horizontal inequities in verdicts.

Wissler and her colleagues (2000) advocate that jurors should be told overtly that they are
not to consider attorney's fees, attorney's recommendations, or beliefs about litigant's

insurance coverage. Instructions could also include an admonition to limit the use of
defendant conduct to determinations of liability (and punitive damages) but that
defendant conduct should not be considered when deciding an amount for compensatory

damages. Another similar admonition could be made regarding limiting evidence of
injury severity only to determinations of damages. Finally, it has been suggested that
jurors should be instructed explicitly to not discount awards due to the plaintiff's

contribution to the incident (Wissler et al., 2000). In other words, jurors should be warned
against awarding less to negligent plaintiffs because the court will reduce the award in

proportion to the plaintiff's negligence (this instruction is designed to avoid double
discounting; see Zickafoose & Bornstein, 1999).
Research on the effectiveness of some of the above admonitions has met with
mixed results and therefore more empirical research is needed. Several studies have
found such instructions were effective in getting jurors to disregard certain irrelevant
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information (Cox & Tanford, 1989; Pickel, 1995; Wissler et al., 2001). Yet the danger
with these admonitions is that explicit instructions may backfire and result in jurors

focusing on the issues even more than if no such instructions were given (some research
finds such a boomerang effect; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977). However, empirical studies
have sho

that explaining the policy or reasoning behind the admonition makes the

cautionary instructions more sensible and effective, thus reducing the likelihood of a

boomerang effect (Diamond & Casper, 1992; Wissler et al., 2001). Also, some of the
above recommendations for revising instructions have never been systematically
manipulated and tested. Ultimately, questions about the effectiveness of these suggestions
concerning revising judicial instructions are empirical in nature. This investigation will
revise typical pattern instructions to examine if they enhance jurors' use of the evidence

properly and reduce the misuse of evidence. Before courts are willing to replace the
current judicial instructions with revised versions, the courts must see some conclusive
support that the revised instructions are an improvement.
Otherproceduralreforms

Revising the judicial instructions may be one of the most influential procedural
reforms in terms of improving jurors' comprehension and their use of the appropriate
evidence, but research has indicated that other procedural reforms may also improve civil
jury decision-making.
Pre-instructions
One such reform, offering jurors pre-instructions, has met with considerable

support in the lab and the field. Researchers close to 30 years ago found evidence
demonstrating that presenting instructions at the beginning and again at the end of the
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trial allowed jurors a greater opportunity to focus their attention on relevant evidence and

remember it (Elwork et al., 1977). A field experiment by Heuer & Penrod (1989) found
that pre-instructions assisted jurors in following legal guidelines in their decision-making.
In a different study, jurors who were pre-instructed on the elements of compensation

made appropriate distinctions between several differentially injured plaintiffs, such that
the most severely injured plaintiffs received the most in compensation. Those participants
that did not receive preliminary instructions failed to use injury severity appropriately
when determining compensatory damage awards (FosterLee, Horowitz, & Bourgeois,

1993). It should be noted that some states already use preliminary instructions (e.g.,
Arizona, Indiana).
Bifurcation
A procedural reform more relevant to the current investigation than preinstructions is bifurcation. Bifurcation is the separation of the various issues put before a
jury. It may involve either a separation of evidence relevant to liability and damage

awards or a separation of evidence related to compensatory and punitive damages. One
benefit of bifurcation is increased efficiency (Greene & Bornstein, 2003). In unitary (nonbifurcated) trials, the jury hears all the evidence and decides all the issues in one
deliberation. In many of these cases, the jury finds that the defendant is not liable.

Therefore no damages are awarded but time has been wasted presenting all the evidence
relevant to damages. In bifurcated cases, the jury initially would hear evidence only
related to liability and not damages.
There are more important advantages to bifurcation than improved efficiency.
One such benefit to bifurcating the trial is that it improves jurors' proper use of evidence
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when they are deciding their verdicts (Gensler, 2000). In unitary trials, jurors may
confuse issues and improperly consider evidence that has no bearing on the particular

decision they are making. Logically, in bifurcated trials, inappropriate use of evidence
would be lessened because jurors only hear the evidence relevant to one particular

decision (i.e., they would not hear about injury severity when determining liability).
Another important benefit to bifurcation is that it can improve jurors' comprehension of
judicial instructions by narrowing the range of issues (and accompanying testimony and

instructions) that they must consider (Gensler, 2000). Thus, by allowing jurors to focus
on fewer issues and instructions at any one time, bifurcation should improve
comprehension. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence regarding the benefits of
bifurcation produces a muddled picture.
The previous discussion on juror competence and extralegal factors has

highlighted research demonstrating that jurors misuse evidence (e.g., Bornstein, 1998,
where injury severity affects liability; Greene et al., 2000 & 2001, where defendant
conduct influenced compensatory damages). So can bifurcation of liability and damage
awards alleviate this improper use of evidence? An early study on the effects of
bifurcation indicated that significantly fewer defendants were found liable in bifurcated

trials than in unitary trials (Zeisel & Callahan, 1963). The researchers proposed that
jurors in the unitary trials were using evidence about injury severity when deciding
liability and therefore tended to find that the defendant was liable in unitary trials.
Horowitz and Bordens (1990), conducting a mock jury experiment, varied whether the

trial was unitary or bifurcated and also found more verdicts in favor of the plaintiff in
unitary trials than in bifurcated trials. Strangely, although the defendant was found liable
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more often in unitary trials, compensatory damages were higher in bifurcated trials.

Greene and Smith (2002) explored bifurcation in an automobile negligence case. Their
results showed jurors in the bifurcated conditions gave smaller awards than those in the

unitary conditions (indicating that those in the bifurcated conditions did not misuse
evidence relevant to liability).
However, other research has shown that bifurcation is not effective at reducing

jurors' improper use of evidence. Wissler and her colleagues (Wissler, Rector, & Saks,
2001) manipulated trial type in a mock personal injury case. They found that bifurcation
actually exacerbated the impact of liability evidence (i.e., defendant conduct) on
compensatory damage awards. In other words, jurors awarded more compensatory
damages when the trial was bifurcated than when it was unitary, indicating that defendant
conduct influenced jurors even more so when the trial was divided than unitary. Thus, it
appears that bifurcation of liability and damages may be somewhat useful in improving

jurors' use of evidence. It may be effective in reducing the impact of injury-related
evidence on judgments of liability but not as effective in reducing the impact of conduct-

related evidence on damage awards.
What about the effects of bifurcation of compensatory and punitive damages? It
has been suggested that defendant's net worth (relevant to punitive damages) may
influence compensatory damages. One study revealed that varying trial structure had no
effect on compensatory damage awards. That is, jurors in unitary conditions awarded the
same amount of compensatory damages as those in bifurcated conditions. Yet punitive
damages were unexpectedly affected by trial structure, such that punitive damage awards
were higher in bifurcated trials than unitary trials (Greene et al., 2000). Landsman and
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colleagues (Landsman, Diamond, Dimitropoulos & Saks, 1998) also assessed the impact
of bifurcating compensatory and punitive damages. They found some evidence that jurors
inappropriately used punitive damage evidence (defendant net worth) in unitary trials
when determining compensatory damages, indicating that separating punitive and
compensatory damage issues can reduce the misuse of evidence. However, the

researchers also found punitive damage awards were higher in bifurcated trials than in
unitary trials (Landsman et al., 1998). Therefore, bifurcation may hinder the improper use
of punitive damage evidence when determining compensatory damages but may also
augment punitive damage awards.

Overall, the research is complicated and rather ambiguous concerning whether or
not bifurcation actually results in better juror verdicts (i.e., increases jurors use of the
appropriate evidence when making various decisions). What about the effects of
bifurcation on juror comprehension rates? Unfortunately, the paucity of research on this
issue does not permit a definitive answer. One of the only studies to examine the issue

found that bifurcating compensatory and punitive damages did not affect comprehension
of the evidence or judge's instructions (Landsman et al., 1998). However, their study
only utilized four questions to measure comprehension of judicial instructions, so it
would be premature to conclude that bifurcation does not improve comprehension rates.
Certainly, more empirical research is needed in order to ascertain the effect of bifurcation

on comprehension rates of judicial instructions. The current investigation will use typical
pattern instructions and revised instructions in unitary and bifurcated trials to both
explore the effects on juror comprehension rates and examine the effects on jurors' use of
evidence.
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The current project consists of three studies designed to: (1) explore horizontal
inequities in liability and damage award assessments, (2) revise judicial instructions to
attempt to increase juror comprehension rates and improve use of evidence, and (3) test
whether revising instructions moderates the effect of procedural and evidentiary

manipulations, reducing horizontal inequities. This is the first investigation to measure
juror comprehension rates of revised civil instructions while also empirically testing the
moderating effects of instructions on procedural and evidentiary manipulations regarding

the issues of liability, compensatory and punitive damage awards.
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Chapter Four: Study #1
This investigation has two goals. The primary goal is developing a more

comprehensive model of horizontal inequities in civil jury decision-making by exploring
potential interactions between irrelevant and relevant litigant characteristics. The second
goal is to develop a measure of mock jurors' comprehension rates of typical judicial
instructions in a products liability case. The comprehension measure developed in this
study will be used in future studies (revised if necessary). The first study investigates the

impact of litigant characteristics on mock jurors' determinations of liability and damage
awards and how those characteristics contribute to horizontal inequities in verdicts. No
empirical studies to date have explored the combined impact of defendant and plaintiff
characteristics on jurors' verdicts in the context of a corporate defendant. This study
focuses on five variables described above: corporate size, corporate wealth, corporate

representative, defendant apologizing, and plaintiff occupation. In a products liability
case involving either a car (i.e., ordinary product) or a yacht (i.e., luxurious product),
litigant extralegal factors and those factors only appropriate for specific decisions will be
systematically manipulated. Several of these factors have not been examined in previous

research. Additionally, potential mediators, such as sympathy and anger will be
considered.
It is hypothesized that main effects will be found for all manipulations. Based on
the similarity-leniency hypothesis, we anticipate that more lenient treatment will be given
to the corporate defendant when an engineer as opposed to the CEO represents it at trial.

It is expected, based on Bornstein (1994) and the deep-pocket hypothesis, that larger and
wealthier corporations will be found liable more often and required to pay greater
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compensation than smaller and less wealthy corporations. It is expected that, as in prior
research (e.g., Robbennolt, 2003) apologizing will result in more lenient treatment of the
defendant, as long as jurors do not interpret the apology as an admission of guilt or
responsibility. Thus, we hypothesize that more lenient treatment will be given to the
corporate defendant when they issue the following apology at trial: "I am truly, deeply

sorry for your loss. My heart goes out to you in this time of tragedy and I offer my
sincerest condolences regarding this unfortunate and terrible accident." Finally, based on
the litigant-similarity hypothesis, it is anticipated that mock jurors will find in favor of
the plaintiff and award more in damages when the plaintiff is a schoolteacher or the
product is conventional (i.e., a car) than when the plaintiff is a neurosurgeon or the

product is luxurious (i.e., a yacht). On the other hand, previous research examining
corporate defendants found that, although jurors insisted on product safety and held high
expectations for corporations, they were more favorable towards the corporate defendants
than the plaintiffs. Jurors were generally skeptical of the profit motives of individual

plaintiffs and expressed concern about large damage awards (Hans & Lofquist, 1992).
Thus, it might be expected that jurors will discount the plaintiff's occupation in light of
their skepticism regarding plaintiffs suing corporations.
The scarcity of prior research prevents the construction of explicit a priori
hypotheses addressing the interactive impact of all litigant characteristics. However, past

research indicates that attitudes toward plaintiffs (and litigation crisis) are more powerful
predictors than attitudes toward corporations (Hans & Lofquist, 1992). Accordingly, it is
expected that defendant characteristic manipulations will have smaller effects (or no
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effect) in conditions where the plaintiff is viewed with greater sympathy (e.g., a
schoolteacher, a car as the product). We will explore all possible two way interactions.
Method

Design
The design is a 2 (Corporate size: branches in 40 states vs. only one branch) X 2
(Defendant wealth: annual net revenue of 500 million dollars vs. 50 million dollars) X 2
(Corporate representative: CEO vs. associate engineer) X 2 (Defendant apology: yes vs.
no) X 2 (Plaintiff occupation: neurosurgeon vs. schoolteacher) X 2 (Product: yacht vs.

family sedan) between-subjects factorial design. The dependent variables of interest are
the participants' liability verdicts and any compensatory and punitive damages they
would award. Additionally, participants answered 15 multiple-choice or true-false
questions designed to measure comprehension of typical judicial instructions (see
Appendix E). These comprehension questions focus on the burden and standard of proof

in civil cases, the issues of negligence and design defects, and considerations of
compensatory and punitive damages. Also, participants will answer various attitudinal
questions regarding their feelings toward the litigants and their views toward civil

litigation in general (see Appendix A).
Participants

One hundred fifty eight participants were recruited from the psychology
participant pool at Florida International University. The experiment was posted on-line at
w .experiretrix.com/fiu, where participants could read a brief description of the
experiment, view available times and sign-up to participate. Only students enrolled in
PSY2020 (Introduction to Psychology) and certain other classes are part of the participant
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pool. Those students under 18 years of age were not allowed to participate, as they must
be the legal age to serve on a jury. Their mean age was 19 years old, with 27.8% (n = 44)

being male and 72.2% (n = 114) female. The majority of these students were Hispanic (n
= 101), with the remainder being Caucasian (n

=

30), African-American (n = 19), Asian

(n = 5), and Other (n = 3). Two hundred thirty additional non-student, adult participants

were recruited through a Web-based participant pool (h p://

wstud

response~com)

that sends out solicitations for Web-based studies. Of these non-student participants,

51.7% (n = 123) were male and 48.3% were female (n = 115), with their mean age being
34 years old. The vast majority of these participants were Caucasian (n = 175), with the
remainder being Asian (n

=

22), African-American (n = 14), Hispanic (n = 14), and Other

(n = 5).
Materials
This was a Web-based study so all materials were in the form of Web pages.
Stimulus materials include the scenario of a products liability case involving a faulty
automobile or boat fuel system (depending on the trial version) that resulted in a fire that
killed the plaintiff's spouse and a 9-item questionnaire that measures participants'
attitudes toward the litigants (see Appendix B). A brief, 16-item questionnaire was also

used to assess participants' attitudes regarding civil litigation. After reading typical
judicial instructions on the law (see Appendix C), participants completed a 15-item
multiple-choice test designed to measure participant's comprehension of the instructions
Materials also include a verdict form that required participants to determine liability and
award any damages they deemed appropriate.
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Procedure

Participants initially read an informed consent form on the first Web page before
proceeding. By clicking on a button on the bottom of the page, they gave implied
consent. The following web page consisted of 16 items that assessed participants'
attitudes toward civil litigation and corporations. Next they read a hypothetical scenario,

approximately 1600 words long, depicting a products liability case involving defective
fuel lines in either a car or yacht that caused an explosion and resulted in a man's death.
His estate was suing the car/boat manufacturer. The various litigant manipulations (e.g.,
plaintiff occupation, corporate size, whether an apology was issued) were incorporated
into the summary. Some manipulations simply involved changing a few words in the
summary (e.g., manipulating wealth only required changing a number: revenue/year)
whereas others variables involved greater alterations (e.g., manipulating occupation
required changing the testimony pertaining to compensatory damages).
At the end of the web page containing the scenario, participants completed 9 ninepoint Likert-type ratings regarding their reactions to various aspects of the case (e.g.,

sympathy for plaintiff, anger toward defendant). After completing these 9 items,
participants clicked on a button at the bottom of the page to proceed. The following web
page contained judicial instructions meant to approximate the typical judicial instructions
that would be given to jurors at the end of a trial. After clicking on a button at the bottom

of this page, participants continued to another web page that had 15 questions designed to
assess their comprehension of the judicial instructions they just read. After this page,
participants proceeded to a page that assessed their verdict for liability. Assuming they
find for the plaintiff, participants were instructed to assign an appropriate sum for
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compensatory and punitive damages as though they were jurors seated on the case. After
clicking on a button at the bottom of this page, they continued to a short debriefing page,

where they were thanked for their participation and provided with contact information in
case they had any questions or concerns.

Results
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed on the 16 Likert-type case
and study-specific attitudinal items in order to identify a smaller number of attitude
factors that might influence liability and damage award assessments. Four factors
emerged from this analysis. The first factor, which measured participants' belief that

wealthier or bigger corporations should be held to a higher standard of care (a = .77), was
composed of three items. One example item was, "Wealthier defendants should pay more
than less wealthy defendants." The second factor, which measured anti-corporation
attitudes (a = .62), was composed of two items (e.g., "Corporations will do anything for

profit"). The third factor, which measured litigation crisis attitudes (a = .71), was
composed of three items. For example, one item was, "Outrageous monetary awards are
ruining society." The final factor, which measured a sense of strict liability (a = .55), was
composed of two items (e.g., "A company should never be excused from compensating
consumers who are injured by its products"). These factors were entered into all future

regressions to examine their total main effects, as well as their interactions with the
various litigant characteristics. Analyses were conducted separately for sample type
(students vs. non-student, adult participants). We explored total main effects, as well as
both two and three-way interactions involving sample type but since only one significant
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difference emerged between the two groups, the results are presented together. The
significant finding for sample type on punitive damage awards is covered below.

Structure of path analysis
The majority of the analyses for Study #1 were structured as a path analysis using
M-plus software (Muthen & Muthen, 2004). The independent variables and the
attitudinal factors derived from the EFA were entered into the first level of the path

analysis. A total of 29 possible two-way interactions involving the various independent
variables and the attitudinal factors were entered into the second level (fifteen of these
were the interactions among the independent variables, the remaining either involved
sample type or one of the various attitudinal factors). We entered four potential mediators
(comprehension, outrage and sympathy directed toward the defendant, and sympathy for

the plaintiff) in the third and final step on the path analysis. The statistics reported below
are for the total effects that emerged, with mediation covered at the end of the Results

section.
Liability verdicts

Findings are significant atp < .05 unless otherwise stated. The corresponding zvalues equate to p < .05, p < .01 and p < .001: z = 1.96, 2.58, and 3.27 respectively. For
all questions regarding liability verdicts, the dependent variable was the dichotomous
choice between the plaintiff and the defendant on each cause of action (negligence and
design defect). 72.8% of the participants found the defendant negligent and 71.9% found
the defendant liable for a design defect. These dichotomous liability verdicts were

analyzed through path analysis using Probit regression.
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For both causes of action, a total main effect was found for litigation crisis
attitudes. Not surprisingly, those who agreed more that there was a litigation crisis were

less likely to find the defendant liable for negligence or a design defect than those who
did not believe there was a litigation crisis (P = -.23, z

-4.54 and

p = -.26,

z = -4.95,

respectively). For both causes of action, there was a significant interaction between
-

company revenue and attitudes concerning standards for wealth and size (p = -. 18, z =

2.42 for negligence and p= -. 17, z = -2.32 for design defect). To interpret the interaction,
we performed a median split on the attitude variable and observed that those participants
who agreed less that wealthier or larger corporations should be held to higher standards

found the wealthier company liable significantly less often than the relatively poorer
company while there were no differences among those who did endorse such attitudes
(see Table 1 for negligence & Table 2 for design defect). For both causes of action, there
was also a significant interaction between the corporate representative and anti-

corporation attitudes (p = .14, z = 2.19 for negligence and

p= .19, z = 2.68 for design

defect). Those participants who held anti-corporation attitudes found the defendant liable
more often when the engineer was the representative than when the CEO was the
representative while those who held more favorable attitudes toward corporations tended
to find liability more often when the CEO represented the company rather than the

engineer (see Table 3 for negligence & Table 4 for design defect).
Regarding the issue of liability for a design defect, there was a marginally
significant main effect for the corporate representative (p = .12, z

1.92,p < .06) and a

significant main effect for the plaintiff's job (P = .14, z = 2.02). Participants were more
likely to find the defendant liable when the engineer was the representative (75.3% found
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for the plaintiff) than when the CEO represented the corporation (68.5%) and when the
plaintiff was a teacher (78.4%) rather than a surgeon (65.4%). A significant interaction
between the company representative and revenue was also found on design defect

verdicts ( = -.13, z= -2.09). For relatively poorer companies, the representative
manipulation did not affect liability verdicts (73.6% found for the plaintiff with the CEO
and 75.6% with the engineer) but for wealthier companies, more liability verdicts were
assessed when the engineer was the representative (75.0%) than the CEO (63.8%).
Damage awards

Prior research on damage awards has analyzed awards in a number of ways. Some
only analyze the awards of those participants that first found the defendant liable
(realistically simulating actual trials). We have chosen to compare that type of analysis to
analyses including the entire sample (thereby including those who chose not to award any
damages). Analyses that include the entire sample should find effects that mirror effects

on liability verdicts, as damage awards for the entire sample reflect jurors' assessment of
the amount of deserved compensation.
Also, some researchers examine the raw damage awards while others transform
the award value in some way (taking the natural log of the awards both reduces skewness
and allows examination of the magnitude of the awards instead of the raw numerical

values). For our data, a square root transformation was sufficient to alleviate skewness
and kurtosis, so complementary analyses using natural log transformation tests effects of
the relative magnitude of awards. Thus, all four possible ways of analyzing damage
awards (either square root or natural log transformation and either entire or partial
sample) were compared in this investigation.
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Analyses including the entire sample (n = 388) were conducted using M-plus

software (Muthen & Muthen, 2004), specifying the award as censored-below in order to
take into account the non-normal distribution of damage awards. A censored variable is
essentially a "cut-off' continuous variable, such that all values below a certain value have
the same value, producing a large number of observations at either the minimum or
maximum of the scale (therefore ordinary estimates of the mean and variance are biased).

Since jurors who decide that the defendant is not liable all must award $0 in
compensatory damages, but may still vary in perceptions of deserved compensation,
damage awards could be considered a censored variable. Though raw means for awards
were not analyzed, they are reported for ease of understanding and visualization.
Statistics reported pertain to the square root analyses of awards but findings are
significant for both square root and natural log transformations unless otherwise

indicated.
Compensatory damages. Several interesting main effects and interactions were
found when analyzing compensatory damage awards that included the entire sample of

participants. Significant main effects were found for the plaintiff's job and litigation
crisis attitudes (P = -14 and -.31 respectively, both p < .01). Predictably, participants
awarded more in compensatory damages to the surgeon (M= $3,241,922) than the
teacher (M= $1,755,095) and those participants who thought more that there was a
litigation crisis awarded less in damages. There were also several significant interactions
involving the company representative. The presence of an apology interacted with the

corporate representative (P = -.12, z = -2.28). With the presence of an apology, more
damages were awarded when the CEO was the representative, but when no apology was
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offered more was awarded when the engineer was the representative as opposed to the
CEO (see Table 5). Reflecting the interaction found on liability verdicts, the company's
revenue again interacted with the representative (P = -. 13, z = -2.52). When the
corporation was wealthier, more was awarded with the engineer (M= $2,809,739) than

the CEO (M

$2,290,034) but when the corporation was relatively poorer, compensatory

damages were larger with the CEO as the representative (M= $2,791,267) than the
engineer (M= $1,835,424). Finally, there was an interaction between the representative
and anti-corporation attitudes (p

=

.16, z

= 2 .88,

p

<

.01), such that those endorsing anti-

corporation attitudes awarded significantly more when the engineer was the

representative than the CEO but the opposite finding resulted among those who endorsed
such attitudes to a lesser extent (see Table 6).

Analyses focusing on only those participants who found liability and awarded
damages were conducted using SPSS software and linear regression. When the analyses
only focused on this group of participants (n = 312), several significant findings emerged.

-

Main effects were found for defendant revenue (p = -. 13, t = -2.16), plaintiff job (P =

.18, t = -6.46, p < .01), and litigation crisis attitudes (P = -.29, t = -2 .7 9 ,p < .01), as well
as a marginally significant main effect for apology (for the natural log analysis only;

p=

.11, t = 1.94, p < .06). Compensatory damages were larger when the corporation was

wealthy (M= $3,408,478 vs. M= $2,803,569). Unsurprisingly, damages were greater
when the plaintiff was a surgeon (M= $4,401,635) than a teacher (M= $2,101,781) and
when participants did not endorse litigation crisis as strongly. Surprisingly, compensatory
damages were greater when an apology was issued (M= $3,454,496) than when apology
was not given (M = $2,779,221). The only significant interaction was between
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representative and revenue (which mirrors the interaction found when all participants

were included in the analysis;

p = -. 13, t = -2.20).

Punitive damages. The next analysis focuses on the decision to award punitive

damages (thus the dependant variable is the dichotomous choice between yes and no).
We first examined those participants who first found liability and therefore were legally
able to award punitive damages (n = 312). The only variables with total main effects
emerging from this analysis were attitude factors regarding litigation crisis (P = -.26, z =

3.70, p < .01) and standards for wealth and size (P = .11, z = 2.21). Predictably, those
with greater anti-corporation attitudes were much more likely to impose punitive

damages. Those participants who believed more in holding wealthier and richer
companies to higher standards than smaller and less wealthy companies were more likely
to impose punitive damages than those endorsing such attitudes to a lesser extent.

When the entire sample was included in the analyses for punitive damages,
significant main effects were found for the product (for the natural log analysis only;

-. 12,

p=

-2.34), and attitudes concerning litigation crisis (p = -.25, z = - 4 .2 6 ,p < .01),

anti-corporation (P = .12, z = 2.16), and strict liability (p = .13, z =2.34). Punitive
damages where larger when the product was a car (M

$5,946,164) than a boat (M=

$3,369,354). Punitive damages were smaller among participants who thought more that

there was a litigation crisis present in society. However, punitive damages were larger
among those who endorsed anti-corporate attitudes and strict liability attitudes to a
greater degree than those who did not endorse such attitudes as much. Three noteworthy
interactions emerged from this analysis. The first interaction, between representative and

plaintiff job (P = .14, z = 2.21), indicated that punitive damage awards did not differ
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between the teacher and surgeon when the CEO represented the company (Ms

$4,261,366 and $4,251,465 respectively) but punitive damages were higher with the
teacher (M= $5,602,276) than the surgeon (M= $4,707,357) when the engineer was the
representative. The second interaction was between the plaintiff's job and the product (p
= .10, z = 2.32). Here both the surgeon and the plaintiff were given considerably less in
punitive damages when the product was a boat versus a car (Ms = $2,542,887 versus

$6,031,336 for the surgeon and Ms = $4,021,845 versus $5,864,505 for the teacher). The
final interaction was between company revenue and attitudes concerning standards for

size and wealth (P = -. 15, z = -3.51, p < .01). Predictably, those participants who endorsed
the attitudes punished the wealthier company more than the relatively poorer company,
but the opposite pattern emerged among those who did not endorse such attitudes (see

Table 7).
The final analysis focuses on those participants who found the defendant liable
and awarded punitive damages (n = 257). Main effects emerged for sample type (students
vs. adults;

p= .16,

t = 2.50), revenue (P = -. 13, t = -1.98), and litigation crisis attitudes (p

= -.15, t = -2.84, p < .01) and a marginal main effect was found for product (for the
natural log analysis only;

p = -. 12, t =-1.93, p < .06).

punitive damages than students (M

Adults tended to award larger

$7,771,956 vs. $5,520,992 respectively). Punitive

damages were greater when the corporation was wealthier than less wealthy (Ms =

$8,186,992 and $5,675,392 respectively). Punitive damages were smaller when the
participants endorsed to a greater degree litigation crisis attitudes. Punitive damages were

also smaller when the product was a boat (M= $5,160,273) as opposed to a car (M
$8,368,676). The only noteworthy interaction that emerged from this analysis was
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between company size and plaintiff job (p = .13, t = 2.01). When the corporation was

large, more punitive damages were assessed with the surgeon as the plaintiff rather than
the teacher (Ms = $9,182,385 and $3,783,364 respectively) but the opposite pattern
emerged when the corporation was small (M= $4,660,745 for surgeon and M
$10,390,677 for teacher).
Mediators
The following four mediators were examined in data analysis: outrage toward the
defendant, comprehension of judicial instructions, sympathy for the defendant, and
sympathy for the plaintiff. Comprehension influenced negligence verdicts and the
decision to award punitive damages, such that lower comprehension scores were
associated with pro-plaintiff preferences. That is, those with higher comprehension scores
were less likely to find the defendant negligent or were less likely to award punitive

damages. However, comprehension also impacted actual punitive damage amounts, such
that higher comprehension was associated with higher punitive awards (this curious
pattern also emerged in Studies #2 and #3 and is discussed in greater detail when the

focus of the project shifts to comprehension). Although sympathy for the plaintiff did not
affect any the measures, sympathy and outrage for the defendant impacted every
dependant variable. The effects of these mediators on each dependant measure are

provided in Table 8.
Across all analyses, most results consistent with mediation involved the effect of

litigation crisis attitudes. For all dependent variables, consistent with partial mediation
(because the direct effect was still significant), jurors who had greater beliefs about a
litigation crisis had more sympathy for the defendant and less outrage directed toward the
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defendant (see Figures 1 through 3). In analyses of negligence verdicts, the decision to
award punitive damages, and the amount of punitive awards, there was also an indirect
effect through comprehension of instructions, as jurors who had greater beliefs about a

litigation crisis actually had slightly higher comprehension. Other analyses showed that
outrage toward the defendant partially mediated the effect of the plaintiff's job on
compensatory damages. Outrage toward the defendant completely mediated the effect of
attitudes concerning standards for wealth and size on the decision to award punitive
damages. Outrage toward the defendant also completely mediated the representative by
revenue interaction on design defect verdicts and compensatory awards. Finally, outrage

toward the defendant mediated the representative by job interaction on punitive damage
awards.

A summary of the total and the direct effects described above are provided in
Table 8 and Table 9, respectively.
Discussion

Overall, the results suggest that mock jurors occasionally used certain evidence
properly (e.g., plaintiff occupation affected compensatory damages). However, the results
also demonstrate that mock jurors misused evidence frequently (e.g., defendant wealth
impacted compensatory damages) and improperly considered extralegal factors (e.g., the

presence of apology), which ultimately contributes to variability in liability and damage
award assessments. Horizontal inequities in verdicts may arise because members of two
juries viewing similar cases may endorse different attitudes, for example, regarding
corporations or the presence of a litigation crisis. Similarly, inequities may arise because
members of the juries are influenced differently by pieces of evidence or their
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consideration of extralegal factors. For instance, one jury may misuse evidence
concerning company revenue while the other jury does not or perhaps only one jury
improperly considers the company representative.

Litigant characteristics
A primary goal of this phase of the project involved exploring the interactions
between various plaintiff and defense characteristics. In Study #1, litigant characteristics
interacted twice to influence punitive damage awards (Job X Size and Job X
Representative). In both instances, plaintiff occupation was misused since punitive

damage amounts varied based on the plaintiff's job (which should not affect punitive
damages). The majority of the other interactions involved attitudinal factors and various
litigant characteristics. However, a plethora of main effects were found for the
independent variables, with defendant wealth and plaintiff occupation being particularly
influential. Consequently, both of these variables will be manipulated in the subsequent

stages of this research.
Jurors' proper use of evidence
Unfortunately, there were only two pieces of evidence that were used
appropriately by the mock jurors. First, plaintiff occupation was considered correctly
when determining compensatory damage amounts, such that the neurosurgeon was
awarded more money than the teacher. Second, defendant wealth influenced punitive
damages in the appropriate manner. In order for punitive damages to have a deterrent
effect, defendant wealth needs to be taken into account and mock jurors awarded

more

in

punitive damages against the wealthy corporation than the less wealthy corporation. Also,

defendant wealth did not impact liability verdicts, so our results do not support the deep-
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pocket effect. Although participants used both plaintiff occupation and defendant wealth

correctly for certain decisions, they also misused both pieces of evidence.
Jurors' improper use of evidence
Regrettably, mock jurors misused pieces of evidence more often than they
correctly considered them. The first notable effect concerns the influence of the
plaintiff's job on liability verdicts. As predicted, more pro-plaintiff liability verdicts were

found when the teacher was the plaintiff rather than the surgeon. Since it is likely that
most participants view themselves as more similar to a teacher than a neurosurgeon, this

finding is in accordance with the similarity-leniency hypothesis. However, this also
means that participants were misusing plaintiff occupation when deciding liability since
plaintiff occupation should not have any impact on liability verdicts.
Although mock jurors used defendant wealth properly when considering punitive
damages, they also misused such evidence when considering compensatory damages. As
hypothesized, wealthier corporations were required to pay more in compensatory
damages. It is possible that knowledge about the wealth of the defendant served as an
anchor that influenced the amount awarded for compensatory damages. Perhaps

participants' desire to punish the wealthier corporation bled into compensatory damage
assessments, or maybe participants felt as though the wealthier company could afford to
give more money to compensate the plaintiff's family than the relatively poorer
company.

When determining an amount for compensatory damages, participants were also
inappropriately influenced by the presence of an apology (an extralegal factor). While it
was expected that issuing an apology would reduce compensatory damages, the presence
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of an apology actually increased the damage amount. This seems contrary to prior
research findings that suggest that offering a remorseful apology might reduce awards
(Bornstein, 2002; Robbennolt, 2003). One possible explanation is that participants
suspected that an apology was an admission of responsibility (thus implying that the
plaintiff was not responsible and deserved more in compensation). Therefore, corporate

litigants should be hesitant to proffer an apology during trial (especially if that apology
might imply responsibility).
Participants also improperly considered the product as well as the plaintiff's job
when assessing punitive damages, such that more punitive damages were awarded when
the product was a car than a yacht, particularly if the plaintiff was a teacher. Since
participants are much more likely to use a car than a yacht, the death of a person using a

car may seem more frightening and realistic to participants, which could translate into the
desire to punish the manufacturer of the defective vehicle. Similarly, most participants
can relate to a teacher more than a surgeon, so participants were additively most punitive
when the teacher dies from using a car.

As previously mentioned, who the company representative was affected liability
verdicts, such that more pro-plaintiff liability verdicts were assessed when the engineer
represented the company as opposed to the CEO. Perhaps more lenient treatment was
provided when the CEO represented the company because participants may have felt that

the corporate defendant was taking the case very seriously if the CEO was present at the
trial (particularly when the company was wealthier). In other words, participants may
have been impressed that the head of the company was at trial ("He really stepped up to
the plate"), and thus offered more lenient treatment than when the engineer was present.
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Alternatively, since the engineer is likely viewed as more responsible for the incident
than the CEO, participants treat the corporate defendant worse when the engineer

represents them at trial (especially when the corporation is large or wealthy). Interactions
found between representative and revenue demonstrated that wealthy corporations
represented by the engineer were more likely found liable than when represented by the
CEO. Wealthy companies represented by the engineer were also required to pay the most
in compensatory damages. It is possible that when faced with a large or wealthy
corporate defendant, participants attempt to place a face on the otherwise "faceless"

entity. In essence, they look for a specific person to whom they can assign some blame or
responsibility. When the engineer represents the corporation, participants are able to
attach responsibility to him to the detriment of the corporation he represents. Moreover,
the most compensatory damages were assessed when the engineer does not apologize at

trial (the apology might be viewed as a means of expressing sympathy or accepting some
of that blame). These findings imply that corporate litigants should be cautious about
whom, if anyone at all, should sit with counsel during trial and whether or not they
should issue an apology (particularly if the representative played any role in the incident
in question).
Influence of attitudinal factors

Probably more generalizeable and predictive of actual juror behavior than the
specific litigant manipulations, several attitudinal factors either exerted a main effect on
verdicts or interacted with some litigant manipulations to affect liability and damage
award assessments. Therefore, the attorneys working for corporate defendants would be

wise to assess such case-specific attitudes during voir dire to assist in seating jurors
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favorable to their side (or at least, not biased against their clients). In the present

experiment, attitudes concerning a litigation crisis and standards for wealth/size
influenced liability verdicts (either negligence, design defect, or both). As might be
expected, more liability verdicts were rendered among those participants who did not
think there was a litigation crisis in our society and among those who felt negatively
towards wealthier defendants and larger companies. However, the interactions between
these attitudinal factors and the litigant manipulations are more interesting and revealing

than the main effects.
Attitudes regarding wealth and size interacted with revenue to affect both
negligence and design defect verdicts such that wealthier corporate defendants were less
likely to be found liable among participants who agreed less that wealthier defendants

and larger companies should be held to higher standards. That is, certain participants
exhibited an "anti-deep-pocket" effect, where the wealthier defendant actually got more
lenient treatment. Thus, wealthy defendants may want to ask venire members about their
standards regarding defendant wealth and size (though less wealthy defendants may not
want to concern themselves with this issue). Both liability verdicts were also affected by
the interaction between anti-corporation attitudes and the corporate representative. Since
the engineer is likely viewed as more responsible for the design and the resultant injuries
than the CEO, more pro-plaintiff liability verdicts are found when the engineer represents
the company, especially when participants hold more negative views about corporations.
This implies that corporate litigants would be prudent to measure potential jurors'

attitudes about corporations in general as well as be cognizant of who from the
corporation sits with counsel at trial.
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Not only did the main effects and interactions involving attitudinal factors
influence liability verdicts but they also affected damage award verdicts in the same
manner. For instance, those participants who believed a litigation crisis was present in
society awarded less in damage awards than those who did not hold such beliefs. Those
who endorsed anti-corporate attitudes awarded the most compensatory damages. And just

as wealthier corporate defendants were least likely found liable when participants did not
feel negatively toward wealthier defendants and larger companies, they were also least

likely required to pay punitive damages. These findings concerning damage awards
support the notion that corporate litigants should measure these attitudes among venire
members during voir dire.
Reactions to litigants

Emotional reactions to the litigants, particularly outrage and sympathy directed
toward the defendant, influenced a multitude of decisions including liability verdicts, the
decision to award punitive damages, and actual compensatory and punitive damage
awards. Moreover, many of the effects found in the present study, particularly those

involving attitudinal factors, were mediated by emotional reactions to the litigants.
Sympathy for the defendant and outrage toward the defendant influenced the effects
found on both liability and damage award verdicts. Therefore, besides assessing casespecific attitudes (e.g., those concerning corporate wealth and size) and more general
attitudes (e.g., about the presence of a litigation crisis), attorneys should consider jurors'

reactions to litigants as a powerful determinant of verdicts. Emotional reactions to the
litigants may be particularly useful when considering settlements for the case. For
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instance, knowing that jurors are unsympathetic toward one litigant may influence
willingness to settle.
Conclusion

Practical implications exist for the results of the first study. Attorneys or trial
consultants should examine factors that pertain to litigants in focus groups or mock trials
in order to assess which attitudes or pieces of evidence concerning corporate litigants
might be particularly influential in a specific case. Such assessments could also be
utilized injury selection to identify and seat sympathetic jurors (or conversely used to
eliminate unfavorable potential jurors). Attorneys or consultants should assess the impact
of specific pieces of evidence and case-specific attitudes related to corporate litigants by
questioning venire members about these factors during voir dire. Finally, settlement
decisions by corporate litigants might be influenced by the results. For example,
depending on which litigant characteristics are present or how jurors react to the litigants,
recommendations could be made regarding when to settle or what monetary values might
be offered in the settlement proposition.

Although not finding many interactions between litigant characteristics like I
thought could occur, this first study did show how mock jurors use the appropriate
information or extralegal information when determining liability and damage award
verdicts. Unfortunately, the results indicated that mock jurors were often influenced by

extralegal factors and improperly considered specific pieces of evidence. One potential
reason for this poor decision-making is failure to comprehend the judicial instructions
covering the applicable laws in the case. In the first study, a 15-item instruction
comprehension test was administered and the mean comprehension score was eight. That
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is, the average comprehension score was slightly over 50% correct, which is consistent
with low comprehension rates found in prior research (e.g., Elwork et al., 1977; Steele

Thornburg, 1988). The second study tests revised judicial instructions in an attempt to
improve comprehension rates and ultimately decision-making.
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Chapter Five: Study #2
The second study investigates two proposed procedural reforms that may
influence juror competence: revising judicial instructions and bifurcating the trial.
Typical instructions (used in Study #1) will be made more explicit and revised according
to principles of psycholinguistics (see Appendix D). Such revisions have resulted in
improving jurors' use of the proper evidence as well as their comprehension rates in past

research (Elwork et al., 1977; English & Sales, 1997; Wissler et al., 2001). Bifurcation of
the damage phases of the trial (another procedural reform designed to improve jurors'
decision-making and comprehension rates) will also be systematically explored. No
empirical studies to date have examined the effects of revised instructions in the context

of bifurcated civil trials. In other words, the combined effects of these two procedural
reforms have yet to be investigated.
This study has three goals. The first goal is to examine the effects of the revised
instructions in the context of a unitary trial. Some participants will be given either the
typical pattern instructions or the revised judicial instructions used in the first study. The
same comprehension test will be used to investigate improvements in comprehension
rates due to the revised instructions. It is hypothesized that the revised instructions will
lead to significantly higher comprehension rates than the typical pattern instructions. The
second goal of this investigation is to examine the effects of the revised instructions in
the context of a bifurcated trial. It is expected that bifurcating the compensatory and
punitive damage phases will decrease improper use of defendant wealth when

determining compensatory damages but amplify punitive damage awards (as in
Landsman et al., 1998 and Greene et al., 2000). However, it is also hypothesized that
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using revised instructions in bifurcated trials will decrease this tendency to augment
punitive damages, such that the best juror decisions will be made in bifurcated trials with
the revised instructions. The final goal of this study is to revisit the issue of mock jurors'

proper and improper use of evidence. Based on the results of the first study, it is
hypothesized that mock jurors will utilize certain evidence appropriately (e.g., plaintiff
occupation will affect compensatory damage awards) but will also misuse pieces of
evidence (e.g., defendant wealth will affect compensatory damages). Ideally, the revised
instructions will increase the proper use of evidence and decrease the misuse of evidence.
Method

Design
The design is a 3 (Instructions: none, pattern, or revised) X 2 (Plaintiff
occupation: schoolteacher vs. neurosurgeon) X 2 (Defendant wealth: annual net revenue

of 500 million dollars vs. 50 million dollars) X 2 (Trial type: unitary or bifurcation of
damages) between-subjects factorial design. The dependent variables of interest are the
participants' liability verdicts and any compensatory and punitive damages they would

award. Additionally, participants' scores on the 15 multiple-choice questions designed to
measure their comprehension of judicial instructions were measured. Also, participants
answered various attitudinal questions regarding their feelings toward the litigants and
their general views toward civil litigation and corporate defendants.
Participants

Four hundred and six participants were recruited from the psychology participant
pool at Florida International University. The experiment was posted on-line at
ww.experimetrix.com/fiu, where participants could read a brief description of the
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experiment, view available times and sign-up to participate. Only students enrolled in
PSY2020 and certain other classes are part of the participant pool. Those students under

the age of 18 years of age were not allowed to participate, as they must be the legal age to
serve on a jury. Their mean age was 20 years old, with 28.3% (n = 115) being male and
71.7% (n = 291) female. The majority of these students were Hispanic (n = 238), with the
remainder being Caucasian (n = 54), African-American (n = 46), Asian (n = 13), and
Other (n = 32). The remaining 23 participants preferred not to provide their racial

information.
Materials

This was a Web-based study so all materials were in the form of Web pages.
Stimulus materials include the same scenario used in the first study of a products liability
case involving a faulty automobile fuel system that resulted in a fire that killed the

plaintiff's spouse. In the bifurcated conditions, the scenario is broken into two parts.
Materials also include a 9-item questionnaire that measures participants' attitudes toward
the litigants and a 16-item questionnaire used to assess participant's attitudes regarding
civil litigation and corporate defendants. Some participants read either typical or revised
judicial instructions on the law. These participants were instructed to answer a 15-item

multiple-choice and true-false test designed to measure their comprehension of the
instructions. Stimulus materials also included a verdict form that required participants to
determine liability and award any damages they deemed appropriate. In bifurcated
conditions, the verdict form was split into two sections (a form for liability and
compensatory damages and a verdict form for punitive damages).
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Procedure

Participants read an informed consent form on the first Web page before
proceeding. By clicking on a button at the bottom of the page, they gave implied consent.
Next, they answered 16 attitudinal questions about civil litigation. Then they read a
hypothetical scenario depicting a products liability case involving defective fuel lines in a
car that caused an explosion and resulted in a man's death. His estate was suing the car
manufacturer.
Unitary trial conditions. In the unitary trial conditions, the participants read the
entire scenario before they answered any questions regarding reactions to the case or
deciding any verdict (i.e., liability, compensatory and punitive damages). Before reading
the scenario, participants first answered 16 items assessing their attitudes toward civil
litigation and corporations. After the scenario, participants answered 9 questions

regarding their reactions to various aspects of the case (e.g., sympathy for plaintiff,
impact of attorney's recommendation). After completing these items, participants were
instructed to click on a button at the bottom of the page to proceed. The following web
page contained either typical pattern or revised judicial instructions meant to approximate
the judicial instructions that would be given to jurors at the end of a trial, or contained no
instructions. After clicking on a button at the bottom of the page, these participants
continued to another web page that has 15 questions designed to assess their
comprehension of the judicial instructions they just read. After the comprehension
questions, liability verdicts were assessed. Assuming they found for the plaintiff,

participants were instructed to assign an appropriate amount for compensatory and
punitive damages as though they were jurors seated on the case. After clicking on a
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button at the bottom of this page, they continued to a short debriefing page, where they
are thanked for their participation and provided with contact information in case they had
any questions or concerns.
Bifurcated trial conditions. In the bifurcated conditions, participants first

answered 16 attitudinal questions regarding civil litigation and corporations. Next they
received the part of the scenario describing the event and testimony pertaining to
compensatory damages. Then some participants read either the pattern or revised judicial
instructions describing the law governing liability and compensatory damage decisions
before being asked 10 comprehension questions related to liability and compensatory

damages. All participants were then asked to determine liability and award any
compensatory damages. After clicking on a button at the bottom of the page, they
proceeded to the next page where they read information pertaining to punitive damage
(e.g., defendant wealth) before some participants received either the pattern or revised
judicial instructions governing punitive damage decisions. Next, they clicked on a button
at the bottom of the web page and continued to the comprehension measure relevant to

punitive damages before proceeding to a verdict page for punitive damages (where they
decided whether or not to award them). Participants then answered 9 questions regarding
their reactions to various aspects of the case (e.g., sympathy for plaintiff). Following

completion of these items, participants clicked on a button at the bottom of the page to
proceed. The final web page was a short debriefing page, where participants were
thanked for their participation and provided with contact information in case they had any
questions or concerns.
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Results
The same exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed on the 16 Likert-type
case and study-specific attitudinal items in order to replicate the results from Study One

identifying a smaller number of attitude factors that influenced liability and damage
award assessments. Three factors emerged from this analysis. The first factor, which
measured participants' belief that wealthier or bigger corporations should be held to a
higher standard of care (a = .51), was composed of two items. One example item was, "A

corporation should be held to a higher standard of responsibility than an individual." The
second factor, which measured anti-corporation attitudes (a = .51), was composed of two
items (e.g., "Big, wealthy corporations don't care about consumers."). The third factor,
which measured litigation crisis attitudes (a = .71), was composed of four items. For
example, one item was, "Jury awards are too large." These factors were entered into
future regressions as predictors of liability verdicts and damages awards. Findings are

significant at p < .05 unless otherwise stated. The corresponding z-values equate top <
.0, p <.01 andp < .001: z= 1.96, 2.58, and 3.27 respectively.
Structure of path analysis
The majority of the analyses for Study #2 (and Study #3) were structured as a
path analysis. The independent variables, the attitudinal factors from the EFA, and the
interactions involving these variables were all entered into the first level of the path
analysis. We were able to enter the interactions into the first level of the path analysis
along with the independent and attitudinal variables because the interaction terms were
residualized (Cohen, 1978; Lance, 1988) and therefore not correlated with these

variables. The second level or step of the path analysis involved comprehension. We
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entered participants' comprehension scores and residualized interactions involving

comprehension and the independent variables into the second level of the path analysis
(these interactions are described further below). If comprehension moderates the use or
misuse of evidence, then results should show interactions between the instruction revision
experimental conditions and evidentiary manipulations and also interactions between the
comprehension measures and evidentiary manipulations. This is a test of moderated

mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), and can be interpreted either as how comprehension
moderates the effects of evidence, or how the effect of comprehension on verdicts varies
under different evidence conditions.
Comprehension of judicial instructions
Comprehension of judicial instructions, measured by a 15-item test, was broken

down into four sections: comprehension for general issues (e.g., burden of proof), design
defect issues (e.g., legal definition of defect), and compensatory and punitive damage
awards (e.g., purpose of punitive damages). Instead of focusing on participants' reactions
to the litigants as potential mediators (as in Study #1), these four comprehension

measures were explored as potential mediators of liability verdicts and damage award
assessments. The mean scores of these measures of comprehension are given in Table 10.
Amazingly, these various comprehension scores did not mediate the effects found in the
analyses, so only total effects of the level-one variables are presented for Study #2.
We created two new variables based on our instruction manipulation to: (1)
)

compare having no instructions with having the original instructions (called instructl

and (2) compare having the original instructions with having the revised instructions
(labeled instruct2). Unsurprisingly, those participants who received no instructions had
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.20] and defect issues [F(l, 405) = 9.00, p <.01;

p = -. 18] than participants

p=

-

lower comprehension scores for both general issues [F(l, 405)= 2 5.14, p < .001;

who received

instructions. More importantly, those participants who received revised instructions had

higher comprehension scores for both general issues [F(1, 405) = 15.76,p < .001;
.19] and defect issues [F(l, 405)= 10.38,p < .001;

p= .13]

p3 =

than those who received

original instructions. As with general and defect issues, those participants who received
no instructions had lower comprehension scores for instructions regarding compensatory

damages than participants who received instructions [F(1, 405)= 6.29, p < .01; P = -.14]
and those with revised judicial instructions had higher comprehension scores for issues
concerning compensatory damages than those who received typical pattern instructions

[F(1, 405) = 3.73, p < .05; p = .12].
Comprehension was also influenced by attitudinal factors. For instance,
participants who believed there was a litigation crisis present in society tended to score
lower on the comprehension measure concerning compensatory damage awards than

those who did not believe in a litigation crisis [r(404)= -0.10, p <.06]. Similarly,
participants who endorsed litigation crisis attitudes scored lower on the comprehension
measure regarding punitive damages than those who did not endorse such attitudes
[r(388) = -0.14,p < .01). Finally, participants who received no instructions had lower
comprehension scores for punitive damages issues than participants who received

instructions [F(1, 389)= 32.07,p<.001;

p = -.28]

and those participants who received

revised instructions had higher comprehension for punitive damages issues than those
who received original instructions and [F(1, 389)= 3 0. 4 3 , p<.001; p = .25]. No other
manipulations influenced comprehension scores.
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Comprehension interactions
In addition examining the mediating effects of the above four comprehension
measures in the analyses described below, various interactions involving these
comprehension measures were explored as predictors of liability verdicts and damage

awards. The interactions were computed by multiplying the different comprehension
scores with each of the five independent variables (instructl, instruct2, trial type,
revenue, and occupation). Therefore, there were five interaction terms for each of the four
comprehension measures. For liability verdicts, comprehension interactions involving
comprehension scores for general issues and defect issues were entered into the

regressions. For compensatory damage awards, comprehension interactions included
those involving general and design issues, as well as comprehension for instructions
regarding compensatory damages. For both the decision to award punitive damages and
actual punitive damage awards, comprehension interactions involving comprehension for
instructions pertaining to punitive damages were included in the regressions, along with
comprehension interactions involving general issues, defect issues and compensatory
damage awards.

Liability verdicts
As in the first study, for questions regarding liability verdicts, the dependent
variable was the dichotomous choice between the plaintiff and the defendant on each
cause of action (negligence and design defect). 70.10% of the participants found the

defendant negligent and 83.4% found the defendant liable for a design defect. These
dichotomous liability verdicts were analyzed via path analysis using probit regressions.
M-plus software (Muthen & Muthen, 2004) was used for all probit regression path

84

analyses. For both liability verdicts, the total main effects and interactions involving the
independent variables and attitudinal factors were analyzed. After the main effects and

interactions involving the manipulations and attitudinal factors were examined, the main
effects and interactions involving comprehension scores for both general issues and
defect issues were then added to the regressions (comprehension scores for compensatory
and punitive damages were not included since they are not relevant to liability verdicts).
For the issue of negligence, total main effects were found for the judicial

instruction manipulation, the factors measuring differing standards and anti-corporate
attitudes, and the comprehension of judicial instructions pertaining to design defects.
Those who received the revised judicial instructions found the defendant negligent more
often than participants who received the original instructions (74.6% vs. 66.5%,

respectively;

p= .14, z =

1.99). Not surprisingly, those who held greater anti-corporate

attitudes or agreed more that wealthier or larger corporations should be held to higher

standards were more likely to find negligence (p = .16, z

2.41 and

= .17, z = 2.48,

respectively). Finally, those who scored higher on the comprehension measure for defect
-

issues were less likely to find negligence than those who scored poorly (P = -.22, z =

4.04, p < .001).
In addition to examining the above total effects, various potential two-way
interactions were also explored: the nine possible two interactions among independent
variables (e.g., trial type X defendant wealth, instruct1 X occupation), a total of six
interactions between independent variables and specific attitudinal factors (differing
wealth/size attitudes X defendant revenue, litigation crisis attitudes X each IV), and the
relevant interactions between independent variables and certain comprehension scores
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(e.g., plaintiff occupation X comprehension for defect issues), as described above. The

only significant two-way interaction detected was between trial type and comprehension
for design defect issues (P = .11, z = 2.04; see Table 11). Here, participants with higher
comprehension scores were less likely to find the defendant negligent than those with

lower scores. This interaction was driven by the unitary trial condition (P = -.22, p < .01),
although the same pattern emerged in the bifurcated conditions (though clearly not

significant;

p = -.06, p

.49). A total of 13 three-way interactions were examined. Five

of these were among the independent variables (instruct 1 X trial type X job, instruct1 X
trial type X wealth, instruct2 X trial type X job, instruct2 X trial type X wealth, trial type
Xjob X wealth). The other eight involved each of the four comprehension measures

(along with trial type and either job or wealth). However, no significant three-way
interactions emerged from any of the analyses.
Only one total main effect emerged when examining the verdict concerning a
design defect. As with negligence, a main effect of comprehension was found, such that
participants were less likely to find the defendant liable for a design defect when they
-

scored higher on the comprehension measure concerning design defects (p = -. 23, z *

4.01, p < .001). A significant interaction between plaintiff occupation and comprehension
for general issues showed that, when the plaintiff was a school-teacher, participants with

high comprehension scores were less likely to find the defendant liable for a design
defect than those with low scores (74.0% found the defendant liable vs. 90.2%), but not

when the plaintiff is a neurosurgeon (84.1% vs. 82.7%) ( = -. 11, z = -2.16). A
marginally significant interaction between the manipulations of trial type and judicial
instructions revealed that participants were more likely to find the defendant liable when
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they received no instructions in unitary trials (88.9% vs. 79.2%) but when judicial
instructions were given in bifurcated trials (86.4% vs. 79.8%; P= -.19, z = -1.93,p < .06).
Damage awards

As in the first study, damage awards were analyzed in a number of ways (e.g.,
analyzing the awards of those participants that first found the defendant liable, analyzing

transformed values of damage award). In all, four possible ways of analyzing damage
awards (either square root or natural log transformation and either entire or partial
sample) were compared in this investigation. Once again, analyses including the entire
sample were conducted using M-plus software (Muthen & Muthen, 2004), specifying the
award as a censored-below, continuous variable. Though raw means for awards were not

analyzed, they are reported for ease of understanding and visualization. Statistics reported
pertain to the square root analyses of awards but findings are significant for both square
root and natural log transformations unless otherwise indicated.
Compensatory damages. When the entire sample was included in the analysis,

three main effects were found. For the natural log analysis only, a main effect of anticorporation attitudes revealed the same pattern shown on the negligence verdict (P

=

.14,

z= 2.43). A main effect of the plaintiff's job (P = -.11, z= -2.14) showed that mock
jurors awarded less in compensatory damages to the schoolteacher (M= $2,044,125) than
the neurosurgeon (M= $3,954,151). For the natural log analysis only, a main effect of

comprehension revealed that participants with higher comprehension scores on

2.05). No significant two or three-way interactions were detected.
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-. 11, z=

-

instructions concerning compensatory damages awarded fewer damages (P

Linear regression analyses focusing on only those participants who found liability
and awarded damages were conducted using SPSS software. When the analyses only
focused on this group of participants, several significant findings emerged. Besides

replicating the total effect of plaintiff's job (3 = -. 21, t = -3.12, p < .01), analyzing the
square root of damages revealed that litigation crisis attitudes significantly affected
damage awards, such that participants who believed more in the presence of a litigation
crisis awarded less in compensatory damages (P

=

-. 12, t

=

-2.21). Analyzing the square

root of damages revealed the only significant interaction, which was between trial type

and job (P = -. 18, t = -2.07). Here the neurosurgeon received greater damages in the
bifurcated trial than the unitary trial while the teacher received more money in the unitary
trial than the bifurcated trial (see Table 12). No significant three-way interactions were
detected.
Punitive damages. The next analysis focuses on the decision to award punitive
damages (thus the dependent variable is a dichotomous choice). We examined those

participants who first found liability and therefore were legally able to award punitive
damages (n = 361). The only total effect emerging from this analysis was for
comprehension of design defect issues, such that participants who scored higher on the
comprehension measure for judicial instructions regarding design defects were less likely
to award punitive damages than those who scored lower on this measure of

comprehension (p = -.32, z = -3.45, p < .001). The only significant interaction found was
again between trial type and job (p = .14, z = 2.06), such that plaintiff occupation had no
effect in unitary trials but did affect the likelihood that punitive damages would be

awarded in bifurcated trials (see Table 13). A marginally significant interaction was
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found between defendant revenue and comprehension for judicial instructions for defect
issues (3 = -. 18, z = -1.
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,p < .06). When comprehension scores were low, defendant

wealth did not impact the likelihood that punitive damages would be awarded (79.6%
award punitive damages when the company is wealthy vs. 81.2% when the company is
less wealthy), but revenue does influence the likelihood when comprehension scores are
high (70.10% award damages when the company is wealthy vs. 54.5% when the company

is less wealthy).
When the entire sample was included in the analyses for punitive damages,
significant total effects were found for trial type (P = .12, z =2.72) and defendant wealth
(3 = -. 12, z = -2.46). Both of these effects emerged only when examining the square root
of damage awards. Participants awarded more in punitive damages against the wealthier

company (M= $8,819,160) than the less wealthy company (M= $3,193,513) and when
the trial was bifurcated

(M = $9,261,845) than when it was unitary (M= $3,637,394).

A
-

main effect of litigation crisis attitudes on punitive damage awards was also found (P =
.12, z = -2.41), such that those participants who believed more in the presence of a

litigation crisis awarded fewer damages. Finally, a significant total main effect emerged
for comprehension of the judicial instructions regarding compensatory damage awards (1
=

-. 21, z = -3.83, p < .01). Here, participants with lower comprehension scores tended to

award more in punitive damages than those with higher comprehension scores. For the
natural log analysis only, the interaction between comprehension for compensatory
damage awards and trial type was significant ( = .12, z = 2.44), revealing that, when
comprehension was lower, slightly greater damages were given in the bifurcated trial

than the unitary trial, but when comprehension was higher, greater damages were
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awarded in the unitary trial (see Table 14). The natural log analysis also revealed a

significant interaction between comprehension regarding punitive damages and trial type
(P = -. 16, z = -2.65; see Table 15). In the unitary trial, higher comprehension was related
to greater damage awards but in the bifurcated trial, greater damages were associated
with lower comprehension. Once again, the interaction between trial type and job

emerged in the square root analysis of damages (p = -.13, z = -2.30), showing that the
schoolteacher received more money than the surgeon in unitary trials (Ms = $5,319,743
vs. $2,268,915 respectively) but received less money than the surgeon in bifurcated trials

(Ms = $4,250,097 vs. $13,975,274 respectively).
The final analysis focuses on those participants who found the defendant liable
and awarded punitive damages (n = 308). The main effect of litigation crisis attitudes

once again emerged (p = -. 14, t = -2.47). For the square root analysis, total effects were
also replicated for defendant revenue (p = -. 14, t = -2.42), and trial type (p = .18, t = 3.21,
p < .01), as was the interaction between trial type and job (P = -. 19, t = -2.27), which
reflected the same pattern found in the analysis of the entire sample. Also, a significant

total effect was found for comprehension of the judicial instructions regarding punitive
damages (f = .19, t = 3.28, p < .01). Here, participants with higher comprehension scores
tended to award more in punitive damages than those with lower comprehension scores.
Curiously, this pattern is opposite of the other main effects of comprehension, where
higher comprehension scores tended to indicate a pro-defense preference. Finally, the
only other significant two-way interaction was between comprehension for compensatory

damages and the judicial instruction manipulation (p = .20, t = 2.82). When no judicial
instructions were given, those with high comprehension awarded much more than those
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with low comprehension (Ms = $5,968,249 vs. $1,173,820) but when instructions were
provided comprehension scores only impacted punitive awards slightly (Ms = $3,421,168
vs. $2,876,314).
A summary of the total effects described above is provided in Table 16.
Discussion

Comprehension of judicial instructions
Examining if revising judicial instructions could improve comprehension rates
was one of the main goals of Study #2. Indeed, as hypothesized, revising the judicial
instructions significantly increased overall comprehension rates. Not surprisingly, the
average total comprehension score on the 15-item test among those who did not receive
any instructions was only 5.92, which was significantly lower than the average score of
those who received the typical pattern instructions (M =7.17). Interestingly, although the
average total comprehension score among those who received the revised instructions (M
=8.13) was significantly higher than the other two average scores, it still was rather
dismal. Curiously, this average score was almost exactly equal to the average

comprehension score from Study #1 (M= 8.12), where only the typical pattern
instructions were given. One likely reason for this notable finding is that only
undergraduate students served as participants in the second study, whereas community

members from the across the country participated in the first study (community members
tend to be older and perhaps pay more attention to and are more interested in the research
than students who participate as a requirement of class). The percentage correct (just less
than 55%) is consistent with previous research demonstrating poor comprehension rates

of judicial instructions (Elwork et al. 1977; English & Sales, 1997), which implies that
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the initial revisions of the judicial instructions did not sufficiently increase
comprehension. Consequently, another round of revisions occurred for the third and final

study.
Even though average total comprehension scores among those who received the
revised instructions were rather poor, it is encouraging that the revisions did have a
significant effect on all four measures of comprehension. That is, comprehension rates
were increased for general and design defect issues, as well as for issues pertaining to
compensatory and punitive damage awards. Interestingly, higher comprehension scores

on these various measures of comprehension tended to indicate a pro-defense preference,
such that higher comprehension scores were related to more verdicts for the defense or
lower damages awards, even when the comprehension measure was conceptually
unrelated to the verdict in question. For instance, those participants with higher
comprehension scores on questions related to design defects were less likely to find the

defendant liable for a design defect (as well as less likely to find the defendant negligent
and less likely to award punitive damages-an issue which will be addressed shortly).
Similarly, those who had higher comprehension scores regarding compensatory damages
awarded less in compensatory damages and also tended to award less in punitive

damages.
The one exception to this trend of higher comprehension indicating a pro-defense
bias was the finding that participants with higher comprehension scores on questions
pertaining to punitive damages awarded more in punitive damages than those with lower
scores. It is unclear why the effect of high comprehension scores on punitive damages

was different from the other effects regarding comprehension of judicial instructions-
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perhaps those who understand punitive damages and how they should be awarded were
sensitive to one of the elements of punitive damages that others were not (e.g., defendant

conduct). Alternatively, since punitive damages are not suppose to be awarded that often,
perhaps those who comprehend punitive damages are skeptical regarding actually
awarding punitive damages. Yet once they become convinced that punitive damages are
warranted, those with higher comprehension tend to award large amounts.

Another interesting finding concerning comprehension of the judicial instructions
was that comprehension for certain issues (e.g., compensatory damages) affected
conceptually unrelated decisions (e.g., punitive damage awards). The effect of
comprehension for specific issues on unrelated decisions tended to reflect the above
finding (that higher comprehension rates indicated a preference for the defense) even
among interactions involving comprehension and independent variables. For example,

there was a significant interaction between comprehension related to defect issues and
trial type on negligence verdicts. In both unitary and bifurcated trials-but particularly in
unitary trials-participants with higher comprehension scores were less likely to find the
defendant negligent than those with low comprehension scores (even though

comprehension for design defect issues should be unrelated to negligence verdicts).
A potential explanation for the above findings that emerged regarding
comprehension involves the intelligence of the participants. Those participants with
higher comprehension scores may simply be more intelligent (or at least pay more
attention to the stimulus materials) than those with lower comprehension scores. As a

result, they may have higher internal standards of proof, demand more information, are
higher in their need for cognition, or are more rigorous in their decision-making than

93

those with low comprehension. Indeed, one study found that people high in the need for
cognition were less supportive of punitive responses to crime (Sargent, 2004). One might
speculate this occurs because they realize the many gray areas involved in a jury trial,
endorse more complex attributions for behavior, or can think of more justifications for
the defense's conduct than their less cerebral counter-parts.

A final note about comprehension concerns the judicial instruction manipulation
and mock jurors' use of evidence. While it was hoped that better use of evidence would
occur when revised instructions were provided, mock jurors actually utilized evidence

appropriately for the majority of their decisions, regardless of whether they received the
revised or original judicial instructions. While it is encouraging that mock jurors'

decisions were largely in accordance with the laws and instructions relevant to the case,
in this study, much prior research shows that jurors use evidence inappropriately. Thus,

we still anticipate that revising judicial instructions can improve jurors' decisions and
their use of evidence, and the next study will focus on evidence misused frequently in

past research (injury severity and defendant conduct). Perhaps this will be reflected in the
third study, following another round of revisions, which ideally will create a larger
distinction in mean comprehension rates between the original and revised instructions.
Bifurcation of the trial
Although the first hypothesis concerning this study was borne out (that the
procedural reform of revising judicial instructions would increase comprehension rates),

the second hypothesis regarding the procedural reform of bifurcation was only partially
confirmed. It was hypothesized that bifurcation would decrease the use of defendant
wealth when determining compensatory damages but increase punitive damages.
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Unfortunately, the results demonstrated that bifurcating the damage phases had no
advantages and perhaps lead to worse decisions than those made in unitary trials. In other
words, bifurcation did not decrease the influence of wealth on compensatory damages
(mainly because defendant wealth did not significantly affect compensatory damages). In

addition, bifurcating the trial augmented punitive damage awards, as hypothesized based
on previous research (e.g., Landsman et al., 1998; Greene et al., 2000). Bifurcating the
damage phases of the trial also increased the inappropriate influence of comprehension
for compensatory damages on punitive damage awards (see Table 14).
The disadvantage of bifurcating the trial was also reflected in an interaction found

frequently in the current study. The significant interaction between trial type and job on
both the decision to award punitive damages and the actual punitive damages indicate
that bifurcating the trial impacted the effect of job on these dependent variables. For
instance, the most damages were awarded when the trial was bifurcated and the plaintiff
was a neurosurgeon. Of course, this effect of bifurcation is undesirable since plaintiff

occupation should not influence punitive damages. Indeed, occupation did not influence
the decision to award punitive damages in unitary trials (see Table 13). When considering
the above findings, it appears that bifurcating the trial offers little advantages and can
actually lead to worse decision-making compared to unitary trials. Consequently, the

results suggest that bifurcation (of the damage phases at least) is not a valuable or
effective procedural reform.
Jurors' proper & improper use of evidence

The final hypothesis regarding this phase of the project concerns the use (or
misuse) of evidence. It was expected that mock jurors would aptly utilize certain pieces
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of evidence but also improperly consider evidence. Indeed, mock jurors correctly used
plaintiff occupation and defendant wealth. That is, plaintiff occupation only affected

compensatory damages and not liability verdicts or punitive damage awards (expect in
bifurcated trials, as mentioned above). Defendant wealth only affected punitive damage
awards and not liability verdicts or compensatory damages (that is, there was not support
for the deep-pocket effect). In fact, mock jurors hardly misused any evidence-the only
improper use of evidence occurred when the trial was bifurcated (e.g., the

aforementioned interaction between trial type and job on the decision to award punitive
damages and actual punitive damage awards). Certainly such evidence speaks against
splitting up the damage phases of a trial, though bifurcating the liability and damage
phases may still be a valuable procedural reform.
Influence of attitudinal factors

While attitudinal factors influenced nearly all dependent variables in the first
study, these factors did not seem to matter as much in this phase of the research. In fact,
only main effects were found and none were particularly surprising. For instance,
participants who thought more that there was the presence of a litigation crisis in society
awarded less in compensatory and punitive damages. Participants who endorsed anticorporate attitudes to a greater extent were more likely to find the defendant negligent

and award more in compensatory damages. Perhaps attitudes were not very prognostic in
this study because only students served as participants in this phase of the project and
attitudes are less predictive of behavior among students as compared to non-student
adults. Though attitudes did not seem to exert much influence in the current study, they

will still be assessed in the final phase of the investigation. It is expected that these
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attitudinal factors will continue to influence decision-making (especially since the third
study utilizes non-student adults, as in Study #1). Consequently, attorneys would still be

wise to assess such attitudes during voir dire to gain important insight into certain juror's
inclinations and biases.
Conclusion

The main focus of Study #2 was testing two possible procedural reforms.
Although bifurcation did not improve decision-making and actually appeared counterproductive, revising the judicial instructions did increase comprehension rates. However,
since total comprehension was still rather poor, another round of revisions will be made
before the final study. Demonstrating that these revisions will increase comprehension
rates even further than in Study #2 is one goal of the final study. Other goals are to

explore how jurors misuse other pieces of evidence-specifically injury severity and
defendant reprehensibility-and to examine the effects those revisions have on the
misuse of evidence. Can increased comprehension increase the mock jurors' correct use
and/or decrease the improper use of evidence?

97

Chapter 6: Study #3
This investigation explores whether the revised instructions developed in the
second study improve jurors' use of appropriate evidence. Mock jurors will receive either
typical judicial instructions or the revised instructions after reading about a products
liability case that includes various evidentiary manipulations. These evidentiary

manipulations were chosen based on prior research examining the inappropriate use of
such evidence (e.g., Landsman et al., 1998, where reprehensibility affected compensatory
damages; Cather et al., 1996, where injury severity did not influence compensatory
damages). Additionally, the role of comprehension as a mediator will be considered.
Mock jurors will be given a comprehension test to replicate that the revised instructions
lead to better comprehension rates than the typical judicial instructions.
There are two main goals of the third study. The primary goal is to explore how
comprehension affects mock jurors' decisions. We want to improve mock jurors'
decision-making by ensuring that they only use the appropriate evidence when

determining liability and awarding compensatory and punitive damages. Therefore, of
particular interest in the third study is whether or not mock jurors are correctly using
evidence when reaching their verdicts. More importantly, we are interested in exploring if
revising the instructions can improve those verdicts. Therefore, interactions between the
manipulation of judicial instructions and the evidentiary manipulations will be examined.
We will also analyze the interactions between the various comprehension measures and

the evidentiary manipulations. It is hypothesized that the revised instructions will
decrease the improper use of injury severity, defendant reprehensibility, and defendant
wealth by explicitly stating how the law wishes jurors to treat specific pieces of evidence.
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A secondary goal was to replicate the effect that the revised instructions increase mock
jurors' comprehension rates.
Method

Design
The design is a 2 (Instructions: pattern or revised) X 2 (Defendant wealth: annual
net revenue of 500 million dollars or 50 million dollars) X 2 (Defendant conduct: lowreprehensibility or high-reprehensibility) X 2 (Injury Severity: mild or severe) betweensubjects factorial design. The dependent variables of interest are the participants' liability

verdicts and any compensatory and punitive damages they would award. Additionally,
participants' scores on the 15 multiple-choice questions designed to measure their
comprehension of judicial instructions are of interest. Also, participants will answer
various attitudinal questions regarding their feelings toward the litigants and their views

toward civil litigation in general.
Participants

Three hundred forty-six participants were recruited from the psychology
participant pool at Florida International University. The experiment was posted on-line at

www.experimetrix.com/fiu, where participants could read a brief description of the
experiment, view available times and sign-up to participate. Only students enrolled in

PSY2020 and certain other classes are part of the participant pool. Those students under
the age of 18 years of age were not allowed to participate, as they must be the legal age to
serve on a jury. Their mean age was 21 years old, with 17.9% (n = 62) being male and

82.1% (n = 284) female. The majority of these students were Hispanic (n = 191), with the
remainder being Caucasian (n = 68), African-American (n = 37), Asian (n = 8), and Other
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(n = 27). The remaining 15 student participants preferred not to give their racial

information. An additional 176 non-student, adult participants were recruited through a

Web-based participant pool (http://w

.studyresponse.com) that sends out solicitations

regarding Web-based studies. Their mean age was 35 years old, with 51.8% (n = 91)
being male and 48.2% (n = 85) female. The majority of these non-student participants

were Caucasian (n = 112), with the remainder being African-American (n = 19), Asian (n
= 16),

Hispanic (n

=

13), Native American (n

=

3), and Other (n = 13). As in Study #1,

analyses were conducted separately for student and non-student, adult participants but no
differences emerged between these two groups so results are presented together.
Materials
Stimulus materials include an approximately 1500 word scenario describing a

products liability case involving faulty seat design in an automobile and a 9-item
questionnaire that measures participants' attitudes toward the litigants. A 16-item
questionnaire is also used to assess participant's attitudes regarding civil litigation and
corporate defendants. Participants will read either typical or revised judicial instructions
on the law and are instructed to answer a 15-item multiple-choice and true-false test

designed to measure comprehension of the instructions. Materials also include a verdict
form that requires participants to determine liability and award any damages they deem
appropriate.
Procedure
Participants read an informed consent form on the first Web page before

proceeding. By clicking on a button at the bottom of the page, they gave implied consent.
The following web page consisted of 16 items that assessed participants' attitudes toward
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civil litigation and corporations. Next, they read a hypothetical scenario depicting a
products liability case involving defective van seats that collapsed upon a rear-impact
accident, injuring a passenger in the back seat. The passenger is suing the mini-van
manufacturer. The various litigant manipulations (e.g., defendant wealth, injury severity)

were incorporated into the summary. Defendant conduct was operationalized in terms of
the amount of safety research done and knowledge of similar incidences in the past.
Highly reprehensible defendants conducted very little safety research on the van seats and
knew of several similar incidences in the past. Defendants low in reprehensibility
conducted a lot of safety research and knew of no similar incidences in the past. Injury
severity was operationalized as either a concussion and some hospitalization (mild) or

prolonged hospitalization and permanent paralysis (severe). At the end of the web page
containing the scenario, there were 9 questions participants answered regarding their
reactions to various aspects of the case (e.g., anger toward defendant). After completing
these 9 items, participants clicked on a button at the bottom of the page to proceed. The

following web page contained either typical pattern or revised judicial instructions meant
to approximate the judicial instructions that would be given to jurors at the end of a trial.
After clicking on a button at the bottom of the page, participants continued to another
web page that had 15 questions designed to assess their comprehension for the judicial
instructions they just read. After this page, participants preceded to a web page that

assessed their verdict for liability. Assuming they found for the plaintiff, participants
were instructed to assign an appropriate amount for compensatory and punitive damages
as though they were jurors seated on the case. After clicking on a button at the bottom of
this page, they continued to a short debriefing page, where they were thanked for their
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participation and provided with contact information in case they had any further
questions or concerns.

Results
Once again, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed on the 16 Likerttype case and study-specific attitudinal items in order to replicate the identification of a
smaller number of attitudinal factors that influenced liability and damage award
assessments. The same four factors that were seen in Study #1 emerged from this

analysis. The first factor, which measured participants' belief that wealthier and bigger
defendants should be held to a higher standard of care than less wealthy and smaller
defendants (a = .68), was composed of three items. One example item was, "A
corporation should be held to a higher standard of responsibility than an individual." The
second factor, which measured anti-corporation attitudes (a

.65), was composed of two

items (e.g., "Big, wealthy corporations don't care about consumers."). The third factor,

which measured litigation crisis attitudes (a = .69), was composed of four items. For
example, one item was, "Jury awards are too large." The final factor, which measured a

sense of strict liability (a = .56), was made up of three items (e.g., A company should
never be excused from compensating consumers injured by its products.). These factors
were entered into future regressions as predictors of liability verdicts and damages

awards. Findings are significant at p < .05 unless otherwise stated. The corresponding zvalues equate to p < .05, p < .01 and p < .001: z = 1.96, 2.58, and 3.27, respectively.
Analyses were conducted separately for sample type (students vs. non-student, adult
participants). As in Study #1, we examined total main effects and interactions involving
sample type but since only one significant difference emerged between the two groups,
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the results are presented together. The single effect of sample type on comprehension is
covered below.

Comprehension of judicial instructions
Just as in Study #2, a path analysis was utilized. The independent variables, the
attitudinal factors from the EFA, and the residualized interactions (Cohen, 1978; Lance,
1988) involving these variables were all entered into the first level of the path analysis.
The second level of the path analysis involved comprehension, with comprehension and
residualized interactions involving comprehension being entered at this point. As in

Study #2, comprehension of judicial instructions was once again broken down into four
sections: comprehension for general issues, comprehension for design defect issues, and
comprehension for compensatory as well as punitive damage awards. These four
comprehension measures were explored as potential mediators in the analyses of liability
verdicts and damage award assessments. The mean scores of these measures of

comprehension are given in Table 17.
Notably, those participants who received the revised judicial instructions had
significantly higher comprehension scores than those who received the original judicial

instructions for general issues [F(1, 520) = 45.81,p < .001;

p= -0.28;

r

.29], defect

issues [F(1, 520) = 78.59, p < .001; P = -0.37; r = .36), punitive damage issues [F(1, 520)
= 77.64,p < .001;

p = -0.39; r = .36] and total comprehension

[F(1, 520)= 117.92,p <

.001; r = .43]. Therefore, only comprehension for compensatory damages was not
significantly increased by use of the revised judicial instructions. Also, non-student

participants scored significantly higher than student participants on the design defect
comprehension measure [F(1, 520) = 4.91, p < .05], and jurors who read about the
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reprehensible defendant scored slightly lower on the design defect comprehension

measure (M= 3.38) than those who did not read about the reprehensible defendant (M
3.74) [F(1, 520)= 5.1 2 ,p < .05]. No other manipulated variables influenced
comprehension scores.

In addition to exploring the mediating effects of the four comprehension
measures, we also examined various interactions involving these comprehension

measures. The interactions were computed as residualized interaction terms (Cohen,
1978; Lance, 1988) between the different comprehension scores and each of the
independent variables (e.g., design defect comprehension X defendant conduct). As in the
previous study, comprehension interactions involving comprehension scores for both
general and defect issues were entered into the regressions for liability verdict in the

second level of a path analysis. For compensatory damage awards, comprehension
interactions also involved comprehension for instructions concerning compensatory
damages. Finally, for both the decision to award punitive damages and actual punitive
damage awards, comprehension interactions involving comprehension for instructions

pertaining to punitive damages were included, along with all the other possible
comprehension interactions.
Liability verdicts

Since very few significant effects were found on the dichotomous negligence
verdict in the previous two studies, design defect was the only liability verdict given by

jurors in the current study. Thus, for questions regarding liability verdicts, the dependent
variable was the dichotomous choice between the plaintiff and the defendant for this
cause of action (54.8% of the participants found the defendant liable for a design defect).
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For this dichotomous verdict, path analysis using probit regressions was used to analyze
the total effects and interactions involving the independent variables and attitudinal
factors. Main effects and interactions involving comprehension scores for general and
defect issues were also included in the path analysis (comprehension scores for
compensatory and punitive damages were not included since they are not relevant to

liability verdicts). M-plus software (Muthen & Muthen, 2004) was used for all probit
regression path analyses.
Significant total effects emerged for defendant conduct, the factors measuring
litigation crisis and strict liability attitudes, and the comprehension of the judicial
instructions pertaining to design defects. Unsurprisingly, more design defect verdicts

were found for the plaintiff when the conduct of the defendant was highly reprehensible
than when not (65.3% and 50.8%, respectively; P = -. 18, z = - 2 .60 , p < .01). Also, those
who held more litigation-crisis attitudes were less likely to find liability than those who
did not endorse such attitudes as much (P = -. 18, z

=

- 3 .0 2 ,p < .01) and those who held

more strict liability attitudes were more likely to find liability (P = .18, z = 3.11, p < .01).
Finally, those who scored higher on the comprehension measure for judicial instructions
pertaining to design defect issues were less likely to find a design defect than those who

scored poorly (P = -.13, z = -3.02, p < .01).
In addition to examining the above total effects, a total of 23 potential two-way
interactions were also analyzed: those six among the independent variables (e.g., injury
severity X defendant wealth), those between independent variables and specific
attitudinal factors (differing wealth/size attitudes X defendant wealth, strict liability
attitudes X each IV, and litigation crisis attitudes X each IV), and the eight relevant
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interactions between independent variables and certain comprehension scores (e.g., injury
severity X comprehension for defect issues). The only significant two-way interaction
detected was between litigation crisis attitudes and defendant wealth (P = .15, z = 2.07).
Here, among participants above the mean (thus representing those who believed more

that there is a litigation crisis present in society) were slightly less likely to find the
wealthier defendant liable (49.9%) than the less wealthy defendant (53.3%), but
participants who did not endorse such attitudes were much more likely to find the

wealthier defendant liable (68.4% and 50.1%, respectively). The four possible three-way
interactions between the independent variables were also examined, but, as in the
previous study, no significant three-way interactions emerged from any analyses.
Damage awards
As in the prior studies, damage awards were analyzed in a number of ways:
analyzing the awards from the entire sample, analyzing the awards of only those
participants who first found the defendant liable, and analyzing transformed values of
damage awards (square root and natural log transformations). In all, four possible ways
of analyzing damage awards (either square root or natural log transformation and either
entire or partial sample) were compared in this investigation. Once again, analyses
including the entire sample were conducted using M-plus software (Muthen & Muthen,

2004), specifying the award as censored-below, continuous variable. Though raw means
for awards were not analyzed, they are reported for ease of understanding and
visualization. The statistics provided below are for the natural log analyses of damage
awards but findings are significant for both square root and natural log transformations
unless otherwise indicated.
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Compensatory damages. When the entire sample was included in the analysis,
five total effects were detected. A main effect of injury severity ( = -. 25, z = -5.59, p <

.001) showed that mock jurors properly used this evidence, such that much higher awards
were given to the severely injured plaintiff (M= $1,515,490) than to the plaintiff whose
-

injuries were relatively minor (M= $121,033). A main effect of defendant conduct ( =
.14, z = -2.46) showed that fewer compensatory damages were awarded when the
defendant's conduct was less reprehensible (M= $715,404) than when highly

-

reprehensible (M= $1,119,832). A main effect of litigation crisis attitudes (P = -. 15, z=
2.05) revealed that participants who believed more that a litigation crisis exists awarded
fewer damages. A main effect of strict liability attitudes (P = .17, z = 3.58,p < .001)
indicated that participants who agreed more that strict standards were appropriate

awarded greater damages than those who did not endorse such attitudes as much. A main

effect of anti-corporation attitudes ( = .10, z = 1.96) revealed that participants who held
more anti-corporate attitudes awarded slightly greater damages than those who held these
attitudes to a lesser extent (for the natural log analysis only).
A total of 27 potential two-way interactions were examined (the same 23 that
were explored with liability, along with the four involving comprehension for
compensatory damages). Four significant two-way interactions emerged. First, litigation

crisis attitudes interacted with defendant revenue (P = .14, z = 2.41), such that more
money was levied against the wealthier defendant among those below the mean but the
opposite pattern emerged among those participants who believe more in a litigation crisis
(see Table 18). Litigation crisis attitudes also interacted with the judicial instruction

manipulation (p

=

-.09, z = -2.01; see Table 19), such that the instruction manipulation
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did not influence damages among participants who believed more in a litigation crisis but
greater damages were awarded when the original instructions were provided among

participants who did hold these attitudes as much. Strict liability attitudes interacted with
injury severity (p = -. 11, z = -2 .77, p < .01), such that extent of injury only mattered
among those participants who maintained strict liability attitudes (see Table 20).
Comprehension exerted a main effect and interacted with injury severity to
influence compensatory damage awards. For the natural log analysis, a main effect of

comprehension for design defect issues (p = -.14, z = -2.23) demonstrated that those with
low comprehension scores awarded higher damages than those with high comprehension.
Also, injury severity interacted with comprehension for compensatory damages ( = -. 10,
z = -2.15), such that the effect of injury severity was much stronger among those higher

in comprehension (see Table 21).
Linear regression analysis focusing on only those participants who found liability
and awarded damages was conducted using SPSS software. The analyses that focused

solely on this group of participants (n = 286) revealed several significant findings.
Several of these findings mirrored the effects found in the analysis of the entire sample,
including the total effect of injury severity (p

=

-.38, t =-6.09,p < .001), the total effect

of strict liability attitudes (for the natural log transformations only;

p= .12,

t = 2.28), and

the interaction between litigation crisis attitudes and the judicial instruction manipulation

(p = -. 11, t = -2.22). Additionally, a total effect for defendant wealth emerged from the
square root analyses (P = -. 15, t= -2.23), such that greater compensatory damages were

levied against the wealthier defendant than the less wealthy defendant (Ms = $749,887
and $538,257, respectively). Finally, for the square root analysis, there was a significant
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interaction between injury severity and defendant revenue ( = .19, t = 1.96), such that
greater damages were awarded against the wealthier company when the injuries were

severe (Ms = $1,793,376 and $1,106,601, respectively), but when the injuries were mild,
slightly greater damages were awarded against the less wealthy defendant (Ms =

$157,244 and $92,903, respectively).
Punitive damages. The next analysis focuses on the decision to award punitive

damages (therefore the dependent variable is a dichotomous choice). The only total
effects emerging from this analysis involved attitudinal factors and comprehension
scores. A main effect of litigation crisis attitudes (P = -.18, z = -3.17) demonstrated that
punitive damages were less likely to be awarded the more participants thought a litigation

crisis existed. A main effect of strict liability attitudes (P = .21, z= 3 .72 , p < .001)
indicated that damages were more likely awarded the more that participants endorsed
strict liability attitudes. A main effect of attitudes measuring different standards for
wealth and size (P = -.13, z = -2.18) showed punitive damages were more likely when
participants believed more in holding defendants of varied wealth and size to different
standards.

Comprehension exerted two main effects and interacted with defendant wealth to
impact the decision to award punitive damages. Main effects of comprehension for

design defect issues (p = -.14, z = -2.56) and of comprehension for punitive damages ($
-. 12, z = -2.16) demonstrated that those with higher comprehension scores were less
likely to award damages than those with lower comprehension scores (36.3% vs. 50.2%
for defect comprehension and 38.8% vs. 49.4% for punitive damages comprehension).
Although a total of 31 two-way interactions were examined, the only significant
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interaction discovered was between defendant revenue and comprehension for punitive
damages (f3

=

-.22, z

=

-1.99). When comprehension scores were low, defendant revenue

did not impact the likelihood that punitive damages would be awarded (49.8% award
punitive damages when the company is wealthy vs. 46.4% when the company is less

wealthy), but revenue did influence the likelihood of awarding damages when
comprehension scores were high (43.5% award damages when the company is wealthy
and 34.5% when the company is less wealthy).
When the entire sample was included in the analysis for punitive damage award
amounts, numerous significant total effects emerged. Injury severity exerted a main effect
on punitive damage amounts (p

=

-. 22, z = -4.72, p

<

.001), such that greater damages

were given when the plaintiff's injuries were severe as opposed to mild (Ms = $1,185,479
and $104,852, respectively). A main effect of defendant revenue (p = -. 16, z = -3.09, p
<.01) revealed that greater damages were levied against the wealthy defendant than the
less wealthy defendant (for the square root transformation only; Ms

=

$1,017,784 and

$276,200, respectively). A main effect of litigation crisis attitudes (P = -. 17, z = -3.70,p <
.001) indicated that participants who endorsed such attitudes more awarded fewer
damages than those who did not believe in a litigation crisis as much. Strict liability
attitudes also exerted a main effect (p = .19, z =

3

.95, p < .001), such that greater

damages were given when participants held greater strict liability attitudes than when

held such views to a lesser extent.
Several significant interactions were also discovered in the analysis that including
the entire sample. Extent of injury interacted with defendant wealth (P = .14, z = 2.09)
such that, when the plaintiff's injuries were severe, much greater damages were levied
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against the wealthy defendant (M= $1,892,352) than the less wealthy defendant (M=
$434,769), but defendant revenue hardly influenced damages when the plaintiff's injuries
were mild (M= $96,123 against the wealthy defendant and M= $113,854 against the less
wealthy defendant). Extent of injury also interacted with litigation crisis attitudes (P =

.10, z = 2.46). These attitudes did not influence damages when the plaintiff's injuries
were mild but did influence the damage awards when the plaintiff's injuries were severe,
such that greater damages were awarded when such attitudes were not endorsed as much

(see Table 22). Also, litigation crisis attitudes interacted with defendant wealth ( = .13, z
= 2.48) to reveal a similar pattern in damage awards. That is, the attitudes did not impact

damages when the defendant was less wealthy but did influence awards when the
defendant was wealthier, such that more damages were awarded when such attitudes
were held to a lesser extent (see Table 23).
Comprehension exerted a marginal main effect and interacted with defendant

wealth to influence punitive damage awards. A marginally significant total effect of
comprehension for defect issues revealed that greater damages were awarded when

comprehension was high rather than when low (for the square root analysis only;

p =.22,

z = 1.95, p < .06). Defendant wealth interacted with comprehension for punitive damages

(P

=

-. 24, z = -2.45), indicating that there was a greater disparity in awards between the

wealthy and less wealthy defendant when comprehension was high rather than low. That
is, defendant revenue had a greater impact on punitive awards when comprehension was

high (M= $273,061 when the defendant was less wealthy vs. M= $1,461,308 when the
defendant was wealthy) as opposed to when comprehension was low (M= $277,769
when the defendant was less wealthy vs. M= $875,066 when the defendant was wealthy).
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The final analysis focuses solely on those participants who found the defendant
liable and awarded an actual amount for punitive damages (n = 240). The results of this

analysis mirrored several of findings that appeared when the entire sample was included.
Specifically, total effects were replicated for extent of injury (p = -.21, t = -3.75, p <
.001), defendant revenue (p

=

-. 25, t = - 3 .5 2 , p < .001), litigation crisis attitudes (for

square root analysis only; 3 = -. 11, t = -1.
natural log analysis only;

9 2 ,p

f= .20, t = 2.37),

injury and defendant revenue

(p =

< .06) and strict liability attitudes (for

as was the interaction between extent of

.22, t = 2.91, p < .01), and the interaction between

litigation crisis attitudes and defendant revenue (p = .15, t =2.11).
Several additional significant interactions also emerged from this analysis. For the

(p =-.18, t =

-

square root analysis, injury severity interacted with defendant conduct

2.41), such that greater damages were awarded when the plaintiff's injuries were severe,

especially when the defendant's conduct was reprehensible (M=$944,706 vs. M=
$856,087 when the defendant's conduct was not reprehensible). However, when the
plaintiff's injuries were mild, slightly greater damages were awarded when the
defendant's conduct was not reprehensible (M= $72,431) than when it was reprehensible
(M= $53,343). Litigation crisis attitudes interacted with the judicial instruction

manipulation (P = -.13, t = -2.23), such that the instruction manipulation did not impact
awards when participants believed more in a litigation crisis (M= $274,094 for pattern
and M = $303,855 for revised instructions), but greater damages were awarded when
such attitudes were not held as strongly, particularly when participants received the

pattern instructions (M= $549,437 vs. M= $425,495 with the revised instructions).
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Two measures of comprehension interacted with defendant wealth to influence
punitive damage awards. The same interaction between defendant revenue and

comprehension for punitive damages that was found in the analysis of the entire samples
emerged (f3 = -.25, t

-1.96). Also, for the square root analysis, comprehension for

general issues interacted with defendant revenue (3 = -. 31, t = -2.65), such that

comprehension did not make much difference when the defendant was less wealthy (M=
$397,114 when comprehension was low and Mf= $454,546 when comprehension was
high), but awards varied as a function of comprehension when the defendant was wealthy
(M= $726,330 when comprehension was low and M= $1,258,323 when comprehension

was high).
A summary of the total effects described above is provided in Table 24.
Discussion

The primary goals of this phase of the project were: (1) replicating that the revised
judicial instructions augmented comprehension scores, (2) examining whether or not
mock jurors correctly utilized evidence when reaching their verdicts, and (3)

investigating if revised instructions improved the use of evidence. The results provided
support for the hypotheses pertaining to these goals. All significant results are discussed,
including a few marginal ones, which could mean some of the included results may have
been produced by chance. However, considering the exploratory nature of this project
and given that nearly all the interactions had yet to be systematically examined, this
project's broad scope is designed to facilitate future research. We leave it to other

researchers to replicate the myriad of results and implore them to continue to explore
civil jury decision-making.
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Comprehension of judicial instructions
As hypothesized, revising the judicial instructions clearly improved mock juror
comprehension rates. Three of the four individual measures of comprehension as well as
total comprehension scores were significantly increased through the use of the revised

judicial instructions. Perhaps more encouraging than the fact that revisions increased
comprehension relative to the original instructions is that the revisions actually increased
comprehension scores beyond mediocrity. Whereas the mean percentage of correct
answers for the revised instructions in the previous study was only 55%, the mean
percentage correct in the current study was 68% (M = 10.15 out of 15). Although this

figure is still not as high as preferred, it is encouraging that the revisions had their
intended effect. Since both of our initial attempts at revising the instructions met with
success, it seems feasible that additional revisions could increase comprehension rates
even higher. Additional research is needed to explore this possibility.
As in the previous study, higher comprehension scores on the various measures of

comprehension tended to indicate a pro-defense bias. That is, those participants with
higher comprehension scores tended to find for the defendant in liability decisions and/or
awarded less money. For comprehension of defect issues, those with higher
comprehension scores were significantly less likely to find the defendant liable for a

design defect than those with lower comprehension. Also, those with higher
comprehension scores on this measure, as well as the measure concerning punitive
damage comprehension, were less likely to award punitive damages than those with
lower comprehension. The only exception to this trend was the finding that higher
comprehension scores on the defect measure were associated with higher punitive
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damage awards. Interestingly, a similar finding emerged in the previous study, where
higher punitive awards were associated with higher comprehension scores on the measure
regarding punitive damages. Thus, it appears as though higher comprehension is typically
related to a pro-defense preference, except when it comes to punitive damages (where it

indicates a pro-plaintiff preference).
It is unclear why the relationship between comprehension and punitive awards is
unique. Although those with higher comprehension are less likely to award punitive
damages, when punitive damages are actually awarded, they tend to assess more against
the defendant than those with low comprehension. Perhaps jurors with higher

comprehension have a good understanding of the definition of punitive awards and when
they are warranted (which is not supposed to be that often), so they are less likely to find
it appropriate to award them as compared to those with lower comprehension. Yet when
they feel as though the evidence supports punitive damages, they give high awards

because they see the evidence as so damaging. That is, perhaps people with higher
comprehension are skeptical regarding actually awarding punitive damages, but tend to
award large amounts once they become convinced that punitive damages are, in fact,
warranted.

Comprehension and juror decision-making
As hypothesized, revising the judicial instructions did improve decision-making.
Overall, mock jurors did not use evidence inappropriately that often (see below), but
there was only one instance of improper use of evidence when revised instructions were
provided (and the same misuse occurred when the original instructions were provided).

Specifically, the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct did not impact punitive
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damage amounts. However, there were some weak trends in the data revealing better
utilization of evidence among those participants who received the revised instructions as
opposed to the original instructions (though the interactions between the evidence and the
instruction manipulation were not statistically significant,ps

<

.2). For example, the

reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct should affect liability verdicts but did so to a
greater extent when revised judicial instructions were presented (r = .13, power = .84; see
Table 25). Similarly, the defendant's conduct is relevant to the decision of whether or not
to award punitive damages, but conduct impacted this decision to a greater extent when

revised instructions were provided (r = .09, power = .53; see Table 26). Also, defendant
wealth should not impact compensatory damage awards, but tended to more so when the
original instructions were provided (r = .09, power = .53; see Table 27).

Perhaps the interactions between the instruction manipulation and pieces of
evidence were not significant because the effect of revising the instructions was not
strong enough. Indeed, the effect sizes for the instruction revision on the various
comprehension measures ranged between .29 and .36. Although these are considered
medium effect sizes, it still means that the instruction revision accounted for, at most,
only 13% of the variance in comprehension scores. Therefore, the somewhat weak but

significant effect of revision might have caused a small increase in comprehension, which
in turn may have caused the corresponding increased sensitivity to the proper evidence to
also be small (thus, the interactions are p < .2). Given that the effects of revision could be
much stronger, future research could attempt to further revise the judicial instructions and
examine how those additional revisions influence the use and misuse of evidence. At the

very least, this project provides initial empirical evidence suggesting that the use of
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revised instructions can not only increase comprehension rates, but may improve overall

decision-making as well.
Jurors' proper and improper use of evidence
Regardless of whether revised or pattern judicial instructions were provided, it is
encouraging that mock jurors used pieces of evidence properly for several distinct

decisions. Extent of injury impacted actual damage awards but did not influence liability
verdicts or the decision to award punitive damages. This appropriate use of extent of
injury belies the prior research finding of a positive relationship between extent of injury
and liability judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 1999; Robbennolt, 2000). Defendant wealth,
just as in Study #1, improperly impacted compensatory damages. Yet, as in Study #2, this

evidence was largely used appropriately, such that defendant wealth neither affected
liability verdicts nor the decision to award punitive damages (and there was a trend for
wealth to only impact punitive damages when revised instructions were used). Therefore,
even though defendant wealth inappropriately influenced compensatory damage awards,
we did not find support for the deep-pocket effect. Defendant conduct influenced liability

verdicts (when the revised instructions were utilized) and punitive damage amounts (via
an interaction with injury severity) but consistent with some prior research (e.g., Greene
et al., 1999 and Greene et al., 2001), conduct also affected compensatory damages
(though see Cather et al. 1996 and Greene et al. 2000, where conduct did not influence
compensatory damages). Thus, it appears that mock jurors were using evidence properly

at times and making decisions that were in accordance with the law, particularly when
revised instructions were supplied.
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Unfortunately, interactions of extent of injury with both defendant wealth and
defendant conduct demonstrated that mock jurors also improperly considered these pieces
of evidence. For instance, extent of injury interacted with defendant revenue to influence
both compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant revenue improperly affected
compensatory damages when the plaintiff's injuries were severe and defendant revenue

did not properly impact punitive damages when the plaintiff's injuries were mild. Extent
of injury also interacted with defendant conduct to influence punitive damage amounts,
such that the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct was only utilized correctly when
the plaintiff's injuries were severe. That is, when the plaintiff's injuries were severe,

mock jurors, likely indignant over the crippling injuries, compensated and/or punished
accordingly based on the conduct and revenue of the defendant. However, participants
misused and/or ignored defendant conduct and revenue when the plaintiff's injuries were
mild. Perhaps they failed to factor these pieces of evidence into their assessments of
damage awards when the plaintiff's injuries were mild because those participants who
decided to award damages simply offered a small amount without fully considering the
evidence and the law. Alternatively, participants may have been sensitive to other factors
or pieces of evidence when injury severity was mild. Also, there were generally very low
punitive damage awards in the mild injury condition, thus making it harder for anything

to have an effect (a floor effect).
Drawing comparisons between these interactions from the present study and the
findings from past research that has examined how jurors use these pieces of evidence
proves difficult because much of the prior research only explored the main effects of
these variables, and often on only one dependent variable (e.g., the impact of defendant
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wealth on compensatory damage awards; the influence of injury severity on liability
verdicts). One notable exception was a study conducted by Greene and her colleagues
(Greene et al., 2001), who specifically investigated the joint influence of injury severity

and defendant conduct on compensatory damage awards. Just as we found the two pieces
of evidence jointly impacted punitive awards, these researchers found that these pieces of
evidence jointly affected compensatory damage awards, such that defendant conduct
improperly impacted the award amount, particularly when the plaintiff's injuries were
mild (just as in the present study, evidence misuse occurred to a greater extent when the

injuries were mild). Since the current research suggests that certain pieces of evidence
can influence how jurors use other evidence, future research should explore the combined

and interactive effects of various pieces of evidence on juror decision-making. Certainly,
most actual trials are complex, involving numerous pieces of evidence that the jury is
expected to utilize appropriately in each of their assorted determinations. There is

therefore great value in understanding how jurors might use, or be influenced by, several
pieces of evidence collectively when making their various verdict decisions.
Influence of attitudinal factors

While attitudinal factors did not exert much influence in Study #2, they impacted
nearly every dependent variable in this study. Indeed, strict liability attitudes influenced
every dependent measure and total effects for litigation crisis attitudes emerged on every
dependent variable except compensatory damages awarded among those who found

liability. Not surprisingly, those who endorsed strict liability attitudes tended to show a
pro-plaintiff (or, perhaps more appropriately, an anti-defendant) bias and those who
believed that a litigation crisis exists demonstrated a pro-defendant (or anti-plaintiff) bias.
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Since these attitudes impacted all decisions made by the mock jurors, it certainly seems
prudent for attorneys to assess these types of attitudes as early as possible in voir dire to

identify those jurors who seem to have strong, pre-existing preferences for one side in a
lawsuit. Besides the ubiquitous main effects of strict liability and litigation crisis
attitudes, main effects occasionally emerged for anti-corporate attitudes as well as
attitudes regarding wealth and size. Therefore, attorneys also may wish to assess these

types of attitudes during voir dire, especially when at least one of the litigants is a
corporation.
While attitudes often exerted total effects, interactions between these attitudinal
factors and the litigant manipulations have greater implications. All but one of these
interactions involved litigation crisis attitudes. These attitudes interacted with defendant
wealth to affect design defect verdicts as well as both compensatory and punitive

damages. In all of these instances, when participants did not believe a litigation crisis
existed, defendant revenue impacted verdict such that wealthier corporate defendants
were either more likely to be found liable or required to pay greater damages than less
wealthy defendants. That is, defendant revenue was particularly influential when

participants believed less that a litigation crisis exists. In fact, when such attitudes were
not endorsed, there was a slight tendency for participants to treat the wealthier defendant

better than the less wealthy defendant. Litigation crisis attitudes also interacted with the
judicial instruction manipulation to influence both compensatory and punitive damages.
In both instances, differences in the instruction manipulation only occurred when such
attitudes were not endorsed as much, such that greater damages were awarded when the

original instructions were supplied. To put it another way, it appears as though the
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revisions lessened or eliminated the effect of litigation crisis attitudes on actual damage
award amounts. Finally, litigation crisis attitudes interacted with extent of injury to
impact punitive damage awards. As with the other interactions involving litigation crisis
attitudes, the manipulation of the independent variable mattered more as participants
believed less that a litigation crisis was present in society-in which case, participants
awarded greater damages when the injury was severe as opposed to mild.

It appears as though litigation crisis attitudes serve to not only affect verdicts
directly but also indirectly affect verdicts by impacting how evidence is utilized. Indeed,
as demonstrated in the above findings, certain evidence was more impactful as jurors
agreed less with these attitudes. Perhaps as participants believed more in the presence of
a litigation crisis, they paid less attention to the manipulations because they were prone to
dismiss the case and find for the defendant regardless of the case facts. This was not
always undesirable, however, considering those jurors who did not endorse the attitudes
improperly considered evidence for certain decisions while those who endorsed the
attitudes did not misuse the evidence. For instance, defendant revenue should not impact

liability verdicts and only did so when the attitudes were not held. Regardless of the
implications of whether actual jurors endorse these attitudes or not, the plethora of main

effects and interactions involving litigation crisis attitudes provides additional empirical
support for the notion that attorneys need to assess these attitudes at the earliest possible

opportunity.
Conclusion
The mock jurors clearly benefited from the use of the revised judicial instructions.
Not only did their comprehension of relevant concepts in the law significantly increase,
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but their decision-making improved as well so that they were utilizing evidence
appropriately. Importantly, no adverse effects were detected as a result of using the
revised judicial instructions. Although additional research is needed to explore the effects
of revisions in other types of cases, surely the above findings provide some empirical

justification for the revision of judicial instructions. Thankfully, some courts already are
addressing the issue of modifying judicial instructions. For instance, in 1997, California
appointed a Task Force on Jury Instructions with orders that it make instructions more
understandable to jurors while still accurately stating the law. Six years later, revised civil
instructions were adopted and now, eight years later, new criminal instructions have been

approved (California Bar Journal, 2005).
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Chapter Seven: General discussion
In its broadest sense, the purpose of this project was to examine civil jury

decision-making. Specifically, we studied civil jury-decision making by systematically
investigating how mock jurors utilized evidence, litigant characteristics, and extralegal
factors. Based on prior research, our primary concern was that mock jurors use evidence
improperly and inappropriately consider extralegal factors in their decisions. Certainly
our initial results provided support for this concern. Consequently, our next goal was to

explore possible procedural reforms that might improve decision-making. Specifically,
we believed that low comprehension of judicial instructions contributed to this poor
decision-making. That is, jurors were not making decisions in accordance with the law
because they could not comprehend the instructions that are supposed to dictate how
jurors should make their decisions. Therefore, we wanted to explore the possibility of
revising the judicial instructions as one potential reform that could increase

comprehension, improve the consideration of evidence, and ultimately enhance decisionmaking. Our results partially substantiated this contention. A secondary procedural
reform we explored, bifurcating the damage phases of the trial, met with less empirical
support. The hypotheses are revisited and an overall picture of the results is provided

below. The implications and limitations of the project are also discussed.
Numerous different pieces of evidence and various litigant characteristics were
manipulated in the current investigation. Since several of these variables had been
explored in previous research, we can determine whether or not our results confirm the
hypotheses formed based on those past studies. However, there was also a scarcity of
prior research on several of our manipulations, particularly in the context of a corporate
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defendant. There was also a paucity of research examining the combined and interactive

effects of various pieces of evidence and litigant characteristics. Accordingly, we have
little prior research with which we can compare some of our results. Nevertheless, our

findings provide valuable insight into how jurors use or misuse information when
determining liability and awarding damages, regardless of whether or not we can
compare our results with past research.
Extralegal factors

Although little prior research has addressed the effects of some of these variables
(e.g., corporate representative), we suspected that mock jurors would inappropriately
consider extralegal factors when deciding their verdicts. Indeed, we found ample
evidence of these extralegal factors affecting participants' decision-making. The

corporate representative improperly influenced design defect verdicts as well as
compensatory and punitive damage awards. Based on the similarity-leniency hypothesis,
we anticipated that mock jurors would treat the defendant more severely the more
dissimilar the representative was to the average person. However, the results failed to
support this expectation as more lenient treatment was given to the defendant when the

representative was the CEO of the company (highly dissimilar to the average mock juror)
than an engineer (more similar to the average mock juror). We reason this occurred

because the engineer was described as a person who helped design the defective product
and therefore the responsibility attached to him caused more severe treatment of the
corporation he represented.

Similarly, even though an apology is extralegal, we expected the presence of an
apology by the defendant to foster sympathy for the defendant and promote more lenient
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treatment (past research suggests apologizing might reduce damages; see Robbennolt,
2003). Mock jurors did inappropriately consider the issuance of an apology, but contrary
to our prediction, apologizing augmented compensatory damage awards. Perhaps, mock
jurors perceived the presence of an apology as an indication of responsibility and remorse
(past research demonstrates this might augment damages; see Bornstein et al., 2002).

Regardless of the direction of these findings, the result is the same: extralegal factors
affect verdicts.
We previously argued that attitudes could be considered extralegal if they have a
direct effect on verdict, such that the effect of the attitudes is independent of the effect of
the evidence in the case. Since the law is not very clear concerning the role of attitudes in

civil cases, and given prior research on attitudes in civil cases (e.g., Hans & Loftquist,
1992), we anticipated direct effects of attitudes on verdicts. It seems foolhardy to think
that attitudes would not directly influence mock jurors' decisions. As expected, a plethora
of attitudinal main effects emerged from this data, especially involving litigation crisis

attitudes (in all three studies), anti-corporation attitudes (in the first two studies) and strict
liability attitudes (in the final study). These attitudinal factors impacted every dependent
measure and therefore influenced decision-making with regards to both liability and
damage award verdicts.
We also found myriad interactions between attitudes and evidence, such that

attitudes influenced how several specific pieces of evidence were utilized (e.g., defendant
wealth, extent of injury). The conglomeration of results pertaining to attitudinal factors
provides strong indication that attorneys should attempt to assess the attitudes of the
venire as early as possible. Certainly, attitudes are better predictors of verdict inclination
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than any superficial characteristics attorneys might look for during voir dire (i.e.,
demographics). At the very least, projects such as this one can provide attorneys with

some initial concrete items that measure certain relevant attitudes. Litigation crisis and
anti-corporate attitudes in particular were prevalent in the current investigation and seem
relevant in actual trials.
Misuse of evidence and litigantcharacteristics
Just as we expected that mock jurors would consider extralegal factors, we also
predicted that mock jurors would misuse specific pieces of evidence and litigant
characteristics. Certainly, an abundance of extant literature on civil jury decision-making
supports this assertion. Indeed, our results showed that the improper utilization of
evidence was a constant found in all three phases of the current project. In several

instances, evidence pertaining to the defendant (e.g., wealth, conduct) was not used
correctly. Research on the deep-pocket hypothesis demonstrates that defendant wealth
can improperly influence verdicts. While only a small amount of research has explored
wealth in the context of a corporate defendant, we found partial support for the deeppocket hypothesis, as defendant wealth impacted design defect verdicts and
compensatory damage awards.
Although little empirical research has systematically examined reprehensibility of
conduct with a corporate defendant, the results of other studies on conduct in the context
of an individual defendant suggest defendant conduct may incorrectly influence
compensatory damages (Greene et al., 2001) and not punitive damages (Greene et al.,
2000). We found mixed support for prior research in the context of a corporate defendant,
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where reprehensibility of conduct affected punitive damages in the appropriate manner
but also impacted compensatory damage awards.

Evidence relevant to the plaintiff (e.g., injury severity, occupation) was also
misused. Jennifer Robbennolt's (2003) meta-analysis on the effects of injury severity
indicates a small positive relationship between extent of injury and liability judgments.

Although we did not find that injury severity influenced liability verdicts (contrary to
Robbennolt's meta-analysis), extent of injury was misused in the current investigation.
Extent of injury either exerted a main effect or interacted with other manipulations to
impact punitive damage awards even though the focus of punitive awards should be on
the defendant (e.g., defendant conduct, defendant wealth).

Based on the similarity-leniency hypothesis, we predicted that mock jurors would
provide better treatment to a plaintiff similar to themselves than one dissimilar (we tried

to manipulate the similarity of the plaintiff to the average mock juror through both
plaintiff occupation and the product). We found support for the similarity-leniency
hypothesis with both manipulations. Even though plaintiff occupation should neither
affect liability verdicts nor punitive damage awards, we found that mock jurors did factor
plaintiff occupation into these decisions, such that better treatment was provided to the

plaintiff when he was a schoolteacher rather than a neurosurgeon. Similarly, support for
the similarity-leniency hypothesis also emerged when examining the product, such that
higher punitive damages were levied when the plaintiff was injured while using an
ordinary product (a car) as opposed to a luxurious product (a yacht). Thus, even though

plaintiff occupation and the type of product should be irrelevant to liability and punitive
damage verdicts, mock jurors improperly considered both pieces of information.
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Comprehension ofjudicial instructionsand decision-making
We know from the extant literature and the results of the current study that people
misuse evidence and consider extralegal factors when deciding their verdicts. We
believed that poor comprehension of judicial instructions was one cause of the incorrect
utilization of evidence and litigant characteristics. The unfamiliar legalese in which the

instructions are written, coupled with the vague guidance provided in the instructions, can
contribute to jurors using certain elements of information inappropriately when
determining their verdicts. Moreover, jurors' confusion concerning important legal
concepts, such as "preponderance of evidence," may result in similar cases reaching
different and highly variable verdicts. If jurors cannot comprehend the instructions on the

law, how can they make decisions that follow the law? We hypothesized that improving
the clarity and wording of the instructions would not only increase comprehension rates,
but also improve the utilization of evidence (and therefore improve decision-making).
The results generally supported our expectations regarding the revision of judicial

instructions as an effective procedural reform. In both phases of the investigation
examining the utility of the revised instructions, comprehension rates were significantly
increased. Sadly, the average comprehension score when the pattern instructions were
used mirrors the findings from prior research, with comprehension barely above fiftypercent correct. Perhaps even more disappointing, when revised instructions were used
after two attempts at revisions, comprehension rates still averaged just over two-thirds
correct. Thus, a promising trend emerged in the data that supports reforming the judicial
instructions, but further revisions are necessary to increase comprehension rates to a
higher percentage.
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In addition to increasing comprehension rates, we hypothesized in the third study
that the revised instructions would improve mock jurors' decisions by either increasing

the correct use or decreasing the improper use of certain information. Improper use of
evidence was rare with the revised instructions, such that the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct was the only piece of information not utilized correctly. Yet
improper use of evidence often arose among those participants who received the original
instructions. Additional research is needed to determine if the revised instructions will
have the same effect on the misuse of other pieces of information used in earlier phases
of the investigation (e.g., extralegal factors such as the corporate representative, or
litigant characteristics such as the plaintiff's occupation). Nonetheless, since very little
research has explored instruction revision in civil cases, these initial results provide
promising empirical evidence in favor of instruction revision and hopefully encourage
future research.

Bifurcationand decision-making
Although our hypotheses concerning judicial instructions were largely supported,
confirming the value of instruction revision as an effective procedural reform, bifurcating
the damage phases of the trial met with less empirical support. We initially hypothesized
that bifurcating the damages phases would decrease the improper use of evidence (e.g.
plaintiff occupation would affect compensatory damages but not punitive damages).
Unfortunately, the results indicated that bifurcation actually increasedthe inappropriate
consideration of evidence. For instance, plaintiff occupation was utilized incorrectly
when the damages were bifurcated, such that occupation affected punitive damages
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(though this did not occur in unitary trials). Thus, it appears as though splitting up the
damages actually exacerbated the improper use of this evidence.

Moreover, bifurcating the trial did not significantly increase comprehension,
although we anticipated that it might since mock jurors were able to focus on fewer
issues at once. This finding is in accord with other preliminary research examining the
effects of bifurcation on comprehension (Landsman et al. 1998). Finally, based on
previous research (Gensler, 2000; Greene et al., 2000), we hypothesized that bifurcating
the damages would augment punitive damages. Indeed, our findings mirrored the results

from these prior studies. One explanation is that those who decide to award punitive
damages already favor the plaintiff in terms of liability and compensation so they award
higher punitive damages. That is, the pro-defense jurors would not reach the punitive
damage phase of the trial and the ones who do proceed to this stage already hold a bias

against the defendant. Additionally, separating evidence pertaining to punitive damages
from the rest of the case serves to isolate that information which allows jurors to focus
and dwell on it. Taken as a whole, the findings concerning bifurcation suggest that
bifurcating the damages phases of the trial may not be an effective procedural reform and

may actually hinder proper decision-making. Bifurcating the liability and damage phases
of the trial may still prove a valuable procedural reform, but given the conflicting extant
literature on this type of bifurcation, additional research is needed to empirically explore
this possibility.
Implications

Jurors are ordinary people faced with an extraordinary and difficult task wrought
with uncertainty and unpredictable variability. It should come as little surprise that two

130

juries hearing similar cases can produce distinct outcomes or that juries can make
decisions not in line with the law by improperly considering information. Yet rather than

casting the blame onto the people who step out of their normal lives into the unfamiliar
realm of a courthouse to resolve disputes, we examine the system that demands jurors
perform such a difficult task with little instruction and guidance. We realize there are
conceptual as well as legal causes for poor jury decision-making, and that certain causes
are inherent to the task facing juries. However, we contend that other causes of poor or

unreliable decisions can be addressed in order to improve decision-making. Specifically,
(1) exploring the role of judicial instruction comprehension in decision-making, and (2)
examining the utility of revising judicial instructions lay at the heart of the current
investigation.

Our results provide valuable insights into civil jury decision-making that could be
utilized in actual cases. Litigators should be mindful of projects such as this one that
produce results with practical implications. For instance, higher comprehension rates
were associated with a pro-defense preference (except with punitive damages). Therefore,
attorneys may try to assess comprehension as early as possible. Even though

jurors will

not yet hear judicial instructions, attorneys could create a few questions to ask during voir
dire that assess general comprehension for civil litigation (e.g., who has the burden of
proof). Perhaps attorneys are already aware of this to some extent, as many share the
general belief that people with higher education and higher income tend to be prodefense. Similar to comprehension, attorneys surely want to assess certain attitudes

during voir dire. In the current investigation, several attitudinal factors played important
roles in several stages of the decision-making process. Moreover, these attitudinal factors

131

tended to indicate either a pro-defense or pro-plaintiff preference, such that a juror's
endorsement of specific attitudinal questions might indicate to attorneys whether that
juror is pro-plaintiff or pro-defense.
Judges and other decision-makers within the legal system should also be mindful
of empirical studies that explore potential procedural reforms as the results have obvious

implications. Given that a chief critique of civil jury decision-making focuses on the
competence of jurors, procedural reforms that might improve competence should be

systematically examined. Empirical investigations provide a vehicle through which to test
the utility of various procedural reforms. If the results consistently support the value of a
feasible procedural reform, such as the revision of judicial instructions, then perhaps the

social-scientific evidence will help convince legal decision-makers to adopt valuable
reforms. Alternatively, if the results suggest a specific reform may not prove worthwhile,

legal decision makers can consider such research when deciding the utility of adopting
the reform. At the very least then, these studies provide evidence that can support or
contest possible reforms and legal decision-makers would be prudent to familiarize

themselves with social-scientific research that focuses on improving decision-making.
This investigation in particular found promising results that supported revising
judicial instructions (but not bifurcation of damages) as an effective and valuable
procedural reform. Yet the results may be limited to the specific instance used in the
project: a product liability case involving a design defect with the vehicle manufacturer

as the corporate defendant. Additional research is needed to determine if the results we
found concerning the procedural reforms apply to other types of cases and defendants as
well. That is, although the initial results regarding revising judicial instructions were
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promising, the results need to be replicated in a variety of cases before deciding if the

reform should be adopted or abandoned. Obviously, some revisions to the judicial
instructions are specific to the laws necessitated by the type of case and therefore change
from one type of case to the next. It is possible that certain instructions are more open to

revisions than other instructions. For instance, complex cases involving foreign concepts
(e.g., anti-trust litigation with numerous parties) may utilize difficult instructions not be
prone to simple revision, which is precisely why some revisions may need to be
examined empirically on a case-by-case basis. However, other revisions may be more
general, such as those in the current research that addressed compensatory and punitive

damage awards. Successful revision of these specific instructions may prove valuable
regardless of the type of case. Nonetheless, that this project is based on a specific
instance is a critical concern and notable limitation to the study, as the results might vary
considerably with other cases. Additional possible limitations are discussed below.
Limitations

There are several other limitations to the current investigation that should be
addressed. Most concern the methodological realism, or ecological validity, of the
proposed studies. First, the stimulus materials involve a simulated mock trial. Thus, the
common concerns are present regarding the mock juror sample, the research settings, the

trial medium, the trial elements included, and the consequentiality of the task (Bornstein,
1999). For instance, the participants read a brief case summary and the judicial
instructions instead of sitting in a courtroom, listening to extensive testimony and being
presented with evidence and arguments by attorneys before having the judge read
instructions on the law in the case. This investigation is obviously an extremely
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simplified approximation of an actual, complex trial. However, it should be noted that
jury simulations utilize experimental methodology, allowing systematic manipulations of
independent variables and eliminating the problems of confounds and the difficulty of
interpreting differences in behavior (Greene & Bornstein, 2003). Actual cases vary on
multiple dimensions that can account for differences in verdict (e.g., skill and experience
of attorney, idiosyncrasies of judge). Thus, although the case scenario may be simplistic,
it allows us to accurately assess the effects of specific variables on verdicts.
Besides being a simplistic approximation of an actual trial, the current research
neglects the process of deliberation on civil jury verdicts. Actual jurors must deliberate

before reaching a verdict while the mock jurors in these studies only provide individual
preferences. It is possible that the verdict inclinations and damages awarded in this
research might change if mock jurors met to deliberate. However, it should be noted that
one of the most robust and widely replicated findings in jury research is that the verdict
preferred by the majority of jurors on the first ballot coincides with the jury's final
verdict (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2000). Notably, there is some
evidence that jury awards are more predictable and less variable than individual jurors'
awards (e.g., Diamond et al., 1998). There is also some empirical research suggesting
case type affects civil jury verdicts. For instance, malpractice defendants are relatively
more successful compared to other defendants (Greene & Bornstein, 2003). More
relevant to the current research, punitive damages are less likely awarded in products
liability cases compared to other tort cases (Devine et al., 2000). Perhaps this limits the
findings of the current investigation to products liability cases (or even more specifically,
those with automotive or boat manufacturers as the corporate defendant).
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Another common concern regarding simulation research is the presentation
media. This investigation uses brief written summaries instead of live or even videotaped
stimulus materials. However, Bornstein (1999) surveyed 11 studies that compared

different trial presentation media (mode of presentation) as a main effect. He found that
only 3 of the 11 studies that examined mode of presentation revealed any main effect.
Moreover, among the studies that did reveal a main effect for this manipulation, the
findings were inconsistent. Also, he found evidence of studies that successfully replicated

their main findings despite changes in trial medium (Bornstein, 1999). Thus, the trial
medium likely has little effect on our findings. There is still concern related to the
consequentiality of the task, such that the trial and consequences are not real, but this
problem is inherent in simulation research.
Perhaps the biggest concern related to simulation research is the sample. Usually,
college students serve as the participants for jury simulations. As a result, critics are
quick to point out that students are different from actual jurors (in terms of age,

education, SES, etc.). Although this concern has intuitive appeal, research comparing
undergraduate students to non-student adults finds very little differences in verdict

inclinations in both criminal and civil case. In only five out of 26 studies reviewed was
there a main effect of sample on verdicts, including a study concerning civil damage
awards where students awarded more in compensatory damages than actual jurors
(though there was no effect on punitive damages; Bornstein, 1999). Also, Bornstein
(1999) found a number of studies that performed multiple experiments using different
samples but replicated the major findings. Thus, there is very little empirical support for
the notion that sample affects the outcomes of the experiments. Also, through the use of
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the World Wide Web, the current investigation proposes to use both college
undergraduates and adult community members from around the country as the sample in

the experiments.
Utilizing the World Wide Web to gather participants introduces potential benefits
as well as drawbacks. The Web-based research is accessible by a larger population,
thereby allowing adult community residents across the country to participate at any time
of the day. However, one drawback to this is potential sample bias because the sample is

limited to those who have access to the Web (Studebaker, Robbennolt, Penrod, PathakSharma, Groscup, & Devenport, 2002; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004).
Although the typical Web-user tends to be young, white males, the population is
becoming increasingly diverse as more people gain access daily. Moreover, the

demographics of on-line participants are more representative of the general population
than the undergraduate student population social scientific research tends to rely upon
(Studebaker et al., 2002).
In addition, there is likely some self-selection and motivational differences
between typical undergraduate and Web-based participants. Those participating via the

Web have chosen to do (self-selected) mainly because of interest in the research or the
Undergraduates
subject matter (or less likely by the promise of some potential reward).
are often required to participate; therefore, they may be less inclined to take the study
of such
seriously. A final comment about Web-based studies focuses on the validity
on the Web does not
research. Although some research supports that conducting research

from a
affect the results, future empirical research is needed that replicates the results
media.
project, such as this one, conducted the Web with that of different presentation
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Fortunately, promising research is being conducted that compares Web-based samples
and research with traditional samples and research. One recent study reveals that Internet

findings generalize across presentation formats and that findings from Internet research
are consistent with findings from traditional

methods

(Gosling et al., 2004).

Conclusion
Despite the several potential limitations to the current project, this research

addresses a critical concern surrounding the civil jury: the (in)competence of jurors.
Moreover, the focus on increasing juror competence and ultimately improving jurors'
decisions makes this a worthwhile project. Finally, the plethora of results not only
provides insight into how jurors determine liability and award damages but also indicates
that revising judicial instructions may serve as a valuable procedural reform that can
enhance decision-making. Surely, additional research is needed to further explore the

complexity and distinctiveness of the civil jury and to test the myriad possible reforms
but initial research like this investigation at least provides a preliminary glance. It is
hoped that this project serves as a catalyst for future empirical investigations focusing on

analyzing reforms and improving jurors' decisions.
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Table 1
Percentagesfor Revenue by Wealth/Size Attitudes Interaction on Ne li ence

ATTIUDE

500 Million
50 Million

IREGARDING WEALTH AND SIZE
REVENUE Above median
Below median
77%
64%
77%
77%

N=385
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.

Table 2
Percentagesfor Revenue by Wealth Size Attitudes Interaction on Design Defect

REVENUE
500 Million
50 Million

ATTITUDES REGARDING WEALTH AND SIZE
Below median
Above median
78%
63%
75%
74%

N=384
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.

Table 3
Percentagesfor Representative by Anti-corporationAttitudes Interaction on Negligence

REPRESENTATIVE

ANTI-CORPORATION ATTITUDES
Above median
Below median

CEO

71%

75%

Engineer

79%

70%

N=385
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.

Table 4
Percentagesfor Representative by Anti-corporationAttitudes Interactionon Design

Defect
REPRESENTATIVE
CEO
Engineer

ANTI-CORPORATION ATTITUDES
Below median
Above median
69%
71%
69
82%

N=384
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.
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Table 5
NaturalLog of CompensatoryDamagesfor Representative by Apology Interaction

APOLOGY
REPRESENTATIVE
CEO
Engineer

No
10.74
12.16

Yes
11.86
10.96

N=361

Table 6
NaturalLog of CompensatoryDamagesfor Representative by Anti-corporationAttitudes
Interaction

REPRESENTATIVE
CEO
Engineer

ANTI-CORPORATION ATTITUDES
Above median
Below median
11.05
11.46
12.37
10.82

N=361
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split for descriptive purposes only; analyses tested the
continuous measure.

Table 7
NaturalLog of Punitive Damagesfor Representative by Anti-corporationAttitudes
Interaction

REVENUE
500 Million
50 Million

ATTITUDES REGARDING WEALTH AND SIZE
Below median
Above median
8.47
11.79
10.31
9.75

N=360
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.
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Table 8
Total Effects for Study #1
Negligence

Design

Comp.

Comp.

Punitive

Punitive

Punitive

Defect

Damages
(all Ss)

Damages (if
found liable)

Damages
(Yes/No)

Damages
(all Ss)

Damages (if
found liable)

-12

-. 12

Main effects

Product
Job

.1

Representative

.1

-1a
2

.18a

b

-.13

Revenue

Apology

.11

Lati

crisis

attitudes

-231a
29

-23
_______

Attitudes about

26a

17

-. 25a

-. 15

.11
*

wealth & size

Anti-corporate
attitudes

.12

Strict liability

13

attitudes
Interactions
Revenue X

,

-. 1

-. 17

-. 20

Standards for

-. 15

wealth & size

Representative

.14

X Anticorporation

Representative

.1

a

.

X Revenue
Apology X

.1

6

a

3

3

-. 12

Representative
Job X Product

.10

SizeXJob

.13

4

Representative
X Job

Mediators
Comprehension

-. 13

Outrage

.24a

toward

-19a

.28a

22a

.13

.18a

.19a

.35a

.20a

.17a

-. 14

-.

.15

defendant

Sympathy for

-. 16

-. 16

-. 14

.

2

b

defendant

Notel: Sub-scripts indicate significance different fromp <.05, where a p <.01, b =p <.06, and c = nonsignificant.
Note2: Super-scripts indicate mediation, where 1 = outrage toward defendant, 2 sympathy for defendant,
and 3 = total comprehension.
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Table 9
Direct Effects for Study #1
Negligence

Design
Defect

Comp.
Damages

Comp.
Damages (if

Punitive
Damages

Punitive
Damages

Punitive
Damages (if

(all Ss)

found liable)

(Yes/No)

(all Ss)

found liable)

-. 10

-. 11

Main effects

Product
Job

.1c

Representative

-. 10

-. 14

C

Revenue

-. 13

-. 11

Apology

Litigation crisis

-.20

attitudes

.

Attitudes about

09

.24

.0c
-. 21

-.20a

-. 12c

-. 13

.08c

08
. C

c

wealth & size

Anti-corporate
attitudes

10

Strict liability

11

attitudes

Interactions
Revenue X
Standards for

-

06

c

0

b

.1

0 8c

c

c

.

wealth & size

.1 3

Representative
X Anticorporation
Representative

-.

.12
e

-

09

C

-. 12

X Revenue

-.10

ApologyX
Representative

Job X Product

.09c

.11

SizeXJob
.

Representative
X Job

_

Note: Sub-scripts indicate significance different from p < .05, where a =p < .01, b =p < .06, and c = nonsignificant.
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Table 10
Mean Scores on ComprehensionMeasureper Instruction Manipulationfor Study #2
BREAKDOWN
Comprehension
Punitive
sub-total (first 10
damages (5
questions)
questions)

COMPREHENSION MEASURE

JUDICIAL

General
issues (3
questions)

INSTRUCTIONS

No instructions
Originaljudicial

Design
defect issues
(6

Compensatory
damages (1
question)

Comprehension
total (15 total
questions)

questions)

.88a
1 25

instructions

.

2.43a
b

2 68

.

ab

.58a
.70ab

3.89a

2.04a

4 63

2 55

.

b

.

b

5.93a
7.18b

3
8.21e
3.02c
5.19c
.7 3 b
.0 2 b
144b
Note: Different sub-scripts indicate mean scores are significantly different from others in column, p < .05.

Revistuctdicial

Table 11
Comprehension of Defect Issues by Trial Type Interaction (Percentagerepresents
willingness to find defendant liablefor negligence)

COMPREHENSION SCORE

TRIAL T

ELo

High

Unitary

77%

51%

Bifurcated

72%

59%

N=406
Note: Comprehension score is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested
the continuous measure.

Table 12
Square Root of Compensatory Damagesfor Trial Type by Job Interaction

PLAINTIFF JOB
TRIAL TYPE

Neurosurgeon

School-teacher

Unitary
Bifurcated

1656.46
1800.08

1393.85
1070.36

N=361

Table 13
Percentagesfor Interactionof Trial Type andJob on Decision to Award Punitive
Damages

PLAINTIFF JOB
TRIAL TYPE

Neurosurgeon

School-teacher

Unitary
Bifurcated

7%
680

75%

N=390

142

84%

Table 14
NaturalLog of Punitive Damages for Trial Type by Comprehensionfor Compensatory
Damages

TRIAL TYPE

COMPREHENSION SCORE
Low
High

Unitary

10.94

Bifurcated

11.06

10.41
10.08

N=406
Note: Comprehension score is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested
the continuous measure.

Table 15
NaturalLog ofPunitive Damagesfor Trial Type by Comprehensionfor Punitive
Damages

TRIAL TYPE
Unitary
Bifurcated

COMPREHENSION SORE
Low
High
9.96
11.22
12.63
10.52

N=406
Note: Comprehension score is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested
the continuous measure.
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Table 16
Total

Effects

for Study
Negligence

#2
Design
Defect

Comp.
Damages

Comp.
Damages (if

Punitive
Damages

Punitive
Damages

found

(Yes/No)

(all Ss)

(all Ss)

Punitive
Damages (if

found
liable)

liable)

Main effects
Instructions

.14

Trial Type

.18a

_.12

.11

Job

.21a

Revenue

Litigation crisis
attitudes
Attitudes about
wealth

-12

-.12

-. 14

12

-. 14

-.

17

& size

Anti-corporate

.16

.14

attitudes

Interactions
Trial Type X
Job

-. 1

.14

-.13

T

a

Mediators
Comprehension

-.

2

a

2 3

a

for defect issues

Comprehension

for

.21a

-.11

compensatory
damages

1 ga

Comprehension
for punitive
damages

Notel: Sub-scripts indicate significance different fromp < .05, where a =p < .01, b =p < .06, and c = nonsignificant.
Note2: Effects are for square root of damage awards. Super-scripts indicate significance for natural log of
damage awards, 1 =p < .05, and 2 =p < .01.
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Table 17
Mean Scores on ComprehensionMeasure per Instruction manipulationfor Study #3

JUDICIAL

COMPREHENSION MEASURE BREAKDOWN
Compensatory
Comprehension
Punitive

General

Design

issues (3
questions)

defect issues
(6 questions)

damages (1
question)

sub-total (first 10
questions)

damages (5
questions)

total (15 total
questions)

1.37a

3.07a

.81a

5.25a

2.32a

7.57a

1 92

4.15b

.85a

6 92

3.23

10. 1 5b

Comprehension

INSTRUCTIONS

Originajudicial
instructions
Revised judicial
instructions

b

.

b

Note: Different sub-scripts indicate mean scores are significantly different from others in column, p < .05.

Table 18
Square Root of Compensatory Damagesfor Revenue by Litigation CrisisAttitudes
Interaction

LITIGATION CISIS ATTITUDES
REVENUE
500

Million

50 Million

Above median
360.06
427.85

Below median
676.69
305.95

N=522
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.

Table 19
NaturalLog of CompensatoryDamagesfor JudicialInstructions by Litigation Crisis
Attitudes Interaction

INSTRUCTIONS
Original
Revised

LITIGATION CRISIS ATTITUDES
Below median
Above median
7.98
6.37
7.21
6.52

N=522
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.

Table 20
NaturalLog of Compensatory Damagesfor Injury Severity by Strict Liability Attitudes
Interaction

-STRICT
EXTENT OFINJUR

LIABTILYATTITUDES
Below median
Aove media

Severe

8.29

6.07

Mild

6.38

5.46

N=522

Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.
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Table 21
Raw Mean of CompensatoryDamages for Injury Severity by Comprehensionfor
Compensatory Damages Interaction

EXTENT OF INJURY
Severe
Mild

COMREHENSION SCORE
Low
High
$793,380
$1,662,526
$337,229
$77,388

N=522
Note: Comprehension score is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested
the continuous measure.

Table 22
NaturalLog of Punitive Damagesfor Injury Severity by Litigation Crisis Attitudes
Interaction

EXTENT OF INJURY
Severe
Mild

LITIGATION CRISIS ATTITUDES
Below median
Above median
5.93
7.43
5.39
5.73

N=522
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.

Table 23
NaturalLog of Punitive Damagesfor Defendant Revenue by Litigation Crisis Attitudes
Interaction

LITIGATION CRISIS ATTITUDES
REVENUE

Above median

Below median

500 Million
50 Million

5.60
5.50

7.71
5.42

N=522
Note: Attitude factor is dichotomized by median split only for descriptive purposes; analyses tested the
continuous measure.
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Table 24

Total Effects for Study #3
Design Defect

Comp.
Damages (all

Comp.
Damages (if

Punitive
Damages

Punitive
Damages (all

Punitive
Damages (if

Ss)

found liable)

(Yes/No)

Ss)

found liable)

Main effects

-. 2 5 a

Injury Severity

Conduct

8

a

-.14

-. 1 8 a

-. 15

-.

Revenue

38

-

-.

Litigation crisis

a

-.

15

a21a
a

- .16a

.1 8 a

attitudesbiy

22

-

-

5a

- 17a

.10b

.13

15

attitudes

-. 13

Attitudes about
wealth and size
Anti-corporate

.10

attitudes

Interactions

Litigation crisis

.1 a

.14

attitudes X
Revenue
Litigation crisis
attitudes X
Instructions
Litigation crisis

-.11

-. 1 309
.10

attitudes X Injury
severity
Strict liability
attitudes X Injury
severity
injury severit

1a

X

4

.19

Revenue

Injury severity X
Conduct

23a
-8

Mediators
Comprehension for

_.

3

a

.14

-14

defect issues

Comprehension for
punitive damages
Revenue X

-. 12
-. 22

Comprehension for
punitive damages
Revenue X

-. 24

-.25
-.

Comprehension for

31a

general issues

Note1: Sub-scripts indicate significance different fromp < .05, where a =p < .01, b =p < .06, and c = nonsignificant.
Note2: Effects are for square root of damage awards. Super-scripts indicate significance for natural log of
damage awards, 1 = p < .05, and 2 =p < .01.
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Table 25
Percentagesfor Interactionof Defendant Conduct and JudicialInstruction on Liability
Verdicts
INSTRUCTIONS

______________JUDICIAL

REPREHENSIBILITY
OF CONDUCT

Original

Revised

Low

54%

51%

High

62%

68%

N=522

Table 26
Percentagesfor Interaction of Defendant Conduct andJudicialInstruction on Decision
to Award Punitive Damages

REPREHENSIBILITY

JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Revised
Original

OF CONDUCT

Low

45%

42%

High

51%

55%

N=522

Table 27
Raw Mean of CompensatoryDamagesfor Defendant Revenue by JudicialInstruction
Interaction

REVENUE
500 million
50 million

JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Revised
Original
$1,105,469
$1,745,824
$992,825
$2,443,132

N=522

148

Figure 1
Mediation of litigation crisis attitudes on negligence verdicts by sympathy for defendant

retat effe ct
Litiatin

-. 33, p<0 15

crs

sNegligence

verdicts

attitudes

21
p<01

--

-°-

16
p<.1

Sym pathy for defendant

Figure 2
Mediation of litigationcrisis attitudes on design defect verdicts by sympathy for
defendant
Total effect= -. 35, p<.0 1

Litiatin

-. 24, p<.05
sDesign

crsisDirect effect=

Litiatin

ors

defect verdicts

attitudes

21-p<01

-

-.16
p<.O1

Sympathy for defendant

Figure 3
Mediation of litigationcrisis attitudes on compensatory damages by outragefor
defendant

.37

P<ota

p<e=

,

-.19
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Appendix A
Attitudinal Measure from Study One

Please fill in the circle next to each of the following statements, indicating
whether you agree or disagree with the statement on a scale from 1 to 9, where

1 represents that you "strongly disagree" with the statement and 9 represents
that you "strongly agree" with the statement.
Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. People are too
quick to sue.
2. There should be a
cap on punitive

damage amounts.
3. A company should
never be excused
from compensating
consumers injured by
its products.
4. Because of juries,
injured people are

unduly profiting from
their misfortune.
5. A defendant that

apologizes should be
treated more leniently
than one who does
not apologize.
6. Jury awards are too
large.
7. A company that
exposes a consumer

to a risk in using its
product should

always be held liable
in

a trial.

8. The plaintiffs job
should not matter
when determining
liability.
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9

9. Corporations will

do anything for
profit._

10. Outrageous
monetary awards in

liability cases are
ruining

our

society.

11. Big, wealthy
corporations don't

care about
consumers.

12. Most people who
sue in court have

legitimate grievances.

13. Wealthier
defendants should
pay more than less
wealthy defendants.

14. The CEO of a
corporate defendant
should be present at
trial.

15. A corporation

should be held to a
higher standard of
responsibility than an
individual.

16. Larger companies
should pay more than
smaller companies if

someone is injured by
their product.
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Appendix B
Case Summary from Study One
Based on the following evidence, your task

is to decide whether Pontack Motor

Corporation is liable for the death of Ronald Stevens caus a design defect existed in
his car. PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING CAREFULLY:
A product is defective when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could

have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the
seller or other distributor, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product

not reasonably safe.

On October 23, 2002, Ronald Stevens was driving his 2000 Pontack Seara family sedan
on an off-ramp of Interstate 101 in California. Witnesses stated that Stevens' car was
stopped at a red light for approximately two minutes when a fire erupted from under the

hood when the vehicle stopped. The fire quickly spread to the passenger compartment
and then the rear of the vehicle. Ronald Stevens was killed in the fire. His estate is suing
the manufacturer of the car, Pontack Motor Corporation.

The plaintiff presented the following evidence:
Carl Rung, a fire origin and cause expert specializing in vehicle fires, inspected the
remains of the Seara in order to determine the potential causes of the fire. Rung testified

that, in his opinion, the rubber fuel lines in the Seara were defective and ultimately
caused the fire. The fuel lines extend from the gas tank in the rear of the vehicle to the
engine compartment in the front of the car. Rung testified that the fuel lines in the Seara
were composed of flexible rubber, which tends to harden and crack over time. Cracks in
the rubber fuel lines allowed leakage of fuel and flammable vapors to build up in the

engine compartment. Rung testified that when the car is in motion, airflow serves to
ventilate and cool the engine compartment, such that flammable vapors do not collect
under the hood in sufficient quantities to pose a problem. However, when the car slows
down or stops, the air-cooling effect ceases, the flammable fuel vapors collect in the
engine compartment and may ignite in the presence on any spark. Rung also stated that

he had seen similar instances of vehicle fires caused by leaks in rubber fuel lines. Rung
explained that fuel lines made of high-grade metal such as high tensile stainless steel or
aluminum are more expensive than rubber fuel lines but are much less likely to
deteriorate over time or leak.

The plaintiff also produced Pontack documents describing the pre-sale design of the fuel
system in the Pontack Seara. From these documents, the plaintiff showed that Pontack

estimated that, if the company sold 250,000 cars per year with the rubber hose assembly,
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there could be up to approximately 20 fires per year due to fuel leaks, and that these fires
could result in 1 death per year. The company estimated that lawsuits and settlements
resulting from these fires would cost the company approximately 13.85 million dollars

($13,850,000) per year. Pontack used the values set by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration and calculated that the average lawsuit from a death would cost 3.5
million dollars ($3,500,000) and from each non-fatal fire would cost $550,000. Pontack
decided not to change its use of the rubber fuel lines before it placed the Seara on the

market.

The plaintiff also presented the testimony of expert economist Mark Dougherty regarding
compensatory and punitive damages. Dougherty testified that Stevens' annual income as

a neurosurgeon schoolteacher was $250,000 a year $50,000 a year. Given that Stevens
was expected to work for 20 more years, Dougherty testified that his family should

receive 5 million dollars ($5,000,000) 1 million dollars ($1,000,000) in lost earnings.
Dougherty also testified that any compensatory damages awarded should include $10,000
for funeral expenses, and that $1,000,000 was a common amount to award for the mental
and emotional pain and suffering as well as loss of consortium his family must face in his

absence. Thus, Dougherty claimed that at least 6 million dollars ($6,000,000) 2 million
dollars ($2,000,000) should be awarded to the estate of Ronald Stevens for compensatory
damages. Dougherty also stated that if the jury found the defendant's conduct

reprehensible enough to award Stevens' family punitive damages, then the jury should
consider the financial status of the corporation.
Dougherty said, "Pontack Motor Corporation is one of the largest smallest automotive
manufacturing corporations in the country, with branches in 40 states with branches in 4
states . Also, Pontack's annual net revenue is 500 million dollars per year 50 million
dollars per year. Both of these things should be kept in mind when determining the
amount of punitive damages necessary to properly punish Pontack and to deter them from
such misconduct in the future."

The defendant presented the following evidence:
Martin Stempler, the CEO of Pontack Motor Corporation an associate mechanical and
electrical engineer who works on the fuel systems for Pontack Motor Corporation,
testified that he disagreed with Rung's opinion that the rubber hose assembly caused the
fire. Stempler testified, based in part on the witness statements relating how the fire
progressed, that the source of the fire must have been a catastrophic release of fuel, and
that small cracks in the flexible rubber fuel line could not have been the source of fuel, in
the form of vapor or aerosol, that would permit the kind of fire that resulted. Based in

part on his inspection of the photographs of the remains of the fuel lines and witness
statements, he concluded that the rubber fuel lines did not crack because they were made
of rubber, but instead ruptured because of a clog caused by poor engine maintenance,
which is not the fault of Pontack.
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Stempler stated that failure to check and replace the fuel filters in a timely manner could
allow deposits to accumulate in the fuel lines, potentially clogging them and contributing
to a sudden rupture in the line. He also stated that he found a low-quality fuel in the
engine, below that which is recommended in the Owner's Manual, which allows more

deposits to form. Stempler also presented maintenance reports from the mechanic who

regularly worked on the Stevens' car. The reports showed that a maintenance check-up
was performed three months ago, without a filter replacement, and the mechanic reports

did not indicate any problems with the fuel lines. Stempler pointed out that fuel lines that
leak do so slowly and gradually, and there would have likely been indications of cracks
forming in the rubber lines that any mechanic would have seen.
Stempler also testified about a series of tests that the company does on the fuel systems in
its cars to test for leaks before any car is distributed. Stempler testified that Pontack
utilizes a ultra-violet leak detection system, which involves filling the rubber lines with a

chemical dye and then using ultraviolet light to detect if the tracer dye leaks through at
any point in the fuel lines. The company also submerges their rubber fuel lines in several
liquids of varying density (e.g., water, gasoline) and never found bubbles or other
indications of leakage in the rubber lines. Finally, the company tests the fuel lines by
filling them with Leak Detective, a product specifically designed to test for gas leaks, and
found no Leak Detective on the outside of the fuel lines. Still, Stempler conceded that,
over extended periods of time, normal deterioration of the rubber hose assembly could
potentially lead to fuel leaks, as described in the company's documents presented by the

plaintiff.
Before finishing his testimony, Stempler faced the family of Ronald Stevens and said, "I
am truly, deeply sorry for your loss. My heart goes out to you in this time of tragedy and
I offer my sincerest condolences regarding this unfortunate and terrible accident."

The plaintiff made the following arguments:
"Ladies and gentlemen, you must determine whether the design of Ronald Stevens' Seara
was defective. The expert testimony in this case and company documents have shown

that the flexible rubber fuel lines in the Pontack Seara is defective. A product is defective
when a reasonable alternative design is possible, the company does not adopt that design,
and thus the product is not reasonably safe. Here, Pontack knew of the ability to make the
fuel lines out of high grade metal, which would be safer and less likely to leak. The level
of risk that the company exposed customers to is not reasonable, and therefore the
product was defective and should not have been sold. In compensation of Ronald
Stevens' death, we ask for 6 million dollars ($6,000,000). In order to punish the company
for its outrageous behavior, we ask that you find them also liable for punitive damages in
the amount of 25 million dollars ($20,000,000) 10 million dollars ($10,000,000). This

figure should be made in light of the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the
company's financial situation."
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The defense made the following arguments:
"Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence in this case has not shown conclusively that the
rubber fuel lines in Ronald Stevens' car were defective. Reports from Stevens' mechanic
did not show any indication of leaks in the fuel lines. And witness statements regarding
how the fire progressed suggest a catastrophic release of fuel as the cause
of the fire,

which would not result from small leaks in the fuel lines as alleged by the plaintiff.

Moreover, normal deterioration of the fuel lines does not mean the car is defective.
Failure to properly maintain the car is the more likely cause of this tragic accident. Every
product brings with it some level of risk, which is normal and does not make the
company responsible. The safety tests conducted by Pontack demonstrated that the car
was safe, that the rubber fuel lines worked correctly and did not leak, and that Pontack
was not reckless in its conduct."

Please respond whether you agree or disagree with the following statements on
a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 represents that you "strongly disagree" with the
statement and 9 represents that you

"

strongly agree" with the statement.

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

7

8

9

1. The defendant
ignored a serious
problem associated
with its product.
2. The defendant's
actions anger me.

3. I feel sympathy for
the Pontack
Corporation.

4. I did not believe
Martin Stempler
because he works for
Pontack Corporation.
5. Pontack
Corporation is
concerned about the

safety of its cars.___

6. The defendant's
decisions were

immoral.
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The defense made the following arguments:
"Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence in this case has not shown conclusively that the
rubber fuel lines in Ronald Stevens' car were defective. Reports from Stevens' mechanic
did not show any indication of leaks in the fuel lines. And witness statements regarding

how the fire progressed suggest a catastrophic release of fuel as the cause
of the fire,
which would not result from small leaks in the fuel lines as alleged by the plaintiff.

Moreover, normal deterioration of the fuel lines does not mean the car is defective.
Failure to properly maintain the car is the more likely cause of this tragic accident. Every
product brings with it some level of risk, which is normal and does not make the
company responsible. The safety tests conducted by Pontack demonstrated that the car
was safe, that the rubber fuel lines worked correctly and did not leak, and that Pontack
was not reckless in its conduct."

Please respond whether you agree or disagree with the following statements on
a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 represents that you "strongly disagree" with the
statement and 9 represents that you

strongly agree" with the statement.

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. The defendant
ignored a serious
problem associated
with its product.
. The defendant's
actions anger me.

3. I feel sympathy for
the Pontack
Corporation.

4. I did not believe
Martin Stempler
because he works for
Pontack Corporation.

5. Pontack
Corporation is
concerned about the
safety of its cars.

6. The defendant's
decisions were
immoral.
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7. I feel sympathy for
Ronald Stevens.

the

8 The defendant
should be punished.

9. The defendant is a
large corporation.
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Appendix C
Original Instructions used in Study One

Please read the following instructions given by the judge very carefully:
The plaintiff alleges that (1) the defendant was negligent and (2) a design defect
exists in the defendant's product.

In a civil case such as this one, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish
his/her case by a preponderance of the evidence. When I say that the plaintiff has the
burden of proof, I mean that the evidence must satisfy you that the proposition on which

the plaintiff has the burden of proof has been established by evidence which outweighs
the evidence against it. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means proof that
something is more likely than not. It means that certain evidence, when compared to the
evidence opposed to it, has the more convincing force and makes you believe that
something is more likely true than not. If the plaintiff fails to meet his or her burden of
proof or if the evidence weighs so evenly that you are unable to say that there is a
preponderance on either side, you must resolve the question against the party who has the

burden of proof in favor of the opposing party.

. Negligence
The plaintiff claims that the Pontack Corporation was negligent in its design of
the Seara. Negligence is the lack of ordinary care; that is, the failure to do an act which a
reasonably careful and prudent person would do, or the doing of an act which a
reasonably careful and prudent person would not do, under the same or similar
circumstances to protect others from bodily injury. A manufacturer is negligent if it fails

to use a reasonable amount of care, skill and diligence in designing and supplying the
product that a reasonably careful manufacturer would use in similar circumstances to

avoid exposing others to a foreseeable risk of harm. In determining whether Pontack
Corporation used reasonable care, you should balance what Pontack knew or should have

known about the likelihood and severity of potential harm from the product against the
burden of taking safety measures to reduce or avoid the harm. A company must
reasonably anticipate the environment in which the product is normally used and must
design the product to minimize foreseeable risks of harm that may result from using the
product in such an environment.

Although a company has a duty to exercise reasonable care, the company is not
required to design a product that is foolproof or incapable of producing injury. To prove
that Pontack Corporation was negligent, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that Pontack failed to use reasonable care, skill, and diligence in designing
its product and that this breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.

166

II. Product Liability

-

Design Defect

The plaintiff also claims that the Seara was a defective product. A product is
defective when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design, and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. In this charge when I
refer to a reasonably safe product I mean a product that is reasonably fit, suitable and safe
for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses. The plaintiff must also prove that the
alleged design defect was the proximate cause of injury.
In proving a defect in the design of a product, the plaintiff need not prove that
Pontack knew that the accident in this case could happen as it did. Knowledge of the
dangers of the product is legally placed upon the manufacturer/seller. The question for
you to decide is whether, assuming the defendant knew the dangers of the product, it was
nevertheless reasonably careful in the manner in which it designed the Seara.
You are to decide whether the safety benefits from altering the design as proposed
by the plaintiff were greater than the resulting costs or disadvantages caused by the

proposed design, including any diminished usefulness or diminished safety. If the failure
to incorporate a practical and technically feasible safer alternative design made the Seara
not reasonably safe, then the product was designed in a defective manner. If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff has not proven there existed a practical and technically feasible safer
alternative, or if you find that the Seara as designed was reasonably safe, then the product
was not designed in a defective manner.

III. Damages-Compensatory
If you find in favor of the plaintiff, you should award as actual damages, insofar
as they have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence and insofar as they were
caused by the defendant's negligence, an amount which will reasonably compensate for
his/her injuries, past and future, that were proximately caused by the defendant's actions.
This compensation is called "compensatory damages." The amount of damages must
include an award for each item of harm that was caused by Pontack's wrongful conduct,
even if the particular harm could not have been anticipated. You must attempt to put the
plaintiff in the same position, as far as money can do it, that he/she would have been in
had the injury not occurred. There is often no mathematical formula in making this
determination. Instead, you must use human experience and apply sound common sense
in determining the amount of your verdict.
In a personal injury action, there are two general types of damages with which
you must be concerned: economic and noneconomic damages. Economic damages are
monies awarded as compensation for monetary losses and expenses which the plaintiff
has incurred, or is reasonably likely to incur in the future. Noneconomic damages are
monies awarded as compensation for non-monetary losses and injuries which the plaintiff
has suffered, or is reasonably likely to suffer in the future. They are awarded for such
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things as physical pain and suffering, mental and emotional pain and suffering, loss of
consortium, and a diminution of the ability to enjoy life's pleasures.

IV. Damages-Punitive
The plaintiff also seeks punitive (exemplary) damages, based on the defendant's
disregard of the risk associated with its product when the defendant designed the cars.
The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to punitive damages solely because you have
found that the defendant liable. However, if you do award the plaintiff actual
(compensatory) damages on the claims of negligence, then you should consider whether
punitive damages should be assessed against the defendant The purposes of punitive
damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff and to serve
as an example to others.

If you find that the injury complained of was attended by circumstances of malice,
then you may assess a reasonable sum as punitive damages. An act is maliciously done if
it is conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and knowing disregard
for the safety of others and the defendant's conduct was a gross deviation from the level
of care which an ordinary person would exert in the same or similar circumstances. A
person acts with knowing disregard when he or she is aware of the probable dangerous
consequences of his or her conduct and deliberately fails to avoid those consequences.

There is no fixed standard for determining the amount of punitive damages, and
you are not required to award any punitive damages. If you decide to award punitive
damages, you should consider the following in determining the amount: (1) The
reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant and (2) The amount of punitive damages
which will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in light of the defendant's financial
condition.

168

Appendix D
Revised Instructions used in Study Two

Please read the following judicial instructions very carefully:
The plaintiff claims that (1) the defendant was negligent and (2) a design defect

exists in the defendant's product.

In a civil case such as this one, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish
his/her case by a preponderance of the evidence. Proof by a preponderance of the
evidence means that something is more likely true than not. It means that certain

evidence is more convincing than other evidence and makes you believe that something
is more likely true than not. If the plaintiff fails to meet his/her burden of proof, or if the
evidence weighs evenly on both sides, your verdict must be in favor of the defendant.
.

Negligence

The plaintiff claims that the Pontack Corporation was negligent in its design of
the X5. Negligence is the lack of ordinary care; that is, failure to do something a
reasonably careful person would do, or doing something a reasonably careful would not
do under similar circumstances to protect others from bodily injury. A manufacturer is

negligent if it fails to use a reasonable amount of care, skill and diligence in designing
and supplying the product in order to avoid exposing others to a foreseeable risk of harm.
In determining whether Pontack Corporation used reasonable care, you should balance
what Pontack knew or should have known about potential harm from the product against
the safety measures taken by Pontack to reduce or avoid potential harm. A company must
anticipate the environment in which the product is normally used and must design the
product to minimize foreseeable risks of harm that could result from using the product in

such an environment.
Although a company has a duty to exercise reasonable care, the company is not

required to design a product that is foolproof or injury-proof. To prove that Pontack
Corporation was negligent, the plaintiff must show that it is more likely than not that
Pontack failed to use reasonable care, skill, and diligence in designing its product, which
played a large part in causing the plaintiffs injuries.
11.

Product Liability - Design Defect

The plaintiff also claims that the X5 was a defective product. A product is
defective when the potential risks of harm caused by the product could have been reduced
by using a reasonable alternative design. Failing to use the alternative design makes the
product not reasonably safe. A reasonably safe product is one that is reasonably suitable
and safe for its intended uses. Also, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged design defect
played a large part in causing the plaintiffs injuries.
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You must decide if the safety benefits from the alternative design proposed by the
plaintiff outweigh the costs or disadvantages caused by altering the design, including any
reduction in usefulness or safety. If the failure to use a practical and safer alternative
design made the X5 not reasonably safe, then the product was designed in a defective
manner. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff has not proven there existed a practical and
safer alternative, or if you find that the X5 as designed was reasonably safe, then the
product was not designed in a defective manner.

III. Damages-Compensatory
If you find in favor of the plaintiff on either claim of negligence or design defect,

you should award an amount for compensatory damages that will reasonably compensate
the plaintiff for his/her injuries and losses, both past and future, which were caused by the
defendant's actions. Therefore, you should only consider the plaintiffs injuries when
deciding compensatory damages. You must attempt to put the plaintiff in the same
position that he/she would have been in if the injury never occurred, as far as money can
do so. There is often no mathematical formula in making this determination. Instead, you
must use human experience and apply sound common sense in determining the amount

for compensatory damages.
In a personal injury action, there are two general types of compensatory damages:
economic and non-economic damages. Economic damages are monies awarded as
compensation for monetary losses and expenses that the plaintiff has incurred, or is likely
to incur in the future. Non-economic damages are monies awarded as compensation for
non-monetary losses and injuries that the plaintiff has suffered, or is likely to suffer in the
future. Such damages are awarded for such things as physical, mental, or emotional pain
and suffering, loss of companionship, and a lessening of the ability to enjoy life's

pleasures.

IV. Damages-Punitive
The plaintiff also seeks punitive damages, based on the claim that the defendant
ignored the risks associated with its product. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to
punitive damages just because you found the defendant negligent or liable. However, if
you do award the plaintiff compensatory damages, then you should consider whether or
not punitive damages should be assessed against the defendant. The purposes of punitive
damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff and to deter
the defendant and others from engaging in similar misconduct.
If you find that the defendant's conduct was malicious, then you may assess a

reasonable sum as punitive damages. An act is maliciously done if it is conducted with a
willful and knowing disregard for the safety of others and is a gross deviation from the
level of care an ordinary person would use in similar circumstances. A person acts with
knowing disregard when he/she is aware of the potentially dangerous consequences of
his/her conduct but fails to avoid those consequences.
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There is no fixed standard for determining the amount of punitive damages and
you are not required to award punitive damages. If you decide to award punitive
damages, you should consider the following in determining the amount: (1) The
malicious conduct of the defendant and (2) The defendant's financial condition so that
the punitive damages will have a deterrent effect on the defendant. Therefore, you should
only consider the defendant when determining punitive damages and not consider the

plaintiff.
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Appendix E
Instruction Comprehension Measure
Please answer the following questions about the decision you are about to make.

1. Who has the burden of proof in a civil case?
(a) The defendant

(b) The plaintiff

(c) The judge

(d) The jury

2. Suppose the jury is discussing the standard of proof in the civil case and juror # 2
wants to know what "proof by a preponderance of the evidence" means. You tell him:
(a) No doubt is left that the claims made by the plaintiff are true.

(b) No doubt is left that the claims made by the plaintiff are false.
(c) The claims made by the plaintiff are more likely true than not.

(d) None of the above.
3. What happens when the evidence weighs evenly on both sides?

(a) The plaintiff wins.
(b) The lawsuit is retried.
(c) The judge decides who wins.
(d) The defendant wins.
4. In this case, the plaintiff claims that the Pontack Seara was defectively designed.
According to the legal standard, a product is defective if:

(a)

The product is not reasonably safe.

(b)

The product is unreasonably dangerous.

(c)

The product does not perform as a reasonable consumer would expect.

(d)

The product caused any injury.

5. Assume the jury is considering the alleged design defect of the product. Juror #2 says
that any plaintiff injured by a product deserves to be awarded damages. How would you
respond:

(a) He's right and the defendant should pay compensatory damages.
(b) He's wrong because the law does not require the defendant to
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make a product that is never defective.
(c) He's right and the defendant should be ordered to pay punitive

damages.

(d) He's

wrong

injury.

because the plaintiff may have contributed to her

6. A company is not required to design a product that is foolproof or injury-proof.

(a) True

(b) False

7. Assume that the plaintiff proves that the defendant knew that his/her product was
potentially defective and capable of causing injuries. Which of the following is true:
(a) The defendant is automatically found to be at fault in causing the

plaintiff's injuries.
(b) The defendant must explain his/her conduct in distributing the
potentially defective product.
(c) The defendant must pay money to compensate the plaintiff for

his/her injuries.
(d) The plaintiff must still prove that the product defect played a large
role in causing his/her injuries.
8. In product liability cases, a plaintiff must prove that:

(a) There exists a design with less risk of harm.
(b) The safety benefits from a design change outweigh the resulting
costs of altering the design.
(c) Failing to use an alternative design renders the product unsafe.

(d) All of the above.
9. Suppose that your jury determines that the product was designed as reasonably safe.
The next step would be:
(a) conclude that the defendant's product was defective.

(b) determine if the defendant was negligent.
(c) assess the amount of punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff
(d) reject the claim that the defendant's product was defective.
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10. Assume that Juror #5 want to know how to award compensatory damages. You tell
her that the rule of compensatory damages is:
(a) to give whatever amount the plaintiff requests.
(b) that the amount should be based on all past and future injuries and
losses suffered by the plaintiffdue to the defendant's conduct.
(c) that the amount should be based on the defendant's wealth.
(d) that the judge will provide them with a reasonable figure that the
jury can adjust as they see fit.
11. A plaintiff is automatically entitled to punitive damages if the jury finds the defendant

liable.
(a) True

(b) False

12. One purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant. Another purpose of
punitive damages is to:

(a) Compensate the plaintifffor pain and suffering.
(b) Compensate the plaintiff for his/her medical bills and lawyer fees.
(c) Deter the defendant and others from engaging in misconduct in the
future.
(d) Bankrupt the defendant so s/he cannot engage in misconduct in the
future.

13. Suppose the jury is discussing the definition of malicious conduct. Juror #1 wants to
know what it means to act with "knowing disregard." You tell him it means that someone
acted:
(a) with awareness of the potentially harmful consequences but failed
to avoid them anyway.
(b) to intentionally misrepresent or conceal something.

(c) so despicably that such actions would sicken reasonable people.
(d) none of the above.

14. The jury should consider the financial condition of the defendant when deciding
punitive damages.
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(a) True

(b) False

15. How should you factor in the severity of the plaintiff s injuries when deciding
whether or not to award punitive damages?
(a) you should double the cost of the plaintiff's medical bills to
determine an amount.

(b) you should consider the plaintiff s pain and suffering that have
occurred or will occur as a result of the injury.
(c) you should not consider the plaintiff's injuries for punitive
damages.

(d) you should consider the effect of the plaintiff s injury on his/her
family.
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